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ABSTRACT
The thesis develops from the viewpoint that the most important structure in 
any Police Organisation is the local Police Station, directly providing a 
service to the public.
It proposes that effective and efficient policing o f this type is almost 
impossible without clear theories and definitions o f the police service. This 
must be followed by a clear analysis o f the method by which this policing 
can be achieved, leading to precisely defined systems o f policing. These 
systems must be designed to achieve measurable objectives within the total 
resources available.
Existing theories o f 'demand led' policing problems are then developed by the 
thesis into the concept o f an Extended Reactive Spiral. This involves public 
demands, the Police System and the external enviomment. The analysis 
concludes that to counter the majority o f  these problems a new police 
system must be designed. This system must develop and utilise voluntary 
public assistance as a major preventive resource. Prosocial public behaviour, 
in the form o f 'self policing' is required as a preventive community activity.
Three types o f police service are described in ascending levels o f  e ffec tiv e­
ness against the problems o f  the Extended Reactive Spiral. A new 3RD 
LEVEL or Geographic policing system is developed in detail and tested in a 
case study at Brixton Police Station between 1983 and 1986.
It is concluded that there was significant evidence supporting the e ffec tiv e­
ness o f police officers influencing public demands in hostile, high demand 
areas. In addition, evidence suggests that the type o f police behaviour 
required for this e ffe c t  is directly influenced by the design and processes o f  
the police system involved.
CHAPTER ONE
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS
1. 1. BACKGROUND
The research for the theoretical foundations o f this thesis began in 
1979 as undergraduate projects, which resulted in two separate yet 
compatible reviews o f modern policing theory and methods 
(BECKETT 1981, HART 1981). These two projects were then 
combined into a Joint overview o f urban policing problems, together 
with a number o f detailed proposals for the development o f future 
policing systems in democratic societies (BECKETT and HART 1982).
In 1982 a Joint Metropolitan Police and Surrey Constabulary research 
project was formed called 'Neighbourtiood Policing'. This project 
was directly ■ based on the original research o f BECKETT and HART 
and was intended to evaluate the practical results o f the proposed 
development for policing systems. In 1985, the basic theoretical 
framework and organisational police system developed by this 
research was adopted by the Metropolitan Police for incremental 
forcewide implementation over a number o f years. The Surrey 
Constabulary began forcewide implementation in 1987 a fter  their 
analysis o f the research project.
This thesis deals with a small part o f the total research project. It 
concentrates on the planning, implementation, monitoring and 
maintenance o f everyday policing activities at individual police 
stations. The thesis is deliberately biased towards a bottom up 
approach, in the analysis, planning and research. It was considered 
that this type o f  approach and area o f  research had been neglected 
in previous work and that when combined with existing 'top down' 
projects a more balanced perspective would emerge.
I .  2. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
There were three major objectives in the research described. Each 
objective was linked to the previous objectives, using the knowledge 
gained as a foundation for developing the next level o f research;-
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(0 The validation o f  the e ffec ts  on police demands caused by the 
REACTIVE SPIRAL (HART 1981).
(ii) To develop and obtain evidence in support o f an EXTENDED 
REACTIVE SPIRAL, which involved specific elements within the 
Environment and the Police System.
(Hi) To develop and test an operational, planning and management 
Police System appropriate for the specific environment and 
public demands for policing services.
Eventually it is hoped to produce an 'Expert' system capable o f 
substantially reducing the number o f errors made in everyday 
policing activities. But at the present time, given the very limited 
amount o f  valid and reliable research evidence, the best that can be 
developed are practical guidelines and a planning framework which 
indicates the most appropriate type o f 'Police System' suited to the 
particular problems o f each police station.
However, it is intended by this thesis to develop a valid, if basic, 
operational system which assists police managers in both the short 
and long term to develop the efficiency and effectiveness o f  policing 
for the defined geographical area covered by their police station.
3. ORGANISATION OF THESIS
Chapter Two describes the problems o f policing, particularly within 
the External Environment, the broad organisation o f  Police Forces 
and the specific delivery o f police services by the local Police 
Station. In addition, the Reactive Spiral is developed, using these 
data, into the Extended Reactive Spiral. This new Spiral includes 
the Environment and the Police System in its analysis o f  the 
problem situation.
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Chapter Three provides a theoretical overview o f specific policing 
theories and introduces the concept o f  Policing Behaviour as Helping 
or Prosocial behaviour. Proposals are then made as to how three 
LEVELS o f Policing Systems could be implemented and measured. It 
is suggested that areas with high demands for police services and 
the highest Potential for increasing demands, required a 3RD LEVEL 
or Geographical Policing Systems. Only this System, it is argued, 
has the potential to a ffec t  the processes o f the Reactive Spiral, by 
involving the public in everyday policing activities.
Chapter Four is the Pre Test analysis o f Brixton Police Station, 
chosen as the case study for the thesis. This analysis concludes 
that both the environment and the existing police system were in 
decay. Significant evidence for the e ffec ts  o f  the Reactive Spiral is 
described, as is the inability o f  the existing police system to a ffec t  
its processes. Evidence for the existence o f  an Extended Reactive 
Spiral is also described.
Chapter Five lists the structure for a Geographical or 3RD LEVEL 
policing system, implemented at Brixton a fter  the Pre-Test analysis. 
The goals and objectives o f this system are explained, together with 
a description o f the organisational elements, functions and processes 
required to achieve them.
Chapter Six notes the absence o f  a planning strategy and evaluation 
framework for operational policing at the 'point o f service' to the 
public. Linked to the Geographical Policing System, an optimal 
behavioural sequence for this service is proposed. Stragegy and 
tactics o f  the street operations within the system are also co­
ordinated within a descriptive framework. The overall process has 
been called Directed Patrolling.
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Chapter Seven is the Post-Test analysis o f Brixton Police Station 
after a three year implementation and development period. It 
proposes that a new Geographical policing system had been success­
fully achieved with distinct improvements to the police structure, 
organisation and behaviour. Unexpectedly there was also evidence o f  
beneficial changes in the external environment, particularly public 
behaviour. Evidence for the Reactive and Extended Reactive Spiral 
being a ffected  by these changes is also considered.
Chapter Eight discusses other evaluations o f the Project and relates 
them to this thesis. In addition, the Extended Reactive Spiral is 
considered in some detail, together with possible implications. A 
number o f options for future development are then discussed.
Chapter Nine considers the original thesis objectives and concludes 
that the existence o f the Reactive Spiral and Extended Spiral as 
powerful influences on policing have been supported by the evidence 
described. It also suggests that the development o f Policing 
LEVELS, together with their supporting frameworks have been 
validated. This particular achievement is suggested to be o f major 
importance and o f significant practical assistance to the development 
and effectiveness o f British Policing.
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CHAPTER TWO
2. THE ANALYSIS
2. 1. THE PROBLEM OF •POLICING•
'Policing' is the name given to a social system which exists in one 
form or another in all social groups and societies. Sometimes the 
system will be informal, imposed by peers and high status individuals 
in a group, providing a form o f 'self policing'. Alternatively, it can 
be a formal, organised and professional activity, restricted to certain 
members o f a society, such as police officers.
Exactly what 'policing' is and the methods by which it attains its 
objectives, forms a major part o f  this study, but for the moment it 
is sufficient to propose that 'policing' is a very complex and little 
understood social behaviour.
This complexity is illustrated by the question, what do police
officers actually do? Until 'policing behaviour’ can be classified or 
accurately described it is very difficult to decide on the best ways 
o f doing police work, or the types o f activities o f which police 
should do more or less. Even more importantly, if  the public are 
being required to 'self police', what exactly, in quantifiable
behavioural terms, does this mean?
These types o f  questions and lack o f  understanding were one o f the 
major reasons for the adoption o f 'systems' techniques and
methodologies in this particular study. A number o f different 
sciences and disciplines all have claim to knowledge about policing. 
Unfortunately, due to differing methods, concepts, rules for validity 
and reliability etc., it is very difficult to combine their knowledge 
into an effective interdisciplinary approach to the problems o f 
policing.
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However, the systems approach to analysis and problem solving 
appeared to o ffer  a solution to this dilemma (ACKOFF 1974). Once 
it is accepted that policing is an important social system which 
exists and interacts with numerous other social systems, then 
systems methodology allows a basic theoretical framework to be 
developed, acting as a co-ordinator and arbitrator o f all the various 
interdisciplinary data which can be input into the framework. Once 
this framework has been developed, the same methodology can assist 
in planning the future development o f  a policing system.
Like all human systems, policing has to be an Open System, 
interacting with a number o f other compatible social processes to 
produce a measurable output which can then be used to gauge if the 
goals o f the police system have been achieved.
It has always been very difficult to provide measures showing the 
'success' or 'failure' o f a particular policing strategy, or even 
general, everyday policing. Classified and reported crime figures are 
unfortunately still used almost exclusively as police performance 
measures, despite their well known inadequacy and openness to 
misleading interpretations.
When these types o f  performance measures are related to the lack 
o f evidence for direct police e ffec ts  on crime and the expectations 
o f the public, where up to 75% o f operational demands on police 
can be o f a service nature, then the severe limitations o f  crime 
performance measures become obvious.
It is suggested that a broader concept in police performance 
measures is required. Such a concept should include the wide range 
o f services and tasks which the police can reasonably be expected to 
achieve, within their statutory and practical limitations.
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However, before any such decisions can be made regarding 'success', 
we have to decide exactly what the goals o f a 'policing system' are, 
and for this we have to define the problems. The difficulties o f  
applying or finding a well supported theory o f policing have already 
been described, but what exactly are the practical, operational 
problems faced  by today's modem police services?
During the period 1980 to 1986 an in-depth analysis was undertaken 
o f two police services in a joint Metropolitan and Surrey 
Constabulary Project. This study was intended to introduce 
experimental policing systems to a number o f police stations and 
evaluate their effects. In order to achieve this type o f
implementation it was essential to analyse the overall police 
organisations and their workings at the Macro level as well as the 
detailed workings o f police stations at the Micro level.
From this extensive study, it is now possible to define with some 
accuracy a 'PROBLEM SITUATION' at the Macro or total 
organisational level and at the Micro, day-to-day police station level.
2 2. THE PROBLEM SITUATION
The study revealed that there are at least three broad areas o f 
problems faced by today’s police.
The first is the external environment, outside the police service, but 
an area in which police are expected to provide certain services and 
exert a level o f control or influence.
The second is the Macro, total police organisation, particularly the 
highest levels o f  planning, control and 'support' services provided by 
the Headquarters Departments, senior officers  and Force Policy.
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The third is the Micro, actual police station and its operational 
street officers who are the genuine 'front line' o f the total police 
service.
The first problem area that will be considered is the external 
environment at the Macro level.—
2 3 THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
2. 3.1 THE REACTIVE SPIRAL
The major problem o f present day policing system has been 
identified as the REACTIVE SPIRAL (HART 1981). This is 
where increasing demands for reactive police services on 
limited police resources effectively  reduce resources 
applied to preventive services. It has been discovered that 
in these types o f public service, reactive services in 
isolation have little preventive e ffe c t  on demands and 
eventually the whole police system decays into a pure 
reactive (fire brigade) service.
Without the restraint o f police preventive services, crime 
and conflict increase to unacceptable levels and the 
demands on police spiral out o f control.
In this context, crime is defined as; "Illegal criminal acts 
against individuals, groups or property".
Conflict is defined as; "Degrees o f alienation or hostility 
towards individuals or groups".
The fact that police services are perceived as 'free' (Le. no 
immediate cost when used) just enhances the speed o f 
police system decay. Interestingly, it has been found that 
improvements in the quality o f reactive services to the 
public
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can also increase the rate o f system decay, as more people 
are encouraged to use the improved service without cost to 
themselves. These particular processes are not unique to 
policing and can be found in other areas, particularly the 
Health Service.
REACTIVE SPIRAL
FIG. 2. 1
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This type o f police system decay, which was well supported 
by all the Project findings, is perceived by the public to 
have a major detrimental e ffec t  on their quality o f life. 
Although it has been found that other major processes and 
events in the environment, not under police influence, are 
also involved the public perceive the police as the major 
culprit for the decay. Effectively, this means that public 
satisfaction with police declines considerably as their needs 
and expectations are not fulfilled.
In isolation, police reactive services can never satisfy public 
needs and expectations. The public require problems to be 
anticipated and prevented wherever possible. Otherwise, 
their quality o f life is significantly reduced and they begin 
to perceive themselves as helpless against the forces in 
their environment (i.e. Learned Helplessness). Police also 
become ineffective; dealing only with incidents after the 
damage or injury has been caused and can also be a ffected  
by a form o f Learned Helplessness. i.e. unable to e ffec t  
change (SELIGMAN 1976).
In the face  o f such obvious police helplessness, the public 
begin to increasingly lose confidence in their own ability to 
a ffec t  the environment. They see themselves as totally 
helpless against the destructive crime and conflict 
influences around them. The public tend to become 
'externally directed' as opposed to 'internally directed', then 
the locus o f  control (LEFCART 1976) begins to change to 
the passive and accepting 'externally directed'.
This withdrawal and acceptance a ffec ts  public intervention 
in incidents and reduces levels o f pro-social behaviour 
(WISPE 1972) between individuals in the community (i.e. 
help each other).
nUnfortunately, helping others who are victims o f crime or 
conflict is now perceived as being dangerous and foolhardy. 
A 'seige mentality' begins to develop and there is a 
narrowing o f neighbourhood and territory down to the actual 
premises or even room occupied by each individual.
THE EHYIBOHMENTAL S P I R A L
IUNIE0 TO THE REACTIVE SPIRAL I
Fig. 2, 2.
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Against this background o f reducing public satisfaction and 
withdrawal from public activities there may well be rising 
hostility against the police by the public, due to their 
inability to solve the problem o f rising crime and conflict. 
On the streets there will now be virtually no public 
restraints against crime and conflict behaviour. Demands 
for police reactive services will spiral far above those that 
can be dealt with effectively  by available resources. This 
process is illustrated in Fig. 2.2. and identified as the 
ENVIRON MENTAL SPIRAL. The diagram illustrates some 
o f its interactions with the REACTIVE SPIRAL.
Historically, there have been three public reactions to this 
situation:-
(i) Apathy and acceptance o f random crime and 
conflict.
(ii) Formation o f vigilante groups to fight back.
(iii) Be taken over by organised crime groups or gangs 
who organise the crime and conflict for profit.
2. 3.3. ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL
In addition to the Macro problems described above, there 
are numerous processes which require to be understood in 
each small geographical area serviced by a police station at 
Micro lev el It is therefore necessary to evaluate the 
Environmental Potential o f each distinctive area.
In essence this means, is the area being policed one which 
supports and encourages crime and conflict? There is 
increasing evidence that the physical structure o f  an area
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and the people in it have more influence over the public's 
quality o f life, than police can ever have. High density 
public housing estates and the e ffec ts  o f organised drug 
crime in symbolic locations are examples o f these 
influences.
Each district, neighbourhood or identifiable geographical 
location within a police station area has to be carefully 
evaluated for its potential regarding the expansion or 
growth o f crime and conflict in three major dimensions:-
1. Physical; structures in the environment which 
reduce or encourage crime and conflict.
2. Social and Cultural; demographic features o f 
the population and their cultural behaviour 
which a ffect crime and conflict.
3. Psychological; the attitudes and perceptions o f 
the people in the environment which influence 
changes in their behaviour towards crime and 
conflict such as their locus o f  control.
It is suggested that certain areas can be classified as 
HOSTILE, with a high potential for crime and conflict, 
when contrasted with more stable SUPPORTIVE areas.
The diagram Fig.2.3 illustrates this concept, where 
'potential' rises as public hostility to police rise. In 
practical terms this can be calculated by a number o f 
measures at the extremes o f  HOSTILE and SUPPORTIVE.
Areas classified as HOSTILE are identified by high levels o f 
street crime and violence, particularly against police or 
other figures o f authority. SUPPORTIVE areas are active 
in their liaison with police, particularly in their 
implementation o f Neighbourhood Watch and other self help 
schemes. Street crimes will also be proportionately lower.
14 -
ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL
FIG. 2. 3.
2. 4. THE MACRO: POLICE ORGANISATION
The Police Service as a whole has to be organised to deliver 
services and influence these types o f environment, otherwise 
individual successes and efforts by small parts o f the organisation 
will be completely ineffective.
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In the Project, the organisational analysis at the Macro level was 
divided into three areas o f major importance; the organisational 
structure, demands and resources, both linked by the third area o f 
information systems.
2. 4.1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE.
The Police have traditionally, since their creation, been 
organised as a simple bureaucratic, hierarchical and 
autocratic structure. They have limited, time consuming, 
rigid work practices and procedures, responding slowly, if at 
all, to external and internal feedback regarding problems 
and difficulties.
It would be fair to say that it usually requires a major 
governmental investigation or legislation (i.e. The Scarman 
Enquiry 1981 and The Police and Criminal Evidence Bill 
1986) before significant changes take place. In short, the 
structure is very close to a classical, rigid, Closed System.
This anomaly, when viewed against the stated requirement 
for an Open System structure, is probably due in part to 
the simplistic and almost universal view o f  policing, as a 
relatively straightforward law enforcement type task. The 
Project data indicated that not only was this view held 
outside the Police Service but was also held by a large 
majority o f  serving police officers, including those at senior 
rank.
It is suggested that in reality, 'policing1 is a very complex 
and uncertain activity with no clearly agreed goals or 
priorities. This study considers that policing is one o f  the 
most complex and demanding tasks that exists today, 
particularly when viewed at the overall planning and policy 
levels.
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With such a simple, closed, hierarchical organisational 
structure it is essential that all levels, particularly the first 
operational street level, are under strict control and behave 
exactly as prescribed, otherwise the whole structure 
becomes unstable and decays.
Unfortunately, evidence gathered by the Project clearly 
indicated that even immediate supervisors o f patrolling 
Constables were unable to control, monitor or evaluate 
workload and work activities o f individuals or large groups.
Clearly the existing Police Organisational Structure was 
unsuited to the reality o f providing police services to a 
complex, changing and fast moving external environment.
The structure o f an organisation has to be very closely 
linked into its goals and priorities. Traditionally, police 
forces have stated their major goal as prevention. In 
e ffec t  they are organised with a strong reactive bias, 
responding to events after they have occurred.
Eventually this type o f bias has been shown to reduce the 
Police Service to one o f fast response and recording o f  the 
incident with little, if any, other type o f police service 
provided.
Another phenomenon o f the police organisation is the rapid 
development o f Functional teams or squads. Once again 
this is influenced by the simplistic perception o f policing 
tasks. It is also true that teams with a single narrow 
objective (i.e. Drugs, Robberies etc.) can in the short term 
produce evidence o f 'success'. However, it has also been 
found that this type o f success is very questionable in the
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long term and difficult to maintain; it also ignores the 
interrelated nature o f events in the environment and may 
produce unintended, even more detrimental side e ffec ts  in 
other areas o f policing (e.g. Prohibition in the United 
States).
Inevitably, this increasing specialisation o f functions 
strengthens the existing bias o f decision making towards 
centralisation, taking more and more authority away from 
Police Stations and their operational commanders. In turn 
this strengthens the power o f Functional Teams and their 
authority to create even more Functional Teams.
Unfortunately, due to the Closed Organisational Structure, 
the priorities o f these teams and even the functions 
selected as priorities are internal police perceptions and not 
necessarily those causing most concern to the public.
In summary, the police organisational structure is simplistic, 
rigid, closed, reactive, functionally orientated with 
increasing bias towards centralisation o f decision making.
2. 4.2 DEMANDS AND RESOURCES
Before an organisation like the police can decide exactly 
how to deploy and invest its resources, it must be 
understood that a large number o f  these decisions have 
already been made outside the police organisation.
First, changes in officers conditions o f work, hours o f work, 
recompense for overtime etc., have all effectively  reduced 
the number o f man hours available to the service, and 
continue to do so.
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Next, legislation prescribing the employment and deployment 
o f officers, such as Custody Sergeants in the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Bill 1986, effectively  introduce restraints 
on deployment. Often these impositions will be 
implemented without effective consultation o f  any kind. A 
basic finding was that all new legislation costs extra 
resources to implement and maintain, thus removing more 
and more decision making about resources from the public 
service.
In addition, the Home Office will directly  impose new 
functional requirements on police forces in a similar 
manner, i.e. Royalty and Diplomatic Protection, Jury 
Protection, Joint Drug Squads etc.
It is also apparent that although new external resource 
demands will continue to be imposed, additional resources 
currently being provided to the police will not be sufficient 
even to keep pace with resource deductions caused by 
improvements in conditions of work.
Eventually, the police service will be le ft with a number o f 
resources to deploy independently. The deployment o f these 
resources will be significantly influenced by the structure 
and priorities o f the organisation as previously described. It 
was found that, in reality, the priorities for allocation were 
as follows:-
(1) The centralised authority structures and
administration (Headquarters Departments).
(2) Functional Teams and Squads (Central then 
Divisional).
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(3) General Administration o f Police Stations.
(4) Police Reactive services at Police Stations.
(5) Preventive Police Services.
The results o f these types o f resource priorities were found 
to effectively  feed  the reactive spiral and increase the 
decay e ffec t  on police services and organisational structure.
It is important to understand in this analysis that police are 
in e ffec t  at the bottom o f any environmental sequence o f 
events and are directly a ffected  by almost every problem in 
the environment or a community. Any reduction o f service 
by other bodies such as Social Services, National/Mental 
Health Services etc., which cause problems in the 
environment, will eventually involve police and subsequently 
increase demands on the police service.
As an example o f this process, the poorer, more deprived 
and alienated a particular area is reduced to, the greater 
will be the initial demands on police. Unhappily, a 
reduction in demands on police by one o f these types o f 
areas may be achieved by it reaching one o f the almost 
irreversible conditions previously described as, apathy, 
vigilantes or organised crime.
It is suggested however, that the cost o f regaining one o f 
these areas or policing the ensuing riot far exceeds the 
estimated costs o f adequate initial public resources.
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In summary, police resources are actually significantly less 
than would appear from basic assumptions on force  
manpower levels and even the deployment o f residual 
manpower and resources after abstraction would appear 
inappropriate to reduce the e ffec t  o f the Reactive Spiral on 
police services.
2. 4.3 INFORMATION SYSTEM
In 1980 when the project first began to analyse the 
effectiveness o f police information systems, it found that 
efficient information systems, o f any kind, were virtually 
non-existent within the police system, or between the police 
and public.
As a result, information that was available, tended to be 
treated as a scarce commodity and the personal property o f 
the individual or small group. This information would not 
be divulged or shared with other police officers.
Centrally, in the Headquarters Departments there was some 
research evidence available about policing methods and 
processes. This had been obtained by in-house research or 
by Home Office Departments. Unfortunately, this type o f 
data existed as isolated sets o f facts, not linked to other 
research and not stored in an easily accessible data bank, 
which limited its operational credibility to police officers.
Many officers, including senior officers, reacted to this 
overall situation by developing a strong cultural resistance 
to using data or information for decision or planning 
purposes, even when it was available. Consequently, policy 
decisions were being made at the highest levels with scant 
regard for  relevant data or research findings in that area.
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In summary, the police organisation was unable to analyse 
its own problems, identify exactly how its resources were 
being deployed, or i f  they were successful. Even if  it 
became aware o f problems, the organisation was very 
unlikely to use any kind o f significant data to plan 
solutions.
The deficiency o f the police information systems was 
considered to be a major contribution to all o f the problems 
described in this study.
2. 5. THE MICRO: POLICE STATION
The project considered that the individual police station was the 
most important, fundamental unit o f  organisational structure in the 
whole policing system. Therefore, any major faults or problems in 
the police station system would directly a ffe c t  the police service 
provided to the public.
Analysis at this Micro level was again divided into the three areas 
o f major importance; the organisational structure, demands and 
resources, both linked by the third area o f  information systems.
2. 5.1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
Police Stations are the first major level o f  the police 
system. They act as service centres for a defined 
geographical area. The environment they are designed to 
service is always biased towards instability, depending on 
the police as a m apr stabilising and regulating influence.
It was accepted that this police influence was a complex, 
varied requirement, with conflicting priorities and demands 
generated by the environment. The structure and
organisation o f each police station was found to be the 
m apr influence on police effectiveness.
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Experience and data in other service organisations, public 
and commercial, have indicated that service provision in 
complex environments are most effectively  provided by 
'organic' type o f organisational structures (BURNS AND 
STALKER 1976). The more unstable the environment, the 
more stable and skilled the police organisation has to be. 
Geographically based, stable teams with a mixture o f 
specialists and generalists, high autonomy at low levels, 
clear policy objectives and agreed best operating practices, 
would appear to be the minimum requirements for effective  
service provision. In e ffec t, an open system is required 
(KATZ and KAHN 1978).
The worst type o f performance appear to be provided by 
bureaucratic systems with high levels o f  functional divisions, 
rigid operating practices allowing little autonomy, low levels 
o f individual skills and a high turnover o f  staff.
However, what was actually found at police stations can 
perhaps best be described as 'bureaucratic anarchy'. The 
police stations were clearly planned and organised as 
traditional bureaucracies, with a large number o f functional 
splits in almost every aspect o f  the police organisation. 
Decisions and policy were always vested to the highest rank 
possible, who would then lay down precise instructions and 
directions for every eventuality. In order to ensure these 
directions were followed, the highest levels o f  individual 
behaviour were prescribed, supported by a rigid discipline 
code, enforcing supervisors and a painstaking complaint 
investigation system. However, in e ffec t, none o f this 
structure was able to influence the actual working practices 
o f  the police station.
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In addition, perhaps due to the complexity o f the police 
task and its existing bias towards narrow functional 
discussions in the organisation, almost every new problem 
would be answered by even more functional splits and 
reorganisation. In e ffec t, functional division and 
specialisation had become a cultural norm. Virtually the 
only method o f responding to any problem, internal or 
external, was by designating a special team or 'squad' to 
become responsible.
An example o f this procedure is the division o f functions 
between the C.I.D. and the Uniform Branch. Both sections 
maintained the planned division with tenacity and then 
further sub-divided internally. In the C.I.D. work tended to 
be split into various categories such as robbery, burglary 
and murder squads, all tending to exist in isolation. 
However, these officers were not as isolated as uniform 
officers on different shifts or reliefs. The most extreme 
example o f  isolation was between those uniform officers  
providing response policing and those specialising as Home 
Beat or Community Officers.
Virtually the only section o f the police station that was 
forced to retain a generalist approach, consisted o f  uniform 
street patrol officers who provided the first response to all 
public requests for police assistance. It was clear that this 
particular area o f policing was the most difficult and 
dangerous, requiring a high level o f skill and ability.
Unfortunately these officers were invariably the newest, 
least skilled and experienced; the most skilled and
experienced having been transferred to specialist functions. 
Up to 35% o f a police station's total personnel could be 
changed in a twelve month period with the majority o f this 
change taking place amongst the uniform street patrol 
officers. Supervisors, from
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Inspectors and above, were often subjected to even higher 
levels o f turnover with over 50% changes being recorded in 
a number o f years.
Up to this point, the organisation had maintained its 
planned bureaucratic structure, perhaps encouraging 
functional divisions to an unusual degree, but still 
recognisable as a traditional bureaucracy.
It is important that any organisational structure, particularly 
a bureaucracy with its internal rigidity, should clearly 
understand its tasks and objectives otherwise it will be 
impossible to deliver an effective service. An analysis o f 
the actual work and demands on the police station, revealed 
that an average 75% - 85% o f police work was o f a non­
crime service nature.
However, the majority o f  the functional divisions inside the 
police stations were crime related, these had the highest 
status and most skilled personnel. In addition, the 
organisational rewards and the training provided by the 
police were strongly biased towards crime and law 
enforcement, geared towards the provision o f response 
service and reaction to crimes a fter they had occurred. 
There was a low priority and few resources to reduce or 
prevent reactive demands, or improve police services in the 
majority o f service demands. Those types o f  demands were 
considered a burden and a nuisance; 'real police work' was 
law enforcement.
In e ffec t, the police station dedicated the majority o f their 
resources and were biased functionally and culturally 
towards tasks that were less than 25% o f its total demands.
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The next problem discovered was the planned bureaucratic 
and management control o f  the police station. On careful 
analysis, it was found that whilst the illusion o f the 
organisation and management control was maintained as an 
outward facade by all o f the people working at the police 
station, the day to day working practices were very 
different.
Although supervision and control at the various levels o f all 
the separate functions was planned to be very tight this 
was, in reality, almost impossible. The very nature o f  
policing where officers operate as virtually independent 
groups or individuals outside the police station, without 
performance measures or planned workloads, results in no 
effective supervision for even the most Junior or inefficient 
officers.
Prescribed work practices were cumbersome and usually 
inappropriate or unnecessary in police work, where simple 
procedures and high levels o f personal skill were required. 
As a result rules had to be ignored or adapted in order to 
cope with the peak time demands on each officer. The 
police station administration systems were so inefficient 
that once an incident required further action the work 
generated was out o f all proportion to the original incident. 
Often the majority o f  this work and inconvenience would 
fall on the o fficer  who first reported or dealt with the 
demand. Therefore, the majority o f  demands had to be 
dealt with and finished by the initial officer, at the scene 
o f an incident, within a very short time period, ignoring 
further actions and tasks laid down as being required.
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Supervisors understood this problem and accepted short cuts 
and lack o f compliance until a problem arose. In these 
circumstances officers were investigated, reported and 
disciplined for non-compliance. These practices introduced 
dual standards o f 'do it but don't get caught' which were 
accepted and even encouraged by supervisory officers. It 
must be emphasised that this non-compliance was in relation 
to instructions that were clearly inappropriate and, in 
practice, not possible to maintain.
These practices further reduced the effectiveness o f 
supervisors and managers, even when they were present and 
able to exert direct control. Supervisors became reliant on 
the good will and agreement o f the officers in their charge, 
with regard to the priorities and manner in which each 
functional team would work.
In reality, these conditions allowed no effective control or 
supervision to take place, allowing individuals or groups o f 
officers to apply their own interpretation o f  control or local 
instructions, or even decide to ignore them completely, with 
little chance o f detection.
Although the potential for corruption and serious misconduct 
was very high, little or no evidence was discovered. 
Despite the inappropriate organisational structure and 
ineffective organisational system, evidence o f  officers  
motivation and dedication to be good police officers and 
serve the public was overwhelming (DAVIS 1985). However, 
due to the narrow functional divisions and preference for  
law enforcement, o fficers at a police station inevitably 
changed and frustrated any concerted long term policing 
strategy directed at anything other than simple law 
enforcement.
-  2 7  -
In e ffec t the organisational structure at a police station 
actually operated closer to anarchy rather than the 
bureaucratic system it was supposed to be. Before any 
alternative policing objectives or methods could be 
introduced, it was clear that a radically different
organisational structure would have to be implemented that 
made policing into an open system rather than a closed, 
bureaucratic type structure.
2. 5.2. RESOURCES
There are three major types o f  resources available to a 
police station. The first two are tangible, relatively easy 
to measure and utilise, but do not have the growth 
potential o f the third, less tangible resource.
2. 5.2.1 Physical Resources
The first tangible resources are the buildings 
or accommodation available at the police 
station and the equipment provided to the
station and the individuals who deliver the
police service.
Many o f the police stations were found to be 
old, in dilapidated condition, with very limited 
facilities. They were totally inadequate to 
deal with the public coming to the police 
station and to service the police officers or 
civilians based at each station. Little 
investigation had been made into the facilities 
required and the best methods o f  co-ordinating 
these requirements. 'Improvements' were 
invariably added ad hoc and at the expense o f 
some other vital facility.
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Police stations constructed prior to the 1950s 
were always totally inadequate, too small, 
overcrowded and noisy leading to very stressful 
working conditions as they were swamped by 
the volume o f work they were expected to 
carry out. Newer police stations had better 
facilities, but were still usually insufficient and 
were not designed to provide the best service 
to the public or sufficient resources for 
officers at the station.
In summary, no police station examined by the 
project could be considered adequate to deliver 
a police service, even in the best possible 
conditions; All were completely overwhelmed
by the volume o f  use they were subjected to.
Other equipment, such as cars, radios etc., 
were a mixture o f the best and the worst, but 
almost always in the wrong quantities and in 
the wrong places. Some equipment was o f a 
very high standard, but totally inadequate for  
the volume o f work. Other equipment although 
plentiful, was completely inappropriate for the 
type o f work involved and either could not be 
used or spent most o f its time being 
maintained.
Basically, the police stations were found to be 
low technology structures, dependent on people 
and manual systems in almost every aspect o f 
their work. There had been little effective  
investment in suitable available technology,
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which could have significantly improved 
working conditions and effectiveness. In 
support o f this finding it has been established 
that on average over 85% o f total police 
expenditure is on wages. The remaining 15% 
includes all new equipment, property and 
maintenance o f existing equipment resources. 
In addition inefficient administration systems 
were once
again responsible for inefficient distribution, 
uses and maintenance o f all equipment. There 
was almost no effective resource planning and 
evaluation for those types o f resources.
2 5.2.2. Human Resources
The next major tangible resource, as illustrated 
above, were the human resources o f the 
people, police and civilian support staff, based 
at the police station. These type o f human 
resources can be examined in two ways, the 
total number o f people available and the 
average quality or effectiveness o f  each 
individual in that total.
At the time o f  the analysis there was no 
accepted manpower formula for estimating the 
total manpower required by each police station, 
or even the requirements for each type o f 
individual police service. Due to the
organisational bias towards functional 
specialisation and the cultural bias towards law
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enforcement, manpower was not distributed 
according to actual demands. The first line o f 
police response service was always the least 
important and most depleted o f manpower. 
The result in a small proportion o f  uniform 
officers actually available for uniform street 
patrol duties.
In contrast, squads and teams were better
resourced, but unable to deal with the reactive 
demand for their services. These demands 
were completely unhindered by a kind o f 
preventive police resources at the operational 
street level and grew exactly as described by 
the Reactive Spiral, strongly supporting the 
original hypothesis.
When the total police station manpower was 
compared to the total station demands, a
different picture emerged. Stations which 
could be considered to have low or medium 
levels o f demands, often had sufficient 
resources. Had they deployed within a
different structure, they could have met
demands and invested in preventive strategies. 
I f  inefficient administration systems were 
improved as well, demands could have been
managed by the available human resources.
However, stations which had high levels o f
demands, often inner city areas, were well
below the minimum manpower required to deal 
with the demands. These calculations were
based on a formula developed and verified for
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this project. Unfortunately, it has long been 
known that inner city deprived areas are the 
areas that are most dependent on police 
services; failure o f  police service often
contribute to the most serious consequences for  
that area and surrounding areas. Riots are 
only one o f the most obvious examples o f 
those consequences.
Although these facts were uncovered by the 
analyses, the perception o f  every police o fficer  
interviewed at every police stations, regardless 
o f whether it was a high or low demand 
station, was that nothing could be achieved 
until more manpower was provided. Once 
again lack o f factual information had 
facilitated another cultural belief that was not 
always correct.
It was also found that once manpower had 
been allocated it was deployed in relation to 
administrative convenience or habit. Little or 
no attempt was made to match the levels o f 
resource each day to the peaks and troughs o f 
demands. Internal working practices and 
culture strongly resisted variations from  
established shift times, or working at an 
earlier or later time than their team or shift 
colleagues. This resulted in roughly the same 
low number o f  officers being on duty at all 
periods o f the working day, regardless o f 
variations in demands.
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Without doubt, the narrowjtmctional structure 
and the cultural b ja s io f the police personnel 
influenced^tft&Tr quality and effectiveness. 
Attempts to maintain a rigid, rank obsessed, 
bureaucracy considerably reduced the potential 
o f the lowest ranks who could always find 
refuge in the) rules when questioned regarding 
their inactivity. Analysis o f these officers' 
working days revealed that a majority had 
considerable periods o f time in which no useful 
activity or achievement could be discovered.
Many organisations rely on training to enhance 
and develop the potential o f their workforce. 
However, despite an extensive and expensive 
commitment to training, with training 
abstractions sometimes as high as 20%, training 
was not directed at this objective. The 
majority o f training was information based on 
law enforcement and internal procedures, with 
a small amount o f skills training and almost no 
personal development or interpersonal training. 
It must be remembered at this point that 
policing is very much a people service, using 
people to provide a service to people. But no 
effective training supported this reality until 
a fter the Scarman Enquiry in 1982.
Eventually, all o f these pressures, 
organisational and environmental, resulted in a 
reasonably predictable average police officer's 
profile, which was analysed as follows.
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Individual officers used a small number o f 
constructs (KELLY 1955) to evaluate a variety 
o f situations and make decisions on their 
actions. Most o f these constructs were 
based on law enforcement and control (CEMAL 
1986). Situations outside these constructs were 
to be avoided until control was possible. 
There was a bias towards group consensus 
amongst fellow officers and group action, as 
opposed to individual interventions and 
responsibility.
The majority o f  officers, who worked within a 
time based structure o f response policing or 
specialist functions, were significantly biased 
towards short term, law enforcement solutions 
to the majority o f  problems. These officer's 
constructs emphasised quick results and 
tangible outcomes rather than long term 
solutions. They perceived the 'ideal' state as 
Law Enforcement, then peace keeping in a 
positive sense, with providing a non crime 
service as the lowest priority. Most
situations were evaluated in this way. Officers 
were also found to be rigid and resistant to 
change as a method o f dealing with stress and 
conflict in their work. Their actual observed 
behaviour on the street supported these 
findings.
A minority o f officers, such as Home Beat and 
Community Officers who worked within a 
geographical structure o f a beat with multiple
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objectives, were significantly different. 
Unlike their time based colleagues, they had 
wider construct systems, and an ability to 
consider long term strategies and non-law 
enforcement solutions. Once again these 
profiles were supported by their actual 
behaviour on the streets.
This finding helped to support the hypothesis 
that the organisational structure and 
reinforcement has one o f the greatest 
potentials for influencing behaviour changes in 
operational police officers.
All the officers at the police stations were 
found to be experiencing high levels o f stress. 
They attributed a major part o f this stress to 
the organisation. This was despite the more 
obvious dangers and difficulties in the external 
street environment. It was also discovered 
that police officers use 'sensation seeking. 
(ZUCKERMAN 1979) as a method o f relieving 
stress (GODDARD 1984). Police work by its 
very nature offers many opportunities for  
excitment and taking risks.
This type o f coping mechanism is particularly 
dangerous in a police service. Sensation 
seeking can manifest itself in driving un­
necessarily fast or dangerously to calls for  
police assistance. Other examples are where 
Police enjoy the physical sensation o f conflict 
and violence, therefore manipulating situations 
for  maximum excitement rather than calmness 
and conflict reduction.
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However, these findings must be balanced by 
other evidence. Independent studies (DAVIS 
1985) on the quality o f police manpower, 
consistently recognised its high quality and 
wasted potential. But these resources were 
not exploited by the organisation due to the 
absence o f e ffective resource planning within a 
long term preventive strategy.
2. 5.2.3. Public Resources
The third area o f  resources is one o f the most 
difficult to utilise, although possibly the one 
with the most potential. In essence it is the 
resource o f the public and all other agencies 
outside the police station.
For centuries 'policing' in Britain has remained 
the responsibility o f each individual citizen. 
All citizens have an obligation to obey the 
laws and to take action if they discover 
infringements by another citizen. Members o f 
the public even have limited powers o f 
arrest to assist and protect them in this 
function. This system o f policing has allowed 
a high level o f personal freedom and a 
measure o f group control over society's quality 
o f life, particularly the acceptable levels o f 
crime and conflict.
Within the past two hundred years modem  
Democratic Policing Systems, using professional 
police officers, have developed to enhance and 
maintain this ancient policing system 
(ALDERSON 1978).
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In Britain, professional Police Officers are 
answerable to the State and its laws, not the 
government in power if it attempts to make 
directions outside the existing laws o f the 
State. This contrasts with Continental systems 
o f policing, where police are direct agents o f 
the government in power. British police are 
only ordinary citizens with a small number o f 
additional powers, balanced by enhanced 
obligations to the state. The British public 
retains the obligation to 'police' themselves 
and assist professional police in their lawful 
duties.
This dependency on the public can be seen in 
most major crises, when the police will first 
call on public volunteers, such as Special 
Constables, to assist them in preference to 
obtaining the support o f the Armed Services. 
The office  o f Special Constable is in fact far  
older than that o f the modern professional 
Constable.
Leaving aside for a moment the political and 
philosophical aspects o f this concept o f 
policing, it is argued that in theory it has the 
potential for a superior human system. 
Concentrating on the design o f the system, it 
would appear that it is very economical and 
yet very effectiv e if maintained at a 
reasonable level o f efficiency.
The majority o f people in this human system 
identify with the individual personal goals 
involved and accept the obligations required.
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A very small number o f more powerful 
individuals assist the majority with the more 
difficult and skilful tasks involved, but the 
major part o f the routine work involved is 
accomplished by the majority outside this 
group. Even the additional powers o f the 
minority group are under majority control in 
the long term. Their consent is required for  
the maintenance, increase or reduction in the 
minority's enhanced power level.
This system is an open system allowing 
personal development and system growth 
assisted by appropriate positive and negative 
reinforcers. The system is also economical 
requiring a very small number o f professional 
individuals with moderate extra powers, but 
still capable o f attaining a high level o f 
achievement.
Other models o f policing are more closed, 
using a larger minority professional group who 
maintain extensive restrictions on individual 
behaviour. This group, usually a state police, 
act as direct agents o f the government in 
power and its personal interpretation o f the 
restrictions required. The minority control 
group require more extensive powers over the 
majority and are far less responsive to 
majority control. Positive reinforcement and 
development are restricted in this model which 
also requires increasing amounts o f negative 
restrictions and personnel to enforce them.
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The implications o f the open system o f policing 
for a police station are clear. Resource 
planning must recognise and include the public 
as a major resource in achieving police 
objectives. Without this recognition and actual 
involvement o f the public, there would never 
be sufficient police resources to cope with the 
total police task.
What was actually found was that the public, 
including supportive agencies and bodies were 
almost totally excluded from any real input 
into policing. Even the most obvious example 
o f voluntary public involvement, the Special 
Constables, were viewed with disdain and very 
effectively  excluded from any real involvement 
in work at the police station. Consequently, 
numbers were always low and there were 
consistent complaints from the police about the 
quality o f  those Special Constables who stayed.
It appeared that the police, over the years, 
had taken their role as professional police too 
literally. They had convinced themselves and 
the public, that anything involving crime or 
conflict was the sole responsibility o f the 
police. The public were only too willing to 
relinquish their own responsibility and 
increasingly complain about police inadequacy. 
The potential for growth o f  public demands on 
police in these circumstances was totally 
beyond existing or potential police resources. 
It was apparent that at the inner city police 
stations with the hi&iest demands, this process 
was well advanced.
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In summary, there was no resource planning or an 
understanding o f the requirements o f resource 
management at any o f  the police stations.
2.5.3. INFORMATION SYSTEM
Ideally, it would be expected that each police station would 
have developed effective information systems, however 
simple, in order to plan, manage and deliver a police 
service. The objective o f the information system should 
have been to provide the best possible level of service to 
the surrounding public.
As an example o f what was required, it would have been 
possible to have an operational and an administration 
system. Both systems could be linked with short term 
immediate functions and long term planning and predictive 
facilities.
However, this was not the case. Only one significant 
information system was identified, and this was a Collators' 
system for gathering information about criminal suspects. 
At some stations, this system was excellent and also 
provided some local crime intelligence for the use o f  
operational officers.
Unfortunately the system existed and operated in almost 
total isolation from the resource deployment and 
management o f the station, even in its reduced day to day 
operation.
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Other than this particular system nothing else existed. 
There was no structure for collating information, analysing 
or disseminating it; no resources allocated to information 
systems, no technical equipment or manual methods o f co­
ordinated information collection. When information was 
required, it was usually for  an urgent immediate task for  
which special manual collection had to be arranged. In 
some cases information or a 'return' was regularly provided 
to a single functional branch or department. However, this 
information would be exclusive to that specialist Branch, 
not shared with other functions and probably not utilised 
effectively, if  at all, by the Branch concerned.
This failure and lack o f a vital organisational structure, had 
already been recognised by central research branches. 
These branches were planning and implementing a new co­
ordinated, manual data collection system on manpower and 
deployment at police stations, which was to be collated by 
central computer systems. However, due to organisational 
structure, norms and culture these efforts were not viewed 
as important by police stations and none planned to use the 
data produced.
The lack o f  co-ordinated, effective information systems was 
identified by the analysis as one o f the fundamental 
problems at police stations. People working at a station 
had no accurate data on what was really happening. Data 
that was available only related to narrow functions or areas 
in very limited time space.
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This deficiency was replaced by an over reliance on 
perception. The higher the rank, the more influential these 
perceptions were. Strategy and policy were then decided, 
almost completely unchallenged by facts.
Without accurate, co-ordinated information systems, 
strategies to combat problems were not possible.
Therefore, improved theories o f policing were o f little 
practical use. The only remaining option was day to day 
response to whatever happened. Unfortunately, even the 
data to organise this type o f police service was not 
sufficient. This situation contributed to a slow but steady 
decline in the police service, assisted by the occasional 
spectacular failure when everything went wrong
simultaneously.
2. 6. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined in some depth a multitude o f problems 
which surround the provision o f an effective and efficient police 
service. Perhaps a more concise summary can be made by develop­
ing an extended Reactive Spiral (Fig. 2. 4). The new Spiral includes 
the additional elements identified in the analysis.
2. 6.1 EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL
[HE EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL
Fig. 2.4
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The original Reactive Spiral hypothesis was strongly 
supported by the evidence from police stations and at the 
higher level of the total police organisation. Crime and 
conflict were found to be increasing at significant rates 
with police reactive services having little if  any e ffe c t  on 
these increases in the longer term. There was some 
evidence that police preventive services could be more 
effective in the long term, but the resources devoted to 
prevention were almost negligible as a proportion o f the 
total resources.
Police organisational structures and systems at every level 
were closed and inflexible, being almost completely 
uninfluenced by information from the environment or other 
parts o f the organisation. Formal, effective information
systems did not exist. Major, powerful influences, such as 
legislation, public enquiries etc., were necessary for many 
significant changes to police practice.
Resource management did not exist in the police 
organisation as a concept, structure or even as an objective. 
Narrow functional divisions were in the majority and 
favoured by the organisational culture as the most effective  
method o f dealing with all problems. As a consequence, 
the highest proportion and the best quality resources were 
concentrated in a few o f the most favoured functions, 
particularly crime and law enforcement, reactive services. 
Non crime Police Services' and prevention were 
discriminated against and starved o f resources due to this 
organisational and cultural bias.
Unfortunately despite the perceived importance o f  response 
police services, the public consider such activities to be the 
exclusive responsibility o f the police, excluding the major 
resource o f  the public’s own responsibility to assist.
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Inevitably, police resources were inadequate to deal with 
these expectations, causing significant reductions in public 
satisfaction.
The dissatisfaction with policing and the increase in crime 
and conflict then begins to decrease the public's quality o f 
life, both their physical environment and their perception o f 
that environment.
These processes now combine to change individual members 
o f the public's locus o f control. Instead o f a bias towards 
controlling their own lives and events in which they are 
involved, they become more passive and accepting o f 
external control over their lives. This acceptance o f 
whatever happens reduces the willingness o f people to fulfil 
their obligation to intervene in unlawful activities. Even 
prosocial helping o f victims is reduced.
This type o f learned helplessness gives rise to increased 
levels o f stress and dissatisfaction which is then displaced 
on to police, who are viewed as responsible for the 
decreased quality o f life.
CHAPTER THREE
3. POLICING SYSTEMS
3. 1. THE PLANNING OF A POLICE SERVICE
The analysis o f the problem situation has provided clear indications 
that the police organisational system, its structure, objectives and 
methods, are a major contribution to the success or failure o f a 
modern police service.
It is suggested that structure and methods cannot be decided until 
the objectives or values o f a policing system are understood and 
agreed by both the police and the public they serve. In a previous 
study (BECKETT 1981) these problems were examined in depth and 
policing was defined as HELPING people in trouble or at risk. This 
type o f behaviour had been identified as Prosocial (STAUB 1978) and 
for policing purposes has been defined as 'Behaviour that benefits 
other people by providing the type o f help or assistance to a victim, 
or potential victim, of crime or other circumstances one might 
reasonably expect from a concerned fellow citizen'. (BECKETT 
1981).
Analysis by the project, o f the various types o f behaviour required 
by the public from their police, supported this definition. Almost 
without exception police work or behaviour could be categorised as 
either VICTIM HELPING or VICTIM PREVENTION.
In this chapter, both o f these aspects o f police work are discussed 
in some depth. This is in order to understand how a police system 
can enhance their effectiveness. Next a description o f
ENVIRONMENT POTENTIAL is provided. This potential provides an 
analysis o f the various types o f environment which create demands 
for these types o f police behaviour.
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The analysis o f existing and potential demand should then provide a 
requirement for the most efficient type o f policing system, or 
LEVEL. These various levels o f policing are then described,
together with performance measures. One o f the most important 
aspects o f each level is its provision o f assistance to the public.
The victim helping aspect o f police work has already been identified 
as a major component o f all Response policing. Victim Prevention 
has also been identified as a major requirement o f any attempt to 
deal with the e ffec ts  o f the Reactive Spiral (Fig.2. 1). These two 
objectives would appear to be major POLICE PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES which, together with the more usual organisational 
performance measures, could be used to plan and measure a policing 
system.
An attempt will now be made to provide more detail and analysis o f 
these types o f police behaviours;
3. 2. POLICE BEHAVIOUR
3. 2.1. VICTIM HELPING
This usually describes helping an individual member o f the 
public who is a victim o f crime, or some other incident. 
This type o f police work includes the majority o f  'Response' 
policing. Members o f the public consider they urgently 
require the assistance o f a police o fficer  in dealing with a 
situation where they are the victim o f crime or other 
incident. Police provide 'immediate' assistance, and in the 
case o f arrests etc., whatever additional assistance is 
required to finish the matter.
-  47 -
Police have to react to a public demand over which they 
have very little direct control and perhaps as a result o f 
this, the police objective is usually to resolve the 
situation/problem very soon after arrival on the scene. The 
emphasis is on speed, resolving the problem as soon as 
possible.
Examples o f these are:-
(i) Arrest and process o f persons responsible for crime.
(ii) Recovery o f stolen property or obtaining redress for  
loss or damage.
(iii) Lost property.
(iv) Missing Persons.
(v) Victims Aid and First Aid to injured victims.
(vi) Civil disputes and general advice.
Some victim helping is concerned with providing help to a 
group o f people and it may be difficult to identify a single 
individual or individuals who benefit from police actions. 
The group may be a commercial company, an organisation, 
a group o f residents or tenants who live in a particular 
community, etc. It may be a very large group such as a 
whole ward, borough, town or even city.
This means that a group o f people require the help o f  
police officers because they are the victims o f crime or 
other incidents which have in some way a ffected  their 
ri&its as citizens, or the quality o f life they should 
reasonably expect.
This type o f police work is similar to individual response 
policing, except that the victims are more difficult to 
identify. In some cases the victim may be a company, 
organisation or a local authority. In other instances the
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victim may be a whole community where incidents have the 
potential to a ffect peoples quality o f life. This may occur 
even though an individual victim is not the result o f the 
incident.
Examples o f these are:-
(i) Robberies and thefts from private companies.
(ii) Damage to company property.
(iii) Theft or damage to Local Authority/ General 
property.
(iv) Insulting behaviour and breaches of the peace.
(v) Drunkenness and linked offences.
(vi) Civil or individual disputes which require police 
advice or industrial police action, i.e. strikes.
3. 2.2. VICTIM PREVENTION
This description refers to the essential preventive work o f 
police officers, which the 'Reactive Spiral' indicates must 
be a large proportion o f any successful police system.
In simple terms, this type o f police work is directed at 
preventing people becoming victims, particularly those most 
at risk. It can be provided in addition to victim helping, 
where a victim is advised or directed to take actions which 
will prevent future victimisation.
In contrast, it can be provided with the intention o f 
preventing people becoming victims before anything has 
happened to them, preferably by teaching them 'self help', 
(how to help themselves).
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Another important area o f long term victim helping is 
where police mount special operations against individuals or 
small groups o f criminals making their living by crime. 
These activities result in a large number o f individual
victims.
All o f  these policing activities can be directed at specific 
individuals, or once again at groups in a community. 
Examples o f these three areas are:-
(i) Crime prevention advice given by police after a
person or group has been victimised. This advice 
can range from target hardening to changes in 
personal behaviour, all aimed at reducing the 
chances o f future victimisation.
(ii) Work with Victims Support Groups aimed at
enhancing co-ordination with police operations and 
increasing the service provided to victims o f crime.
(Hi) Work with Special Constables and other public
volunteers who are willing to be trained by police 
and assist directly in police work. This both 
increases the resources available to police and 
teaches/encourages the public to 'self help' in a 
very direct way.
(iv) Assisting in Neighbourhood Watch Schemes/Property 
Marketing, and all other general crime prevention 
advice aimed at teaching the public 'self help' 
thereby preventing themselves becoming victims o f 
crime
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(v) Enforcement o f appropriate legislation (i.e. Road 
Traffic offences such as defective vehicles) directed 
at preventing people becoming victims o f their own 
neglect, or being the cause o f other victims (e.g. 
drink and drive offences).
(vi) Surveillance and targetting o f active 'career
criminals' (these may well be juveniles committing 
burglary and theft). Work directed against organised 
crime networks. Monitoring o f  legislation, proposed 
and existing, which appears to be working against 
the interests of victims o f crime and reduces the 
effectiveness o f measures aimed at recognising the 
importance o f victims o f crime.
(vii) Working with schools (School Liaison) and other 
agencies (Inter-agency Liaison) are also important 
aspects o f everyday police work in the context o f 
victim prevention.
Victim prevention is also important in the area o f 
'victimless' crime. This is where offences such as drugs,
prostitution or pornography, where there is no obvious 
victim, are acted against by police. It is suggested that 
there is in fact a victim. It is society in general, Le. a 
town or a city. Unrestricted activity in these types o f 
offences can significantly a ffect the quality o f  life  in 
certain areas.
I f  police did not contain these types o f activity to within 
certain levels they could begin to finance organised crime 
networks which would then begin to create individual and 
identifiable group victims. In addition, a more direct e ffec t
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might well be on the children and juveniles in society whose 
physical and mental development could be a ffected  as a 
consequence o f exposure to those types o f offences.
The fact that society has created legislation preventing or 
restricting certain activities which are apparently 
'victimless' tends to indicate both concern by society and 
the fact that in the long term victims are created in one 
way or another. What is now required is a description o f 
the various types o f environments which generate demands 
for both victim helping or preventive behaviour.
3. 3. ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL
Using the types o f 'Ideal' policing behaviour described and the most 
effective organisational performance measures, it should now be 
possible to create a suitable policing system. However, whilst these 
types o f measures are adequate to understand and control the 
Reactive Spiral, they may not take account o f the e ffec ts  o f 
Environmental Potential (Fig.2. 3).
This concept can be evaluated in three dimensions as summarised 
below:-
3. 3.1. PHYSICAL INFLUENCES
3. 3.1.1. Design state o f  the community.
The structure o f the buildings, estate, 
recreation (parks etc) the roads, walkways etc. 
Does it constrain people or assist them?
3. 3.1.2. Physical state o f  the community
The quality o f  the physical structure in the 
environment i.e Good Condition.
-  5 2  -
3. 3.1.3. Geographical Features
Hills, dales rivers, canals, railway lines etc., 
including major through roads which act as 
barriers in the community.
3. 3.2. SOCIAL/CULTURAL INFLUENCES
3. 3.2.1 Structure o f the community
Social, racial, sex, age, employment, school,
further education, secondary employment,
family construct, earners in the family
'lifestyles'.
3. 3.2.2. Social/Cultural provision
Leisure, cultural, sports, community, local and 
government facilities. Events o f social/cultural 
significance.
3. 3.2.3. Facilities - Welfare
Emotional support, religious, medical, legal, 
employment etc.
3. 3.3. PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES
3. 3.3.1 Perception
Perceived state o f community/society. 
Perceived 'safe' areas to commute and style o f 
travel. Unknown areas. People perceived as 
being sa fe  to meet.
3. 3.3.2 Travel
Travel Percentages prepared to travel and need 
to travel or desire to travel.
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3. 3.4. POTENTIAL ANALYSIS
From these types o f measures, the potential o f a particular 
area can be calculated and a prediction made as to the 
e ffec ts  o f police strategies.
I f  police are to be effective in very hostile areas with a 
high potential for crime and conflict; then they will require 
very different policing systems to a simple response service, 
which can be quite effective in a supportive area. The 
Police also need to find out what type or level of service 
is expected by the public who pay for the service provided. 
These 'levels' o f service are now described in more detail.
3. 4. LEVELS OF POLICING
This study now describes a framework which takes account o f the 
ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL in predicting the type o f police 
service required. This framework will also analyse the actual police 
service and system which existed at that time. In addition, it would 
recommend systems o f policing which provided various levels o f 
VICTIM HELPING and PREVENTION as required by the POTENTIAL 
analysis.
Accordingly the concept o f 'LEVELS OF POLICING' is described. 
This creates three levels o f police service which can be defined, 
their major features described and their claimed advantages/  
disadvantages listed. In addition, performance measures are listed in 
order to judge if a system is working effectively  and efficiently. 
These levels o f policing are as follows:-
(A) RESPONSE POLICING
(B) SQUAD POLICING
(C) GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING.
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Response and Squad policing already existed during the pre-test 
analysis. However, the performance measures indicated to what 
extent they provided the service they were designed for.
Geographical policing did not exist at any police station as a 
policing system, although a number o f  its elements were working in 
isolation from the existing policing system. Therefore Geographical 
policing only existed as a concept not as a practical reality at this 
stage.
Three levels o f policing, or service, are now described. Each o f  the 
levels are very different. They provide a different type o f  service, 
have different objectives and performance measures. Once a 
decision is made on a level o f  service it is not possible to evaluate 
it by performance measures relating to another level.
I f  this were to happen, then the whole policing system will change 
to a different level o f  service. It is important to understand that 
the way a policing system is evaluated actually maintains the type 
o f service originally planned.
3. 4.1. RESPONSE POLICING
The 1st level o f  service that can be provided has been 
called RESPONSE POLICING and is time based in its 
operation.
Responding to the public's requests for police help in 
dealing with various types o f  immediate problems, has 
become an important part o f  modem policing. On average, 
up to 85% o f  these requests can be for incidents o f  a non­
crime, service nature, with the remainder involving victims 
o f crime or conflict.
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1st LE V E L R E S P O N S E  , T I M E
POLICING P O L I C I N G  1 B A S E D
RESPONSE POLICING 
I U I  Level ol Service!
FIG.3. 1.
It has been argued that police are expected to deal u ith 
too wide a range o f problems and that not all problems are 
immediate, so they can be graded. However, some basic 
level o f effective police response service is obviously 
required and expected by the public.
This type o f police service is time based, with the highest 
manpower levels being available at peak demand times. 
The officers are mobile and strategically placed to respond 
quickly to any call from an allocated area.
With the right technical support, this type o f service can be 
very effective. It requires the lowest manpower o f any 
level o f service.
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The manpower resources needed can be calculated for each 
individual police station or unit as follows (HART 1986):-
Number o f incidents x Average time per incident 
Officers average working day.
By analysis o f  message or incident logs, the average number 
o f incidents per hour and per day can be calculated. This 
is then multiplied by the average time taken per o fficer  to 
deal with each incident, approximately 2.5 hours.
The total is then divided by the average number o f hours 
that each individual o fficer  is available during his tour of 
duty, approximately 6.2 hours.
The result o f  this calculation will be the number o f police 
officers required per hour or per day with a sliding scale 
dependent on the time o f day or day per week. Peak 
demand times will obviously require the highest manpower 
levels.
Support services at police stations are then added to 
provide the total manpower required for an effective  
response service. The number o f  officers required must 
then be at least doubled, to allow for abstraction rates.
This simple formula has been found to be accurate at a 
number o f inner city and other urban police stations.
Response Policing o f this type is considered a basic found­
ation o f  all policing activities. It is based on the concept 
o f fast response to a public demand for police services, 
providing initial help and support to the public.
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Evaluation o f this type o f policing must be concentrated on 
speed o f response and development o f manpower to meet 
predicted demands. Recently a number o f computerised 
Police Command and Central Systems have developed this 
concept and created numerous evaluative measures o f this 
type o f policing. More details o f these evaluation 
techniques are provided in the following summary.
3. 4.2 1st LEVEL RESPONSE POLICING IN SUMMARY:- 
DEFINITION:-
A police system which provides a 'first aid' service, 
responding to victims o f crime and other incidents outside 
the publics competence or authority.
MAIN FEATURES:-
(i) Time based.
(ii) Lowest manpower level
(iii) Almost total response to demand a fter incident
occurs (i.e. VICTIM HELPING).
(iv) Little preventive capacity (i.e. VICTIM 
PREVENTION).
(v) Allows high level o f centralisation for resource
deployment and policing.
(vi) Minimal structure for public involvement.
(vii) Low levels o f autonomy for Inspectors, Sergeants 
and Constables.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES INCLUDE
Demands Proportions o f HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW 
Demand areas.
Percentage o f Demand in HOSTILE areas.
Ratio o f 'calls for service' to levels o f 
population.
Resources Adequate accommodation and equipment. 
Effective Information system.
Manpower skills and ability.
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Levels o f overtime per officer, per team;
(1) Planned;
(2) Without notice.
Levels o f sickness;
(1) Injury on duty;
(2) Certificated
(3) Self Certificated.
RESOURCE TO DEMANDS 
Balance o f resources to demand.
(1) Incident level per officer.
(2) Resource deployment to demand pattern
(3) Appropriate response e.g. traffic unit to accident.
(4) Graded response system to demands.
Vehicle costs include mileage and accidents per ratio of 
incidents.
(1) Emergency.
(2) Non emergency.
INCIDENT HANDLING 
Average speed o f Response.
(1) For emergency.
(2) Non-emergency graded calls.
Average time per incident to complete number o f  officers  
per incident.
QUALITY OF SERVICE 
Accurate incident recording.
(1) All information required obtained.
(2) Information correct.
Quality o f  police assistance.
(1) Victim helping
(2) Correct procedure and referrals.
(3) Progress reports as required.
Public satisfaction i.e. letters o f thanks 
Public complaints with service.
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ADVANTAGES
(1) Provides a genuine and valued public service.
(2) In the short term reduces police costs to the 
minimum.
(3) With investment and research in technology and 
work study there is scope for further reduction in 
operating costs and lower manpower levels are 
possible.
(4) Greater scope for control over each individual 
officers behaviour and efficiency levels (actions can 
be clearly prescribed and enforced).
(5) Greater level o f overall management control.
DISADVANTAGES
(1) Always responding to problems gives no scope for 
prevention in this service. (Feeds the Reactive 
Spiral with no Victim Prevention).
(2) Improving the quality o f the response service further
increases demands on it. (Speeds the Reactive
Spiral).
(3) Takes no account o f Environmental Potential and in 
hostile areas can significantly increase conflict and 
reduce public quality o f  life.
(4) Ineffective in collecting routine, good quality 
intelligence about problems.
(5) In many areas high levels o f  stress on officers  
providing this service. This is due to lack o f 
control or prevention and fear o f the unknown, due 
to limited information about the environment.
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(6) Increasing levels o f police powers are required to 
impose effective control over growing problems and 
the willingness to use violence against police.
(7) Increasing difficulties in providing response service 
to hostile areas can create problems between street 
officers and senior managers where conflicting 
cultures develop. This can cause stress and 
discipline problems.
3. 4.3. SQUAD POLICING
Recognising the inability o f Response policing to prevent 
and deal with problems rather than symptoms, an additional 
level o f service may then be provided.
2nd L E V E L S Q U A D | F U N C T I O N
POLICING P O L I C I N G B A S E D
I
1 s t  L E V E L R E S P O N S E  | T I M E
P O L I CI N G P O L I C I N G  1 B A S E D
SQUAD POLICING 
12nd Level ol_ Service!
FIG. 3. 2
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This is a 2nd Level o f Service, called SQUAD POLICING, 
which is functionally based. Added to the basic foundation 
o f the 1st Level Response Service, special teams or squads 
o f officers are created to deal with specific problems.
These squads are functionally based with a single task to 
the exclusion o f all other problems. They are often created  
to deal with high fear crime; murder, sexual offences or 
street robbery and organised crime; terrorism drugs and 
armed robbery.
Calculating the additional manpower for this level o f 
service is more complex and depends on the exact function 
o f the squad. Manpower must be calculated on the number 
o f individual suspects involved, rather than crimes in 
general. For example investigations into drugs or robbery 
gangs may require ratios o f two officers per targeted 
suspect.
The concept o f Squad Policing was developed in Britain and 
the United States during the 1950s and 60s, when it proved 
very effective against specific persistent criminal problems.
More recently repeat Offender Squads in the United States 
have devised workload levels and work practices which are 
proving very successful in the effective deployment o f these 
squads. A summary o f this concept and the evaluation 
developed by this work is detailed below.
3. 4.4 2nd LEVEL SQUAD POUCING IN SUMMARY
DEFINITION
A police system which aims to reduce a priority demand on 
police resources, using a team which specialises in this 
single objective.
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MAIN FEATURES:-
(i) Function based.
(ii) Is supported by a Response policing system
(iii) Created to deal with high fear crime and
organised/group crime.
(iv) Directed against individuals or premises/location.
(v) Limited preventive e ffec t.
(vi) Total response to demands a fter incidents occur.
(vii) High levels o f autonomy for all squad/team
personnel.
(viii) Requires effective technical and equipment support.
(ix) Requires effective information and intelligence
system.
(x) Requires effective liaison and co-ordination with
other officers/squads and agencies or any public 
involved.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES:
In addition to those o f  1st LEVEL (Response) Policing.
Number o f calls for specialist units by first response 
officers.
Number o f  times specialist units deployed.
Average time o f  post incident enquiries.
Levels o f demand in specialist functions and geographical 
areas where squads employed.
Ratio o f  squad manpower to response manpower.
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Skills o f specialist officers.
Number o f tasks per squad.
Ratio o f resources (officers, equipment and time) per task.
Number o f  additional actions generated per task.
Ratio o f arrests per task.
Proportions o f  property recovered or seized per task.
Number o f new tasks (targets) per period o f time.
Ratio o f convictions to persons charged.
Number o f registered informants.
Number o f charges per informant.
Cost per informant.
Number o f outstanding arrest warrants.
Co-ordination with other squads and specialist officers.
ADVANTAGES
(1) If carefully planned and managed with good 
technical support, can be very successful in all the 
above performance measures.
(2) Can be very effective in temporarily regaining 
police control o f . a hostile area.
(3) Helps to reduce public fear o f crime when successes 
are properly marketed.
(4) Increases public satisfaction with police when 
successes are properly marketed.
(5) Can improve the morale o f the whole force to see  
the results o f successful squad policing.
(6) Encourages non squad officers to perform better on 
other duties in order to qualify for squad work.
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DISADVANTAGES
(1) Although intended as a preventive measure, really is 
reactive depending on a problem already existing 
before implementation.
(2) Limited e ffec t on reactive spiral due to reactive 
bias.
(3) Although initial positive e ffec t  on hostile 
environment, if use continued, can be manipulated 
into increasing conflict in an area.
(4) Due to complex nature o f policing, concentrating on 
one or two major problems always causes serious 
e ffects  in other areas.
(5) Best quality officers are drained into narrow 
functional tasks wider more complex tasks left to 
less able officers.
(6) Can produce an internal 'end over means' culture 
which inevitably causes public concern and more 
external restraints imposed over policing.
(7) Squad can assume a life  o f  its own and lose 
direction. Support services increasing in cost until 
costs exceed benefits.
3. 5. ANALYSIS OF POUCING LEVELS
Remembering that 1st and 2nd Levels o f policing already existed, at 
this stage it is perhaps appropriate to evaluate them against the 
Extended Reactive Spiral (Fig 3. 3). A theoretical evaluation and an
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assessment o f the factual project data, both reveal the inadequacy 
o f these policing systems. Either in isolation or combination, both 
systems have been shown by the analysis in the first chapter, to be 
virtually ineffective against the powerful processes involved in the 
Extended Spiral, Fig. 3. 3.
3. 5.1. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
These difficulties, in brief are as follows:-
3. 5.1.1. The Police Spiral; indicates a requirement for  
an open, flexible 'organic' type organisation 
with extensive information systems and 
efficient resource management. However, 
whilst it is accepted that police information 
systems and resource management could be 
improved dramatically, the major difficulties 
are their organisational objectives.
The limited response design o f 1st Level 
Policing and the inflexible functionalisation o f 
2nd Level Policing will always induce a bias 
towards centralisation and the rigid 
organisational structure which was described in 
the analysis o f the original problem situation.
3. 5.1.2. The Reactive Spiral; shows the importance o f  
significant VICTIM PREVENTION in any police 
system. Analysis o f this prevention, has also 
suggested the importance o f public 'self help' 
as virtually the only method o f  providing 
significant resources for this essential 
investment by any policing system.
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1st and 2nd Level Policing are not designed for 
this kind o f public involvement and even if 
such a requirement were designed it would be 
just another functional element and very 
unlikely to be accepted and integrated by the 
other 'professional' factions. Evidence for this 
process can be shown by the low priority for  
Crime Prevention (Victim Prevention) and its 
minimal resources as described by the original 
problem analysis.
3. 5.1.3. The Environmental Spiral; supports the 
importance o f public involvement in any police 
system. This is to influence the objectives and 
values o f the system, support 'self policing' 
and any other attempts to improve their own 
quality o f life.
Even though 2nd level policing makes a number 
o f determined attempts to assist in this 
process, such as Neighbourhood Watch, the 
organisational design predicts a rapid decay in 
police effectiveness. 1st Level Policing is not 
designed to accept or accommodate any o f this 
public involvement.
3. 6. OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
It is apparent that a radically different policing system will be 
required in order to deal with the problems described above.
Additional objectives and performance measures will be required 
from any proposed policing system, particularly in the effective  
utilisation o f  the public by police.
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I f  the public are involved in a policing system, then the required 
behaviour or involvement has to be clearly understood before it can 
be included in the design o f the police system.
3. 6.1. PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
A previous study (BECKETT 1981) suggests that police 
behaviour is not confined to modern professional police 
officers, but that such behaviour also exists as informal 
responses in non-police citizens. This means that prosocial 
HELPING behaviour in the public should be supported by the 
policing system.
The study also hypothesised that this requirement for 
increasing 'self-policing' in non-police individuals, could be 
attempted by utilising the professional police officers as 
prosocial models for the general community as to the 
appropriate behaviour in various circumstances. This aspect 
o f the police system involves the important concept o f 
'social learning' via a modelling process (BANDURA 1977).
It should be noted that, although in the original theory and 
analysis police acting as prosocial models was examined in 
some depth and suggested to be an important area for  
experimentation, it is not the only method that will be 
proposed for police to increase public self-help.
3. 6.2. POLICE PUBLIC CONTRACT
Regardless o f the method by which an increase in public 
prosocial behaviour is obtained, it is an important system 
performance measure which will require to be recognised by 
the police system and has been described as a Police-Public 
Contract as follows:-
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"A policing system in which professional police and 
a community, establish a partnership which results in 
a significant proportion o f policing service within 
that community being provided voluntarily by 
community members. The primary objectives of 
such a police system are the prevention of crime, 
reduction of conflict and assistance o f victims'. 
(BECKETT 1981)".
3. 6.3. COMMUNITY HELPING
Another element o f the Environmental Spiral which must be 
influenced by a police system is the 'Locus o f Control'. It 
is proposed that a more difficult aspect o f modern urban 
policing strategies, is the involvement o f police in assisting 
and supporting various groups in the community and using 
them as an influence on levels o f helping behaviour in the 
general public.
In this study, such a sequence is argued to be essential in a 
successful urban policing system, particularly as an input to 
the Locus o f Control in the Environmental Spiral. This 
process has been defined as a system performance measure 
o f COMMUNITY HELPING (BECKETT 1981) and describes 
any group supporting behaviour with the eventual end
result o f enhancing an internal locus o f control in the 
individuals involved. Ideally the group behaviour would be 
directed towards increasing prosocial VICTIM HELPING and 
PREVENTION.
It is clear that the existing 1st and 2nd Levels o f policing 
are not designed to support or maintain this type o f 
process. Therefore any new system will have to clearly 
understand what is being attempted and be designed 
accordingly. First the concept has to be defined and 
explained in a police system context.
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The DELTA chart overleaf (Fig. 3. 4) illustrates the process 
o f COMMUNITY HELPING in the community and its 
subsequent e ffec t on the REACTIVE SPIRAL, reducing the 
demand for RESPONSE policing.
In summary, the chart details the required training for  
operational beat and specialist officers, in order to act as 
community role models for Pro-social Behaviour. Once 
trained, officers provide high quality victim helping and 
preventive services to the public. This ’ideal’ behaviour is 
intended to encourage increases in public Pro-Social 
Behaviour, particularly the levels exhibited by juveniles in 
the community.
By targetting and involving specific influential public 
volunteers as additional role models, the process is 
considered more effective. This type o f behaviour will
include membership o f Special Constables, Victim Support 
Groups and Neighbourhood Watch Groups. It is suggested 
that groups o f volunteers will be more effective in this role 
than individuals working in isolation.
Therefore, it is essential that the police system invests a 
proportion o f their organisational resources into developing 
and supporting various community groups, particularly those 
which will encourage increased levels o f ’self policing’ in 
their individual members. Subsequently, due to the 
influential nature o f these individuals and groups, they will 
also act as prosocial models to the community and then by 
established group learning processes, will encourage 
increased levels o f s e lf policing behaviour in the general 
community.
Fig. 3. 4.
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In practical terms this means that the police organisation 
encourages all_ community groups who can be influential in 
promoting self help strategies within the general public. 
Individual police officers would give this support and always 
behave in a manner which acts as a 'model' for the 
'correct' prosocial behaviour in everyday life, i.e. always 
help people in trouble and if possible prevent themselves 
and others from becoming victims.
Police officers would be trained to intervene and interact 
with various local groups, or even encourage their formation 
where none exist. The intentions o f this intervention would 
be:-
(i) Obtain the support o f influential community 
volunteers.
(ii) Where appropriate assist these volunteers to form 
effective working groups.
(iii) Encourage such individuals and groups to involve 
themselves in the se lf policing behaviours o f Victim 
Helping and Prevention.
(iv) Involve local groups and agencies in the achievement 
o f a practical POLICE/PUBLIC CONTRACT at an 
individual and a group level.
3. 6.4 QUALITY OF LIFE
A remaining element in the Environmental Spiral is the 
'Quality o f Life'. This must be reduced to quantifiable 
measurable terms before it can be utilised as a police 
performance measure.
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Initially the police input into 'Quality o f Life' is defined 
as:-
The quality o f everyday life in a defined 
geographical area, where the level o f crime and 
conflict are tolerable and in proportion to the 
density of population. Residents have access to 
information about these matters and should they be 
dissatisfied, can actively contribute to measures 
designed to influence these events. Also, where 
’victims’ of unlawful or unusual events receive an 
active priority from both the residents and all 
official helping’ services.
This definition implies a mixture o f factual and attitudinal 
measures which can be used to design an appropriate 
policing system.
3. 6.5. POLICE SYSTEM CHANCES
The problem analysis in the first Chapter demonstrated the 
importance o f a suitable Police System in order to achieve 
objectives and performance measures. It is also clear that 
the previously described 1st and 2nd LEVELS o f policing are 
not designed, or easy to adapt to systems capable o f 
achieving results in the areas described above.
The Police System required will have to be open and 
receptive to the environment with an organic and flexible 
structure. I f  possible the system should utilise the powerful 
e ffec ts  recorded o f geographical work design as opposed to 
time based influences. The cultural bias towards small 
teams as the ideal work units should also be exploited.
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There must also be substantial investment and use o f 
information systems linked into the performance measure o f  
the whole Extended Spiral. These systems would have to 
provide a basis for predictions o f trends and changes. The 
predictions arrived at would be very important for effective  
Resource Management.
Police Resources in this system must be viewed in the 
widest possible context and utilise the full potential o f  all 
available resources, police and public, full time and part 
time, professionals and volunteers.
This analysis is providing a requirement for a radically 
different policing system. It is apparent that such a system 
would require major changes in both policing methods and 
the behaviour o f the public involved in such a service. 
Therefore, the 3rd and final level o f service is very 
different from the two previous levels. Although, it does 
o f course still have to provide 'traditional' and expected 
policing services.
3. 7. GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING
Third Level Geographical policing is designed as an open system, 
flexible, with a geographical foundation and a bias towards the 
preventive policing o f VICTIM PREVENTION and COMMUNITY 
HELPING.
Small, permanent teams o f officers provide response and preventive 
service, in addition to dealing with any special problems in their 
allocated area. Additional resources or assistance are only provided 
in unusual circumstances. The whole police system must then be 
designed to support these teams and the police stations they work 
from.
GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING 
(3rd Level oj Servicel
Fig 3. 5
Geographical policing is not new and is based on one o f the most 
traditional and acceptable methods o f policing yet devised. In short, 
the local constable with his own permanent beat.
The concept o f preventing victims and providing a support for the 
community dates back to the beginnings o f modern policing in the 
1830s. Beat constables were taught at that time that preventing 
crime and preserving peace and tranguility were their major tasks. 
Officers would achieve these objectives through the use o f 
preventive patrol on their permanent beats.
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This theme o f  preventive policing and community support has been 
consistant through police instructions and writings up to the present 
day. Even the most recent police training emphasises this 
traditional and hallowed concept o f policing.
Unfortunately for a number o f reasons geographical policing is not 
currently considered an effective or viable option in many urban, or 
even rural areas and therefore has fallen into disuse. As a result, 
the majority o f today's operational street officers and their 
immediate supervisors, have developed little practical knowledge 
about it and are unskilled in this system o f policing. In addition, 
police forces as a whole have developed a bias towards supporting 
response and squad policing.
A major problem in Geographical Policing is its complexity. It 
utilises a number o f simple and not so simple concepts, many o f 
which are accepted by the majority o f police officers. However, 
when these elements are all linked into an interactive, 
comprehensive policing system the complexity is very daunting, 
(Figure 3. 6).
Once a decision is made to introduce a Geographical Policing System
(A) it should be understood that although it contains elements o f 1st 
and 2nd LEVEL Policing, it is radically different and therefore 
requires a qualitative change in the new systems performance 
measures.
The evaluation o f a Geographical policing system had to be 
developed especially for the project. It consisted o f a logical 
systems analysis o f each element and its potential measurement. 
Throughout the project, on a basis o f trial and error, evaluation 
criterion were developed and modified. In the summary that 
follows, a description is provided o f  the measures eventually 
adopted, with varying degrees o f success.
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3. 7.1. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY 
(A) Geographical Policing:-
Definition
A system in which all the police services within a
defined geographical area, are consistently provided
by a stable team o f dedicated police officers;
assisted by the public.
Features
1. High proportion o f preventive Policing (high 
investment o f resources).
2. Basic work units o f multiple objective teams 
(Sector teams).
3. Minimum o f functional divisions.
4. Majority o f operational Street Officers
'geographically based'.
5. Policy o f public involvement and resources
allocated.
6. Within policy guidelines, majority o f  decisions 
on resource deployment made by geographic 
Inspectors and Sergeants.
7. High levels o f autonomy for Inspectors and 
Sergeants.
8. High investment in information systems and
prediction.
9. Police resources maintained above minimum
'Response Level', with efficient use o f all 
available resources.
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10. Maintenance o f an effective 'Directed 
Patrolling' strategy aligned to the 
Environmental Potential.
As can be seen from the definition and its 
performance measures, the geographical system 
requires considerable pre-planning, policy 
changes, reviews on priorities and use o f 
measures. It will also require initial 
approaches to THE PUBLIC (J) and AGENCIES 
(I) to enlist their support and resources for the 
system. Although it will be less effective in 
its first iteration, the system is in fact 
designed to work with minimal input from 
these elements, but some practical support is 
essential in order to produce (B):-
(B) POLICE/PUBLIC PLANNING/INFORMATION SYSTEM 
A network whereby police collect information to 
enable the police and public to jointly plan the 
provision o f policing services within a defined 
geographical area.
Measures
1. A police information collection and 
dissemination system between police and public 
(organisational structure).
2. The quantity and quality o f information on the 
net-work.
3. The quantity and quality o f analysis and 
prediction.
4. A joint police and public planning and 
evaluation system (organisational structure i.e. 
Consultative Groups, Sector Working Parties, 
Sector Planning Teams).
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•5. Using the team geographical areas (Sectors) as 
the basic unit o f all police planning.
6. Level o f public involvement and influence in 
planning police services.
7. Level o f autonomy in planning system for 
geographical teams.
This information and planning system will require 
police resources. I f  it is designed as a non­
electronic system, using people rather than 
technology, it could be very expensive. However, if 
a major investment has to be made into information 
technology, then the initial investment will again be 
high. But this sytem is essential in order to 
achieve the next element (C):-
(C) JOINT POLICING SYSTEM
A structure by which police and the public provide 
assistance to victims, manage conflict and crime by 
the best use o f the available resources.
Measures
1. Numbers/percentage o f formal assistance to 
police Cue. Special Constables and non 
uniformed assistance to police).
2. Numbers/percentage o f  informal public 
assistance to police (i.e. Neighbourhood Watch, 
Business Watch etc.)
3. Effective Victim Support Scheme.
4. Effective Community Mediation/Intervention 
Scheme.
5. Effective Lay Visitors Scheme.
6. Changes in professional agency and policing 
procedures to co-ordinate joint policing system.
7. Ratio o f tasks between police and professional 
agencies.
This element recognises the important resource o f 
the public and the performance measures require a 
significant input from these types o f resources. 
Some o f the joint policing will be with professional 
agencies, such as the Local Authority, other policing 
will involve voluntary part time public involvement.
The Joint Policing element requires clear direction 
within a planned framework if real progress is to be 
made in improving the public service. This 
framework for (C), is provided by the element (D):-
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The efficient use o f police and public resources to 
stabilise, reduce and deal effectively  with public 
demands for police service.
Figure 3. 7 illustrates the method used to quantify 
and plan this type o f management. First an analysis 
is made to determine what type o f police service is 
currently being provided and decide, is it decaying 
or improving? For example if a majority o f police
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
DEMAND
STABILISATION
DEMAND
REDUCTION RESPONSE
DEMAND
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I
I
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>
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resources were found to be dealing with Demand 
Stabilisation and yet demands were significantly 
increasing, the system would be predicted to be in 
decay. Resources would now have to be re-deployed 
into Demand Reduction to prevent a rapid decline 
into a basic Response Service.
Police Services found to be mainly Response would 
have to increase or re-deploy resources into Demand 
Reduction in order to achieve an eventual Demand 
Stabilisation. The tables below provide measures for  
each category;
Response Management:
Ratio o f public 'calls for service’ to the levels o f 
population.
Percentage o f response calls deferred to appropriate 
time.
Accuracy o f police resource deployment to public 
demand pattern.
Public complaints per 100 'calls for service'.
Average speed o f response to urgent calls.
Average time to complete each 'call for service'. 
Average number o f incidents per o fficer  per day.
Balance o f incident type per o fficer  per week.
Vehicle costs including mileage and accidents per 
100 'calls for service'.
Average number o f o fficers in first urgent response. 
Number o f times per 100 incidents additional 
officers deployed.
Number o f calls for specialist units by first reponse 
officer.
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Number o f times specialist units deployed.
Number o f post incident visits.
Percentage o f referals to Victim Support for 100 
responses.
Percentage o f other service agency referals per 100 
responses.
Error levels in police procedure and recording.
Public satisfaction, letters o f thanks and consumer 
panels.
Levels o f sickness per officer and per team.
Levels o f planned overtime per o fficer per team. 
Levels o f unplanned overtime per officer, per team.
Demand Reduction
Levels o f demand (total calls for service) in 
geographical areas where reduction strategies
implemented.
Levels o f demands in specific area o f reduction 
strategies (service, crime and conflict).
Additional demands generated by reduction
strategies.
Total cost o f reduction strategies (personnel and 
equipment).
Demand Stabilisation:
Rate o f increase o f  demands (total calls for service) 
in geographical areas where prevention strategies 
implemented.
Rate o f  increase o f  demands in specific areas o f 
prevention strategies (service, crime and conflict). 
Value (financial and time) o f public and agency 
involvement in prevention strategies.
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Additional police demands generated by prevention 
strategies.
Total costs o f prevention strategies, police and 
public (personnel and equipment).
(ii) CRIME MANAGEMENT
The efficient use o f all resources to reduce and 
prevent crime, whilst dealing effectively  with the 
results o f crime, particularly its victims.
This category is a specialised aspect and important 
sub-category o f general Resource Management. 
Figure 3. 8 illustrates a similar format where 
decisions and predictions can be made regarding the 
existing system state and direction o f charge within 
the Crime Management process;
Crime Response:
Percentage o f initial crime response deferred. 
Average speed o f response to initial crime demand 
in urgent and differred categories.
Levels o f police resource deployment to crime 
investigation demands.
Speed o f  police response to crime victims (victim 
crime classification).
Average time per initial investigation.
Number o f calls for specialist crime unit by first 
officer  at crime.
Number o f times specialist crime unit deployed 
(SOCO Etc).
Efficient initial investigation and police procedure. 
Accurate recording o f initial investigation.
CRIME MANAGEMENT
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PREVENTION
CRIME
REDUCTION
CRIME
RESPONSE
CRIME
REDUCTION
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>  -------------------------------------------------------------->
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Levels o f crime investigation skills in initial 
response officers.
Number o f crimes screened out.
Type o f crimes screened out, percentage in each 
category.
Average investigation time per screened in crime. 
Number o f  arrests for screened in and screened out 
crimes.
Number o f additional charges and TICs.
Percentage o f interrogation per 100 prisoners.
Number o f detained suspects not charged
Number o f victim referals to support agencies per
100 crimes in victim classification crimes.
Public satisfaction with initial victim helping 
(consumer panels).
Further reports to victim per 100 crimes.
Follow up enquiries per arrest.
Percentage o f property stolen recovered.
Crime Reduction:
Levels o f crime in geographical areas where 
reduction strategies implemented.
Levels o f crime in specific crime priority categories. 
Number o f police specially employed in crime 
reduction.
Number o f objectives for each team/squad.
Ratio o f  officers, vehicles, equipment and time per 
targetted location or individual.
Ratio o f charges per 10 targetted individuals and 
locations.
Number o f follow up enquiries generated by each  
target.
Result o f officers and time to the value/quality o f 
property recovered or seized.
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Ratio o f convictions to persons charged.
Number o f new targets introduced each month.
Public satisfaction with crime reduction priorities. 
Number o f registered informants.
Number o f charges per informant.
Cost per informant.
Number o f outstanding arrest warrants.
Crime Prevention
Rate o f crime increase in geographical area where 
crime prevention strategy implemented.
Rate o f crime increase in specific crime priority 
categories.
Value (financial and time) o f public and agency 
involvement in crime prevention strategies.
Additional police demands generated by crime 
prevention strategies.
Total cost o f crime prevention strategies, police and 
public (personnel and equipment).
(iii) CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
The prevention and reduction o f harmful conflict 
behaviour and the effective peacekeeping o f public 
disorder.
Conflict Management is an important sub-category 
o f Resource Management developed by this thesis. 
Once again system state and direction o f change can 
be established. However, Figure 3. 9 also illustrates 
a proposed link between various states o f conflict 
which has not been utilised before. Using this 
concept it is suggested that the management o f 
conflict or 'peace keeping' can be developed into a 
practical and effective strategy. Each state o f 
Conflict is accurately analysed by its list o f 
performance measures;
CONFUCT MANAGEMENT
CONFLICT
PREVENTION
CONFLICT
REDUCTION
DISORDER
MANAGEMENT
CONFLICT
REDUCTION
CONFLICT
PREVENTION
DECAY
>
IMPROVEMENT
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Disorder Management-
Speed o f police response to disorder.
Public order skills o f response officers.
Average number o f officers to each  disorder 
incident.
Average length o f time disorder incident continues. 
Number and nature o f public casualties.
Number and nature o f police casualties.
Individual or group, public involvement.
In group; organised or unorganised.
Levels o f public violence.
Levels o f police violence.
Number o f arrests per 10 incidents.
Ratio o f convictions to arrests.
Number o f entries in 'Doctor at Police Station' 
register.
Conflict Reduction
Levels o f disorder and conflict behaviour in 
geographical areas where reduction strategies
implemented.
Levels o f disorder and conflict behaviour in total. 
Public use o f streets and fear  o f disorder.
Public satisfaction with conflict reduction priorities. 
Number o f police referals to other mediating 
agencies.
Number o f police involved in strategies.
Conflict Prevention:
Rate o f  conflict increase in geographical area where 
conflict prevention strategy implemented.
Rate o f increase in specific types o f conflict 
behaviour overall.
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Value (financial and time) o f public and agency 
involvement in conflict prevention strategies. 
Additional demands generated by conflict prevention 
strategies.
Revision and testing o f current public order 
contingency plans.
Levels o f public alienation/tension.
The interaction between the Planning and 
Information System (B), Joint Policing System (C) 
and the Management Framework (D) will then 
produce changes in the Elements (E), (F), (G) and 
(H) o f  the Geographical Policing System. These 
changes are the outputs or results o f this system, 
indicating its level o f effect.
(E) GOALS (MACRO MEASURES)
(i) Quality o f Life
Where the level o f crime and conflict are tolerable 
and in proportion to the density o f population. 
Where both police and public actively help 
'victims' and the public are able to significantly 
influence the provision o f policing services. In 
addition, levels o f alienation are low and do not 
cause isolation in the community.
Measures
1. Level o f crime/population
2. Level o f conflict/population
3. Public fear o f crime and conflict
4. Level o f public helping for victims (total 
levels)
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5. Quality o f  police service for victims.
6. Levels o f alienation (attitudes) and isolation 
(group behaviour).
7. Life style changes (behaviour) i.e. use of 
street, movement out.
8. Effectiveness o f public influence on policing.
(ii) Police/Public Contract
A policing system in which professional police and a 
community establish a partnership which results in a 
significant proportion o f policing services within that 
community being provided voluntarily by community 
members.
Measures
1. Percentage o f public involvement in policing 
services.
2. Percentage o f professional agency involvement 
in policing services.
(iii) Demand Stabilisation
Where the level o f demand on police resources are 
reduced and maintained at a level which enables a 
high quality o f service to be provided for each 
demand.
Measures
1. Total level o f demand/resources.
2. Nature o f demand i.e. Percentage o f  Response 
to preventive.
3. Stability o f  police service to demand i.e.
maintaining service to the volume o f
demands/influencing increases/matntatning
quality and public satisfaction.
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I f  significant results are obtained by the Joint Policing 
System (C) and improvements are made in the System Goals 
(E) it is then predicted that three particular areas o f 
feedback will be input to the wider Public (J) and Public 
Agencies (I) as below:-
(F) PUBLIC PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
(1) Increased levels o f 'bystander' prosocial intervention 
(VICTIM HELPING).
(2) Increased levels o f preventive behaviour (VICTIM 
PREVENTION).
(G) LOCUS OF CONTROL
Changes in the public 'Locus o f Control' from external to 
internal with a lessening o f  perceived helplessness.
(H) SATISFACTION WITH POLICE 
Changes in Public satisfaction with:-
(1) The work o f local police officers (i.e. quality of 
service).
(2) Police service in conflict.
(3) Police service in crime.
All o f these improvements in police and public behaviour 
should now influence the willingness o f all non-involved 
public and professional agencies to be involved or increase 
their involvement in the next sequence o f Police/Public 
Planning (B). The expected gains and losses with a 
Geographical Policing System can be summarised as 
follows:-
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ADVANTAGES
(1) Positively Influences the Response Spiral.
(2) Reduces the Environmental Potential.
(3) Increased public satisfaction with police service.
(4) Once trained and skilled, increases in morale and 
sense o f status in operational street officers.
(5) Maximum effective use o f each individual officer.
DISADVANTAGES
(1) Not immediately effective, requires time to produce 
significant improvements.
(2) Requires radical changes in established working 
practices if high manpower requirements are to be 
avoided.
(3) Efficient information systems must be maintained at 
every police station which may require additional 
expense.
(4) High quality o f leadership and management needed 
at police stations.
(5) Higher levels o f individual skills required from all 
operational street officers.
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In comparison to 1st and 2nd LEVEL policing, 3rd LEVEL 
Geographical Policing is a major challenge to any Police 
Force. It identifies a number o f separate elements and 
performance measures, all suggested to be required in a 
modem policing system, then integrates them into a total 
police system. This system then prescribes an 
organisational structure which may appear similar to past 
policing methods but in fact in both operation and theory is 
significantly different. Any Police Force which intended to 
introduce such a policing system would have to plan and 
implement major organisational change programmes.
3. 8. SUMMARY
In this chapter the importance o f VICTIM HELPING and VICTIM 
PREVENTION were described. It was suggested that these concepts 
provide an accurate behavioural description o f police work, whether 
performed by police or public.
The ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL was seen as a major restraint 
and source o f demands for police services at the micro level, which 
dictated vital requirements for any policing system devised or 
created. At the micro level the EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL 
imposed other major requirements and limitations.
Levels o f Policing were then described in order to provide increasing 
levels o f service in these environments. Unfortunately 1st Level 
RESPONSE POLICING and 2nd Level SQUAD POLICING which 
already existed, were unable to provide sufficient levels o f VICTIM 
PREVENTION.
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In addition their organisational structure prevented them from  
dealing with the problems identified by the EXTENDED REACTIVE 
SPIRAL. Major deficiencies were; closed, bureaucratic, functional 
designs and in particular an inability to involve and encourage the 
public in s e lf policing and more particularly in COMMUNITY 
HELPING.
Third Level Geographical policing was then created as a potential 
policing system, which did not exist as a total system at that time. 
This level o f policing was specifically designed to deal with the 
problems identified in the PROBLEM analysis and to utilise effective  
organisational structures and methods. Many o f these elements 
already existed inside the police or other service organisations. The 
major concern o f the project was to implement and evaluate 
Geographical policing as a total policing system.
In the next Chapter, a pre-implementation analysis at Brixton Police 
Station will be described. The analysis o f the existing situation will 
be provided using the concepts, definitions and measures developed 
in this Chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4. BRIXTON THE CASE STUDY
4. 1. INTRODUCTION
In November 1981, the joint Metropolitan Police and Surrey 
Constabulary Neighbourhood Policing Project was formed. The 
project team immediately began work at Brixton Police Station, in 
the London Borough o f Lambeth and Addlestone Police Station in 
Surrey.
During the next two years a total o f ten police stations became 
involved in this project. However, for the purpose o f this analysis 
only one, BRIXTON will be used as a case study. Brixton Police
Station is probably one o f the most powerful examples o f pre 
planned changes to a policing system. It also has the longest and 
most comprehensive data base o f all the project stations, though it 
is not necessarily the most successful o f the sites.
Although collection and analysis o f data at Brixton began in
November 1981, it was still possible at that time to collect some 
data on policing at the micro level back to 1980. Therefore the 
PROBLEM SITUATION at Brixton will be confined to the period
1980 - 1983, a fter which a new policing system was introduced.
The methodology o f the various surveys listed in this Chapter, are 
detailed in Appendix Two.
It was found that the theoretical framework o f the Problem 
Situation, both the Environment and Police system analysis as
described in the preceeding Chapters, had to be modified for  
practical use at each police station.
In this Chapter, a detailed system o f analysis and comparison at the 
micro level will be described. First, the Environmental Potential 
o f Brixton will be determined and analysed against the Environment 
Spiral. Next, Brixton police station will be analysed to determine 
the LEVEL o f  service provided and its quality o f performance. This 
policing system will then be evaluated against the Police Spiral.
BRIXTON POLICE DIVISION
Fig. 4. 1.
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Finally, the total analysis will be quantified against the core 
Reactive Spiral in order to judge the interactive e ffects  o f the 
Extended Reactive Spiral. It is intended to provide an insight into 
the complex Problem Situation at Brixton between 1980 - 83.
4. 2. BRIXTON AS A POUCING ENVIRONMENT
Brixton Police Division is 2.94 square miles in size and is located in 
the centre o f the Borough o f Lambeth, with Kennington to the 
North, Streatham to the South and Clapham to the West. (Fig. 4. 1). 
The Division is an established commercial and residential centre 
within the inner area o f South London, it is an inner city area 
which shares many o f the features o f other decaying city areas. 
Examples o f these features are; economic decline, a declining,
transient low skilled population with high unemployment, inadequate 
housing stock and a significant number o f cultural and ethnic 
minority groups.
In 1981, the area had suffered one o f the worst post war riots on 
mainland Britain. As a result o f this disorder a major enquiry had 
been undertaken into these riots (SCARMAN 1981). It was clear, 
perhaps in a most dramatic way, that whatever social processes 
existed in the environment o f  Brixton, they were inadequate for the 
needs o f the local people. The Scarman Enquiry also suggested that 
the methods o f  policing were inappropriate and in e ffe c t  that the 
existing police system was in decay, failing to meet the perceived 
needs o f the community.
4. 3. ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
In order to attempt some type o f quantitive and predictive analysis 
o f the interaction, between the physical structure and social aspects 
o f the population, an analysis framework had to be developed. (Fig.
4. 2). This framework will be used to describe the Environmental 
Analysis o f Brixton Police Division.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
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From the police viewpoint, the first priority o f the analysis is the 
geographical Demand Analysis. This shows the precise time and 
place o f all recorded service demands, which allows the volume o f 
demands from various locations to be identified. Eventually the 
whole o f the area policed can be graded in a Demand Profile 
consisting o f  three grades, High, Medium and Low Demands.
Next, both the physical structures in the environment and the social 
or cultural behaviour o f  the community, can be evaluated over the 
total area or at selected  locations. I f it is available this can be 
supported by a psychological attitude or opinion survey o f the 
community. These types o f analysis are then combined to produce 
an Environmental Profile, which provides a value on a scale o f 
HOSTILE to SUPPORTIVE, regarding the policing o f that area.
Both the Demand Profile and the Environmental Profile are utilised 
to analyse the types o f offenders and the nature o f crime and 
conflict in each area. Jointly, these three summaries o f  the data 
provided a description o f  the Environmental Potential. This analysis 
is intended to act as a predictor for any type o f  police service 
provided in each area.
4 3.1. GEOGRAPHICAL DEMAND ANALYSIS
With regard to the demands on police, it is not sufficient 
just to deal with the overall levels and percentage 
increases. The demands have to be linked into geographical 
areas in the environment. This is to establish exactly  
where the major public demands are coming from. Initially, 
it is immaterial exactly what the demands are and 
therefore must include all crime and service demands.
At Brixton all these demands were plotted on a Divisional 
map showing the total area covered by Brixton Police 
Station.
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This plotting revealed clusters o f demands around particular 
areas and geographical features on the Division. It was 
found that total demands on police had to be plotted in this 
way, otherwise subtle interactions between apparently 
unlinked demands were missed.
Another important finding was the e ffec t  o f volume o f 
demands within certain periods o f time. In areas with few  
demands, it took considerable periods o f time before 
patterns and links between demands could be analysed. 
Whereas in other areas within days or weeks the large 
column o f demands ■ quickly exposed patterns, trends and 
links.
4. 3.2. DEMAND PROFILE
Eventually, a fter a sufficient time period had been analysed 
the geographical demand plotting enabled three levels o f 
demands to be identified; HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW which 
were related to specific and identifiable locations on the 
Divisional map. It should be noted that this technique is 
not a rigorous statistical formula and requires a mixture o f 
data and professional police knowledge. However the 
method was certainly robust enough for project and police 
operational analysis. It allowed the project to identify 
significantly different areas and operational police officers 
to understand the type o f  police service required for the 
differing needs o f those area.
In November 1981, when the first demand analysis was 
undertaken (N.P. Report 1982) it was found that more than 
50% o f the demands on Brixton Police originated from  
within eight identified areas. In total these areas only 
represented a quarter o f the geographic size o f  the 
Division. (Fig.4, 3). At this time only HIGH and LOW 
demand areas could be easily identified, MEDIUM areas 
were difficult to categorise.
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HIGH DEMAND AREAS - BRIXTON 1981
Fig. 4. 3.
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The survey also revealed that the workload was evenly 
divided across the seven days o f the week, with minor 
increases at the weekend. The samples taken indicated that 
34% o f the total workload was between 7 a. m. - 3 p.m. 
(early turn), 48% between 3 p.m. - 11 p.m. (late turn), and 
18% between 11 p.m. - 7 a.m. (night duty). Most o f the 
night duty workload was prior to 2 a.m.
In March 1983 a second demand analysis was carried out. 
(N.P. Report 1983). This time HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW 
areas were easier to identify and it was clear that HIGH 
and MEDIUM areas were increasing significantly. (Fig. 4, 
4). Between them, those types o f areas constituted over a 
third o f the total geographical area and were responsible 
for over 75% o f the total demands on police. It appeared 
as though the HIGH demand areas were spreading by first 
creating MEDIUM demand areas all around them.
As had been predicted, the disadvantaged population o f 
Brixton created higher than average demands on their police 
station. The Division was consistently highest in the 
National Home Office Crime statistics and had the highest 
incidents o f violent street crime and disorder in Britain. 
As an example o f this situation the graph (Fig.4. 5) shows a 
breakdown o f crime allegations for 1980 - 1982. Crimes 
averaged 42 per day and during the three year period major 
crime had risen by 39%, beat crime (less serious crime) by 
24% and motor vehicle crime by 43%.
As has already been argued, crime is only a small part o f 
everyday police duty and as an example o f this situation an 
average o f 192 callers per day attended Brixton Police 
Station. In 1981 - 82, 56% o f these callers required an 
officer  to complete a report o f some description and the 
remaining 44% required advice or information.
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Examination o f the demand data showed that between 75 - 
79% o f everyday police work was o f  a non-crime service 
nature.
It will be seen from this analysis, that recorded crime 
figures are only a small part o f everyday police demands. 
It was found that the demands on individual officers at 
Brixton were higher than any other police station examined.
With regard to the times o f demand, little had changed and 
the percentages and times were very similar to the 1981 
analysis.
This Demand Profile and in particular the HIGH and 
MEDIUM demand areas, helped to prioritise the most 
important geographical areas for the Physical and Social 
Analysis to consider.
4. 3.3. PHYSICAL STRUCTURE
Generally speaking it can be said that a majority o f the 
HIGH and MEDIUM Demand areas corresponded with the 
local authority high density housing estates. (Fig. 4. 6). 
The dwellings in these estates were mainly Local Authority 
flats designed for convenience and ease o f access.
In reality, they had low levels o f physical security, 
providing little restriction on burglary and theft and were 
surrounded by a warren o f  escape routes for offenders. In 
addition, the majority o f  these estates bounded, or included 
major roads and through routes which were used by large 
numbers o f potential victims on their way to and from the 
central tube, rail, bus terminus and shopping areas.
B R I X T O H  D I V I S I O N  
E S T A T E S  & D E M A N D  A R E A S
Fig- 4. 6
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A number o f methods were used to evaluate the physical 
environment in these areas, including COLMAN (1982). 
Each method conclusively showed that there were high 
levels o f crime and conflict.
As an example one HIGH demand area with high potential 
was the central Brixton market and shopping area. It is a 
major transport terminus of rail, underground and bus for  
the South London area. This ensures a steady supply o f 
potential robbery and theft victims from early morning until 
late at night. The shops and the open air street market 
also attract potential victims. In addition, the narrow 
surrounding streets with interconnecting passages and ample 
transport facilities provide easy access and escape routes 
for offenders.
Other HIGH demand areas, in particular RAILTON ROAD 
and its surrounding streets, had another unique aspect which 
considerably increased their environmental potential. Each 
o f these locations had a number o f premises or locations 
which were used for drug dealing, illegal drinking and 
gaming. Most importantly they had well known reputations 
for drug dealing and RAILTON ROAD was an internationally 
recognised drug market with an illegal financial income o f 
more than a million pounds per year.
In addition, RAILTON ROAD was a symbolic location with a 
history o f public disorder. This reputation was deliberately  
exploited by local criminals in order to restrict police work 
and maintain the illegal activities, together with their
revenue.
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Many different types o f people were attracted to these 
areas in order to purchase drugs. Some were only 
interested in drugs and had the money to pay for them. 
Others required drugs but had no money so they robbed 
those who had and other people in the central market area; 
these people also committed local burglaries to obtain the 
money required.
An interesting phenomenon, which supported an earlier 
hypothesis, was that in the immediate area around the 
criminal premises there was virtually no reported crime. It 
was discovered by local officers that these areas were 
highly controlled by local criminals who prevented theft, 
robbery and burglary to ensure police could not use these 
types o f  crime as reasons for being in these areas.
It was concluded by the project that the 'Design state o f  
the community' constrained peoples behaviour towards 
isolation and defensiveness, increased fear, and generally 
detracted from peoples Quality o f  Life.
In addition the 'physical state o f  the community' in the 
high and medium demand areas was very poor with typical 
urban decay and neglect. This decay included the roads, 
public open spaces and buildings. Over 12,000 dwellings 
were defined by the local authority as unfit with some 20% 
o f the total housing stock being substandard and a fuller 
12% in need o f major renovation. Almost all o f the 
substandard buildings were in the high demand areas. (N.P. 
Reports 1982, and 83).
Another important aspect o f the physical environment were 
the influences o f the actual location o f  Brixton in London 
and its 'geographical control' over the community. As has
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already been noted; Brixton is a major travel terminus for  
rail; underground and buses with major through routes
dissecting the Borough.
Brixton is a very convenient place to travel through and 
change from one form o f transport to another in 
consequence it is always full o f  strangers passing through. 
Some o f  the strangers stay for a while especially squatters 
in some o f  the 7,000 unoccupied council properties. It was 
suggested by the project that Brixton's geographical location 
and properties had a significant influence on the
communities stability and long term planning and
development.
4. 3.4. SOCIAL/CULTURAL ANALYSIS
For the purpose o f this study this category o f  analysis was 
confined to observable behaviour and did not attempt to
understand the mental processes connected with that 
behaviour. It is argued that this type o f  analysis o f  Social 
and Cultural features is more measurable and probably more 
significant to this type o f  study. Peoples actual behaviour 
is usually the major concern o f  any policing system.
A good example o f this is population movement. The 
population o f  Brixton was estimated to have dropped by 
20% between the 1971 and 1981 census. The majority o f  
those leaving had been in the 25 - 60 age range,
professional and skilled workers. In addition to this decline 
there was a high rate o f  transience or population movement 
with approximately 20% moving into Brixton in the five 
years prior to 1981. (N.P. Report 1982).
The main features o f  the Brixton population, which were 
considered to be one o f the worst examples in London,
were:-
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(a) A higher rate o f  population decline.
(b) A higher proportion o f  semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers.
(c) A larger proportion o f  low income households.
(d) Greater proportions o f  young and elderly.
(e) More one parent families, twice the national 
average, and a very high number o f  children in local 
authority care.
(f) Higher incidence o f  mental illness and mental and 
physical handicap.
There was also a higher proportion o f black people, in 
Brixton. Overall some 30% o f Brixton population were 
estimated to belong to non-white, ethnic groups. However, 
40% o f the under 18 year olds and 50% o f the 1 0 - 2 1  year 
olds were black. Unemployment among these two groups 
was estimated to be between 40% and 50%.
An important point to remember is that although these 
statistics refer to the whole o f  Brixton, the majority o f 
these conditions and groups were concentrated in the HIGH 
demand areas. This once again indicates that the poorer 
and more deprived an area is, the higher the demands on 
the police.
Leisure facilities in the whole o f  Brixton were extremely 
poor, with very little provision for the young unemployed in 
sport or any other leisure activity. The lack o f  this type 
o f  facility had contributed to the development o f  a street 
culture, where the young mainly black population in the 
HIGH demand areas used the streets for their leisure. The 
illegal drug, drinking and gambling premises became 
attractive haunts for many o f  these young people.
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In this situation crime had become a normal, accepted  
occupation and in one HIGH demand area over 60% o f the 
local residents had criminal records. In this area, crime 
was a successful way o f life and local fuvenile gangs had 
developed robbery and burglary into professional occupations. 
This point was particularly emphasised by the 1981 Public 
Enquiry,
"And living much o f their lives on the streets, they 
are brought into contact with the police who appear 
to them as the visible symbols o f the authority o f  a 
society which has failed to bring them its benefits 
or do them justice." (SCARMAN 1981).
The best predictor o f potential for serious conflict, 
especially street violence and disorder, is the fact that it 
has happened before. It would appear that behavioural, 
cultural or community restraints are significantly weakened 
in these circumstances.
4. 3.5 PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
An important element o f the Social and Cultural analysis is 
the psychology o f its inhabitants or communities. This 
concerns the attitudes and perceptions o f these people to 
their environment.
The 'community' or the public in BRIXTON were considered 
by the project to be made up o f a number o f broad 
interactive groups who held significantly different attitudes 
and perceptions about the area they lived, frequented or 
worked in.
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These groupings were broadly as follows;-
(0 A Street Culture group; mainly young, non white, 
unemployed in poor housing, squatting or homeless 
and involved in or surrounded by a criminal culture 
(SC ARM AN 1981).
(ii) A Residential group; living or working in BRIXTON, 
older, less unemployment in better housing as 
tenants or owners, with some financial stability 
despite low income levels in many cases.
(iii) A Community Agency group; professional or 
voluntary, extremely client orientated, trying to 
provide the best possible service for a wide range o f 
clients, usually with very restricted budgets and 
little or no power in the community.
(iv) Local Authority Services; organised and managed 
under strict Political ideology, with services to 
clients only provided in accordance with a rigid 
political framework. These services and individuals 
were highly active and motivated, often with 
considerable finance, resources and power.
4. 3.5.1. Street Culture
The Street Culture group were difficult to 
obtain attitudinal data from in a rigorous and 
reliable manner. They were suspicious o f  any 
type o f authority and often refused to be 
involved in any type o f  data collection. 
However, the Scarman Public Enquiry (1981) 
did manage to obtain a fair sample o f this 
groups attitudes and concerns.
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It appeared that this group were highly 
suspicious of the police, avoided them 
whenever possible, held low expectations, 
negative stereotypes and very hostile attitudes 
towards all police actions. As a group, they 
viewed themselves as rejected by society and 
excluded from the benefits enjoyed by the 
majority. They considered that laws,
regulations and conventions were designed to 
discriminate against them and therefore were 
not humane or just
In these circumstances, obtaining material gains 
by any means, legal or illegal, is justified as 
necessary to gain equal rights and standards as 
the majority.
In summary, this psychological profile is one o f 
extreme alienation from the majority, or even 
from similar but less disadvantaged people i.e. 
parents or successful peers. This profile is not 
unique to Brixton, in fact  it is similar to ones 
found in many disadvantaged groups all over 
the world. It has also been identified by 
various terrorist and extreme groups as the 
ideal profile for recruits to their various 
causes.
4  3.5.2. Resident Croup
The Resident group in BRIXTON were easier to 
approach and obtain data from. Their 
attitudes and perceptions were obtained by 
personal interviews conducted among a 
significant proportion o f  residents (S.C.P.Report 
1983)
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This research discovered that amongst this 
group, feelings o f community were not 
particularly strong in Brixton. Most people
saw it as an area where people keep  
themselves to themselves. Less than one in 
three knew most o f their neighbours to talk to. 
Asked for their feelings about leaving the area, 
as many said they would be pleased to leave 
as said they would be sorry.
Fear o f crime was high, particularly among 
women. One person in three fe lt  very unsafe 
walking alone after dark, a figure half as high 
again as that for London as a whole. Three 
people in four sometimes worried about the 
possibility they may be victims o f crime. For 
one in four, it was a big worry.
The crimes feared most were burglary and 
mugging. More than half the people in the 
Brixton division thought there was a fair  
amount o f burglary and a great deal o f bag- 
snatching or pick pocketing in their local area. 
More than half thought the police in the area 
were not very successful in dealing with these 
offences.
A considerable majority thought there were too 
few  police in the area and a considerable 
majority thought that too few  o f the police 
were on foot.
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People who had been in contact with the 
police were, in general, satisfied with the way 
they were treated (77%). The most common 
criticisms were o f slow response to emergency 
calls and o f lack o f interest or lack o f suitable 
action by police approached for help. The 
manner or behaviour o f officers was
occasionally criticised, especially by people who 
had been stopped as possible suspects.
Asked to rate the job done by the local police 
generally, more than half say they did a fairly  
good job. (Fig. 4. 7). One in five said they 
did a very good job. One in six said they did 
a rather poor job or a very poor job. The
opinions of young people on this point were 
generally less favourable than the opinions of 
older people.
Most thought the people in the area could do 
more on their own to prevent crime and most 
thought the police should get the help o f the 
community to prevent crime.
Half thought Neighbourhood Watch a very good 
idea and just under half said they would join if 
approached. But some were sceptical whether 
it would work and some saw it as a potential 
invasion o f privacy.
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OPINIONS OF POLICE (S.C.P.R.1983)
Fig. 4. 7 (Continued).
Just over one in three thought it a very good 
idea for people in the area to work as special 
constables with the police. Young people were 
less enthusiastic than older people about 
special constables. Special constables may 
relieve pressure on police manpower and act as 
a link between the police and the public. But 
some were doubtful about the level o f  training 
they would have and the sort o f  duties they 
could undertake and some were doubtful about 
the sort o f  people likely to enrol as special 
constables.
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4. 3.5.3. Community Agency
The Community Agency group were also 
relatiyely easy to obtain attitudinal data from 
and personal interviews were conducted 
amongst a significant proportion o f represent­
atives (A.2(3) Report 1983). It was found that 
these types o f groups were much closer to the 
Street Culture and therefore tended to 
represent some o f this groups views.
Community Agencies in the Brixton Division 
offered  a broad range o f  services to the public 
and catered for a large number o f people in 
the area. Most agencies used voluntary 
workers indicating the high degree o f
community involvement. However, some 
difficulty was experienced in recruiting 
volunteers from the area.
Most contact with police occurred when 
agencies reported a crime or incident to the 
police. Only a small number o f agencies came 
into contact with police informally or in 
situations which were not directly related to 
crime; for example, through meetings, police 
giving talks or demonstrations, etc. 
Interestingly, although agencies were aware o f 
the role o f  the Home Beat Officer 
(Geographical Officer) and showed enthusiasm 
for establishing or developing contact with this 
type o f officer, a substantial number o f 
agencies had never had any contact with a 
Home Beat Officer.
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The overwhelming majority o f  agencies stressed 
the need for more foot patrols and for police 
to get to know the people in the area. It is 
notable that, although a fair number o f  
agencies thought that police patrolled the area 
on foot a great deal or a fair amount, only a 
few thought the police actually got to know 
people in the area.
Most agencies welcomed more contact with 
police, particularly with Home Beat Officers. 
Many felt that such contact should be an 
informal and friendly nature, established on a 
regular basis and constructive in its aims. 
Agencies were very forthcoming with their 
ideas on ways o f  working together.
The majority fe lt there was room for  improve­
ment in the way police work in the area. 
Firstly, by improving contact and information 
flow between police and agencies. Second­
ly, through quicker response to calls and 
improvements in the way in which police deal 
with callers. Of those agencies who had 
reported a crime or incident to police in the 
past six months, many expressed some dis­
satisfaction with the service. Thirdly, for  
police to become more sensitive to the needs 
o f the community, by showing a caring and 
friendly attitude to people and by adopting less 
threatening policing strategies in the area. It 
was strongly fe lt that the use o f  certain police 
practices served to alienate police from the
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community and antagonise individuals, 
particularly youngsters. For example, the use 
o f the Special Patrol Group and stop and 
search procedures.
There appeared to be a vast potential for co­
operation between police and community 
agencies in the Brixton Division.
The overwhelming majority thought the police 
should try to work more closely with other 
agencies and many were prepared to take part 
in a police-community group approach to local 
problems. Agencies were very favourable to 
the idea o f  setting up Neighbourhood Watch 
Schemes in the area although somewhat less 
favourable to the use o f Special Constables.
However, despite positive attitudes towards a 
joint police and public approach to local 
problems, many held strong reservations. It 
was generally felt that, initially, only a few  
individuals would be willing to get involved. 
For most, the question o f  social acceptability 
in the community and the possibility o f  target 
attacks or reprisals against individuals were 
cited as reasons for non-participation.
By far one o f  the most significant findings o f  
this study was that the majority o f community 
agencies in Brixton Division recognised the 
need for closer co-operation and involvement 
with police at a informal level.
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However, a common theme running throughout 
the interviews was that police would be faced  
with many difficulties which they should 
address before starting any initiative in the 
community. These difficulties included a 
history o f poor relations between police and 
public in the Brixton Division, general suspicion 
and hostility towards police and an 
unwillingness to work with police due to apathy 
or fear o f reprisals.
4. 3.5.4 Local Authority
The Local Authority service group, despite 
repeated requests and initial agreement,
refused to co-operate with the project. This 
refusal resulted in a lack o f reliable attitudinal 
data from this group at the Pre-Test stage.
The collective data from the Physical, Social and 
Psychological analysis can now be used to calculate the 
Environmental Profile o f the required geographical areas.
4. 3.6. ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE
This profile refers to the ability o f a particular area to 
react to the levels o f crime or conflict. In particular, it 
reflects levels o f suppression or support for such behaviour. 
As described previously this interaction could be the 
physical design o f  an area and/or the people in that 
location, which provides this influence.
As illustrated below a scale was devised which graded the 
potential between SUPPORTIVE and HOSTILE.
+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3
SUPPORTIVE APATHETIC HOSTILE
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The most supportive areas were graded as +3 and required 
very little policing other than an effective 1st LEVEL 
service and support for local residents in self policing their 
own area.
At the -3 grade hostility or alienation from police was at 
its highest, requiring much higher levels o f police resources 
and sophistication in the policing systems utilised. The mid 
point o f  the scale at 0 tended to represented individuals 
who were able and capable o f actively supporting police but 
lacked the willingness or initiative to do so and were 
considered APATHETIC.
In BRIXTON, approximately a third o f the geographical area 
was classified as -2 or -3. Less than a sixth was 
considered +3 or +2, with the remainder being +1, 0, -1.
The total HOSTILE area was considered dangerously large 
when compared to the SUPPORTIVE. This type o f profile 
was significantly different from the 'average' police station 
examined, with the exception o f  HACKNEY, which is 
another inner city deprived area.
All the BRIXTON HIGH demand areas were HOSTILE, with 
only a small proportion o f the LOW demand areas being 
correspondingly SUPPORTIVE. Many o f  these LOW demand 
areas had significant geographical features which mitigated 
against high crime and conflict demands allowing the people 
in the area to be APATHETIC without great cost to their 
own QUALITY OF LIFE.
However, the mafority o f the SUPPORTIVE, LOW demand 
areas were close to HIGH demand areas which residents 
perceived as a threat to their QUALITY OF LIFE and were 
willing to be actively involved in maintaining and improving 
their areas.
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This environmental Profile now had to be combined with the 
Demand Profile for a more detailed analysis o f  the crime 
and conflict which existed. This was particularly important 
in the HIGH Demand area and these are shown as most 
HOSTILE (-3).
4. 3.7 CRIME AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS
A system was devised for predictive analysis o f crime and 
violence in a priority system which assessed the degree o f  
contribution to the potential o f an area. It also gave the 
priorities for police planning and strategies.
The system recognised both the TYPE o f crime or conflict 
and ■ who was involved. High fear events which had the 
most extreme e ffec ts  on public 'fear o f crime', such as 
sexual assaults, personal violence or entry to homes, had 
the highest priority for TYPE o f crime or conflict. 
Organised crime or conflict such as Mafia style
organisations and terrorist organisations had the highest 
priority for being INVOLVED. The next priority was group 
crime and conflict, where loose knit groups operated as 
supportive teams to commit robbery, burglary and
disturbances. The individual, random offender was the 
lowest priority in this system.
INVOLVED TYPE
(A) Organised groups (i) Sexual assault
Personal violence 
Entry to homes
(B) Random groups (it) Incidents against People
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(C) Random individual (iii) Incidents against Property
(Note: serious public concern or a perceived 'threat to the 
fabric o f  society' must sometimes increase the priority o f 
some incidents).
The priority level o f the TYPE o f incidents and to be 
linked to the priority o f who was INVOLVED to provide a 
final priority. Therefore, when high fear crime was 
committed by 'organised' groups, this produced the highest 
level o f concern and an urgent police priority.
By way o f example, in BRIXTON, the HIGH demand areas 
had resident organised groups who were making large 
amounts o f  money out o f illegal drugs, drinking and gaming. 
These groups also initiated violence and fearful street 
disturbances to maintain their control over these areas. In 
addition, random groups were continually and persistently 
committing high fear crimes o f robbery, burglary and sexual 
offences, all with a high degree o f personal violence 
towards the victim.
This type o f public behaviour existing as a significant norm 
and the continuing high demands on police to 'do their duty' 
and stop it produced the highest levels o f  
ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL in any o f  the police stations 
involved.
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4. 3.8. ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL
Finally, this concept, as an amalgum and interaction o f all 
the various Environmental data, proved very useful despite 
its simplistic approach. For example a HIGH demand area 
could have an Environmental profile o f -2 (HOSTILE), Crime 
and Conflict o f B(i) (Random groups committing incidents 
against people), expressed as:-
HIGH, -2, B(i).
This type o f POTENTIAL statement and prediction was then 
used to plan the type o f police service required and the 
particular strategies which may prove most effective.
It was clear that in BRIXTON police action in isolation 
would be ineffective. However, it should be remembered, a 
number o f  specific behaviours by the remaining population 
in these areas, who make up the potential victims for this 
type o f predictory behaviour, could help to neutralise and 
reduce this high POTENTIAL.
One such behaviour is that potential victims make 
themselves less vulnerable to crime and conflict. It was 
found that this did in fact happen and 95% o f residents 
took some type o f special precautions by protecting their 
homes and businesses with locks etc., (target hardening). 
Significantly, people also avoided some areas completely, or 
at certain times i.e. a fter dark.
Although this behaviour reduced the potential victim 
population, it also increased the level o f 'seige mentality'
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and street avoidance as hypothesised in Chapter 3. The 
research also confirmed that in these circumstances, this 
type o f environment increases demand on police and, on 
average, one person in five had contacted the police for 
assistance. This figure is almost twice the average for  
London as a whole at that time.
Prosocial behaviour, or helping your neighbours and 
associates, could also help to reduce POTENTIAL. One 
possible measure o f prosocial behaviour levels is involvement 
in voluntary work. The research found that 35% o f the 
people in BRIXTON had been involved in voluntary helping 
in the previous year. This was lower than the national 
average o f 44% at that time. In addition, three in five 
people interviewed considered their neighbourhood as one 
where neighbours did not get involved with each other. 
Less than one in three (31%) said they knew all or most o f 
their neighbours to talk to, 10% said they knew none o f 
their neighbours to talk to.
However, in support o f  the hypothesis in Chapter 3, it was 
found that there was a very large and significant difference 
in the behaviour o f voluntary workers and the remainder. 
Three in five o f those who were doing some form o f  
voluntary work said they had been approached for help by 
neighbours in the past year. This compared to only one in 
five o f  those not involved in voluntary work. These figures 
appear to imply that some people have a greater propensity 
or ability for prosocial behaviour than others and that this 
is something that can be recognised.
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It was also apparent that there was a significant minority 
o f people in Brixton, who were very active and influential 
in demanding and achieving changes. One such group had 
already formed the first voluntary Police and Public 
Consultative Group in Brixton. This model was later to be 
imposed by legislation to the whole o f England and Wales. 
The Consultative Group also carried on in very difficult 
circumstances, to produce a number o f  important initiatives, 
(e.g. Lay Visitors to the police station).
It would appear that despite the negative environment and 
decreased levels o f prosocial behaviour, individual members 
o f the public could still be very effective in these 
circumstances. This particular piece o f evidence helped to 
support the proposal that police should assist and protect 
such groups or individuals. It is suggested that this 
assistance against unlawful behaviour or intimidation would 
encourage higher levels o f such behaviour or better still, 
increase the numbers involved.
Despite these type o f encouraging evidence, in behavioural 
terms, the meeting o f a significant proportion o f  BRIXTON 
population and the police in the HIGH and sometimes 
MEDIUM demand areas, could only be considered an 
extremely HOSTILE situation with very high 
ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL for increasing the levels o f  
crime and conflict even further.
More recently TENSION INDICATORS (LOCKE, 1985) are 
being developed to link into ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL. 
It is envisaged that TENSION INDICATORS will predict the 
e ffec t  o f  a single incident or a series o f incidents in a 
particular area given the baseline o f  the POTENTIAL scale.
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For the purpose o f this analysis, it is now important to 
consider the e ffects  on the ENVIRONMENTAL SPIRAL 
(Chapter 2) introduced by the degree o f POTENTIAL 
described in this chapter.
4. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SPIRAL
Using the analysis involved in predicting the Environmental Potential, 
it should now be possible to evaluate this data against the important 
environmental elements already identified.
4. 4.1 QUALITY OF LIFE
(1) It was found that the level o f crime to the ratio o f 
population (HOME OFFICE CRIME STATISTICS) was, 
and had been for several years the highest in 
Britain.
(2) The levels o f conflict to the ratio o f population 
were again calculated by the project to be amongst 
the highest in the country. In 1981 BRIXTON 
suffered one o f the worst riots in the post war 
period.
(3) Attitudinal surveys and behavioural analysis o f the 
publics fear o f crime and conflict found that public 
life  style and perceptions were severely affected , 
producing unacceptable restrictions on everyday life.
(4) As previously reported Prosocial and helping
behaviour was found to be significantly lower than 
the averages for London as a whole.
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(5) The quality o f the police service for the victim was 
judged by the public and local police officers, to be 
very poor and in some cases non-existent.
(6) The levels o f public alienation were exceptionally 
high for significant groups in the population. This 
alienation was particularly evident against the police 
but also included deep splits between various groups 
and cultures in the community. As was indicated on 
the psychological element o f the environmental 
measures, isolation from authority and differing 
groups was a norm in BRIXTON.
(7) A number o f significant 'life style' changes were 
evident. The total percentage o f residents leaving 
was increasing every year. In addition the 
percentage o f transient residents in the population 
was much higher than the London average. As 
previously noted, people were also restricting their 
behaviour in everyday life by not going out, or 
avoiding areas close to their homes.
4. 4.2. LOCUS OF CONTROL
It was apparent that a significant proportion o f the public 
in BRIXTON, perceived themselves as helpless and unable to 
influence the major events in their lives. These individuals 
expected interventions by outside bodies, police, Local 
Authority or Community Agency, in any important life  
events. Independent action to resolve difficulties was 
threatening and almost inconceivable, displaying the traits 
o f 'Learned Helplessness' and 'External Locus o f Control'.
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However, there was one significant group that were far 
from helpless in these circumstances. This was the 
Street Culture Group, who most definitely had an internal 
Locus o f Control and were not helpless in many ways. 
They had learned that crime and conflict, initiated by them, 
was a means o f gaining control over their surrounding 
environment.
4. 4.3. PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
(1) 'Bystander' intervention had become a rare and 
unusual behaviour in BRIXTON. It was considered 
dangerous, unwise and foolhardy in all but the Street 
Culture group. These individuals would almost 
always intervene to help each other on the streets 
in any brushes with the police or other authorities.
(2) Very high levels o f victim avoidance (restricting 
personal freedom to avoid risk) were discovered, 
almost to the point o f neurosis. However, it 
became clear that high levels o f victim avoidance or 
prevention had to be balanced with prosocial 
behaviour towards neighbours. Otherwise this type 
o f behaviour became counter productive and assisted 
in a seige mentality.
(3) Voluntary helping or Community helping was found 
to be significantly lower than for London as a 
whole. However, some individuals, despite their 
smaller numbers, seemed to be able to produce 
major changes and effects.
4. 4.4. POLICE SATISFACTION
Satisfaction with police was only slitfxtly lower than average 
in the residents group, with 77% saying they thought police
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were doing a very or fairly good job. This compares with 
79 - 85% in national polls at that time. However, this
group was very concerned about the methods police used 
and expressed some disquiet.
The Community Agency groups were quite critical o f police 
as representatives o f their various clients. They made 
strong criticisms o f police methods, behaviour and attitudes 
in the BRIXTON area.
Surprisingly, complaints against police, as recorded at that 
time, were below average, for that type o f London Police 
Station. However, it was apparent that many o f  the 
registered complaints had involved advice from Community 
agencies or the Local Authority.
In summary, it would appear that demands for police 
reactive service had spiraled far above what could be 
effectively  dealt with by available police resources.
The majority o f  the public in BRIXTON had reacted to this 
situation with apathy and acceptance o f  random crime and 
conflict. In certain areas, possibly as much as a third o f  
the total police area, organised crime groups were in 
control and obtaining a high return from their illegal 
activities.
Fortunately, no illegal vigilante groups had been formed to 
fight back, but a small number o f powerful groups and 
individuals were fighting back, by all the legal means at 
their disposal.
The picture which emerges from the Environmental Analysis 
in this chapter is suggested to be one o f significant urban 
decay. Physically the environment would appear to have 
been creating powerful negative e ffec ts  on the residents 
Quality o f Life. Social and cultural influences in the area
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were fragmented into numerous minority interests with little 
cohesion or co-operation between any groups.
Virtually the only cohesive and co-operative groups were 
those involved in the dominant criminal sub-culture, which 
had become established as a 'normal' way o f  life in Brixton. 
Hostility against legal authority o f any kind tended to be 
concentrated against the most obvious symbol o f  that 
authority, the police.
The question which now remains is what sort o f Police 
System was attempting to cope with this problem, and why 
was it in decay?
4. 5. POUCE SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In Chapter 1, an overview o f  the projects police station analysis was 
described. It summarised the total data and problem areas from all 
the police stations involved. The major areas o f concern were; 
organisational structure, resources, demands and information systems.
Chapter 3 then identified two existing police systems, which 
although argued to be inadequate, could still be maintained with 
limited effectiveness for various periods o f  time. This effectiveness 
was dependent on achieving certain levels o f performance on the 
measures laid down. In addition, a third, as yet non-existent, 
system o f policing was created.
It was argued that, in theory, this system answered the problems 
identified earlier. However, a system o f analysis was required which 
would clearly indicate which LEVEL o f policing existed and its 
effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with the processes o f the 
Extended Reactive Spiral.
Accordingly a method o f  analysis was created, which is illustrated in 
Fig.4. 8. This diagram lays out the process developed by the 
project to analyse police stations and was first used in a very early 
form at BRIXTON.
It was found that significant amounts o f data required by the 'ideal' 
measures described in Chapter 3, were not collected and were 
almost impossible to collect with the limited project resources. The 
police organisation itself did not routinely collect such information. 
However, the available data has been described and despite the 
omissions, still allows considerable analysis.
In this section, the diagnostic chart (Fig.4. 8), will be followed for 
the analysis o f Brixton Police Station. This will allow all the
identified problem areas to be described. A summary will then be 
made against the Police Spiral to provide an overview o f the 
'Problem Situation' at that level.
3rd L E V E L  G E O G R A P H I C A L  
POLI CI NG ; POLICING
D E F I N I T I O N  F E A T U R E S M E A S U R E S
2nd L E V E L  i SOUAO 
POLI CI NG ' P 0 L I C I N 6
D E F I N I T I O N  | F E A T U R E S M E A S U R E S
1st L E V E L  , RESPONSE 
POLICING 1 POLICING
D E F I N I T I O N  | F E A T U R E S M E A S U R E S
POLICE SYSTEM ANALYSIS
..............— ...................... .......... i i
Fig. 4. 8.
-  1 3 6 -
At Brixton Police Station, two analyses were undertaken in 
November 1981 and April 1983, as previously described. For this 
thesis, the 1981 data will be used as a base line with changes in 
1983 noted at the end o f  each description.
In essence, the analysis first looked at the definition o f  the LEVEL 
o f the problem to see if  that could broadly describe the method o f 
policing. I f it appeared doubtful that the LEVEL described actually 
existed, then a brief check on the system Features or measures was 
made. An in depth analysis was only made when a LEVEL was 
believed to exist.
4. 6. 1st LEVEL RESPONSE POLICING
Definition Analysis; Without doubt, there was almost total 
commitment from the majority o f  resources at Brixton Police 
Station to providing 'First Aid' to victims who were rendered 
temporarily inadequate by events outside their control.
4. 6.1. FEATURE ANALYSIS
(1) The Police Station was almost totally 'time based' 
in strategy, operation, deployment, operational street 
behaviour and culture.
(2) The manpower level was inadequate in 1981, but 
more than adequate to provide an effective  
Response Service in 1983. However the police 
manpower actually deployed on response service was 
a low proportion o f  the total with many officers on 
specialist functions on 'standby' in a peacekeeping 
role.
(3) Resources at BRIXTON were deployed almost 
exclusively in response to public demands and 
incidents. Police were dedicated to helping victims 
after  an incident had occurred.
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(4) There was little or no e ffec t  victim prevention 
achieved by the Policing System. Less than 1% o f  
police resources were involved in prevention.
(5) The structure and methods o f  everyday operational 
policing were for uniform officers to await for  
directions and tasks from the Police Station or 
Scotland Yard Information Room. Officers would 
habitually return to the police station for further 
assignments or would patrol whilst awaiting radio 
assignments. Decisions on deployment were made 
centrally in response to public demands. Police 
officers preferred to be directed by radio than to 
intervene in an incident on their own initiative 
whilst on patrol.
(6) Both officially at policy level and within police 
culture the public were not considered to have a 
part to play in the policing o f  BRIXTON.
(7) The lowest level o f  official autonomy or decision 
making was at Chief Inspector rank. Inspectors, 
Sergeants and Constables were expected by the 
system to comply with the comprehensive rules and 
rigid procedures laid down. In e ffec t , these ranks 
had all merged into a common work group, with 
little evidence o f  management or supervision. 
Deployment and procedures as prescribed, were 
almost impossible to achieve.
At this point in the analysis it is clear that a 1st LEVEL, 
Response Policing System did exist. The next analysis o f  
the Performance Measures will now assess the efficiency  
and effectiveness o f  that system.
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4. 6.2. DEMAND FOR SERVICE;
In March 1983, HIGH and MEDIUM Demand areas
constituted over a third o f  the total geographical area and 
were responsible for over 75% o f the total demands or calls 
for service. Approximately one third o f the geographical 
areas all o f  the HIGH demand and the majority o f  the
MEDIUM demand, was classified as HOSTILE (-2 or -3).
Less than a sixth was considered SUPPORTIVE (+3 or +2),
the remainder was APATHETIC.
It was estimated that a little over 20% o f  Brixton public 
had required p o lic e ' assistance in the last twelve months. 
This ratio was one of, if  not the highest in Britain at that 
time.
4. 6.3. POLICE RESOURCES 
4. 6.3.1. Buildings
Brixton Police Station was built in 1958 and 
opened on 5th January 1959. Although it was 
less than 30 years old and therefore one o f  
London's newest police stations, it was 
woefully inadequate for the policing
requirements o f  Brixton in 1981. The major 
problems were as follows:-
(1) Very restricted facilities in the front 
o ffice  dealing with the public calling at 
the station for service. For example, 
waiting, seating and interview facilities 
could not cope with the public demand 
which sometimes led to queues in the 
street outside.
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(ii) Totally inadequate cells and charging 
facilities for prisoners. This sometimes 
required three to four prisoners for single 
cell. In addition a charge room had not 
been included in the original design o f  
the building and required an entrance 
corridor to the cells to be converted into 
a tiny charge room.
(iii) Lack o f  o ffice  space, briefing rooms, 
charging, refreshment, toilet and storage 
facilites for all police and civilian staff, 
leading to severe overcrowding.
(iv) The police station yard was too small to 
even accommodate the police vehicles 
allocated to the station. No 'on street' 
parking was available.
Remembering that the building was in use 24 
hours per day and grossly overcrowded for the 
majority of that time, the building had become 
very shoddy and even squalid.
After 1981, a major re-building programme was 
planned to be completed by 1986. However, in 
the short term, the reality o f  the situation was 
that without any significant improvements, by 
1983 the number o f  police and civilians using 
the existing building had increased by over a 
third.
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In summary, despite the relative newness of 
the building it was totally inadequate for its 
purpose and overwhelmed by the volume o f 
work and use it was subjected to.
4 6.3.2 Equipment
Apart from the police building, the only other 
significant equipment available to the police at 
Brixton were vehicles and communication/radio 
equipment. Very little technology, o ffice  
systems or labour saving equipment was 
available during either survey.
Information systems, with a single exception, 
did not exist. Not only between the environ­
ment and the system, but also inside the 
system between the various functions. No 
investment, technical or human, had been 
made at the police station, nor was there an 
understanding or acceptance that such systems 
were essential to any police system.
This system was closed, responding only to the 
immediate powerful demands o f  the 
environment. It did not utilise feedback from 
the public customers o f  its service, or 
information regarding its effectiveness. This 
system remained static and rigid, bound in 
tradition and culture as a classic 'closed 
organised system'.
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Communication equipment at Brixton was also 
a problem. All telephone calls from the public 
and between police were routed through one 
old, inadequate switchboard, operated by a 
single telephonist. In 1981 the first analysis 
had highlighted this problem and it was then 
found that up to half o f the available lines 
were persistently defective due to the age o f  
the equipment.
This situation and equipment still remained in 
1983, but by then was the subject o f  increasing 
complaints by the general public and the local 
Police Consultative Group.
Brixton was supplied with 58 personal radios in 
1981, by 1983 this had been increased to 83 
radios. However, in both analysis it was found 
that over 30% o f radios were always awaiting 
repair due to the lack o f adequate repair 
facilities. This resulted in significant numbers 
o f  officers not having radios when patrolling. 
None o f  the radios supplied were suitable for  
use by plain clothes officers.
Supply, maintenance and repair o f  police 
equipment was the responsibility o f  different 
branches o f  the organisation. Despite the best 
o f  intentions these separate branches had little 
or no co-ordination or communication between 
them. When compared to the existing military 
communications at that time, police operational 
communications and equipment were old, 
inadequate and insufficient.
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In 1980, prior to the riot, Brixton had three 
'Panda' car3 withdrawn as a result o f  central 
policy decisions to 'return more officers to the 
streets'. It should be noted that this decision 
was made without research or adequate 
analysis as to its e ffects . The results for  
Brixton were that the number o f  police 
vehicles was reduced to seven, five in police 
livery and two unmarked vehicles.
It is not possible to analyse precisely the 
e ffec ts  o f  this reduction, due to lack o f  
suitable data. However the perception o f  the 
public and the police was that service to the 
public and assistance to officers and trouble 
were seriously a ffected . The available data 
support this to some extent.
By 1983, a fter the riot, the number o f  vehicles 
at Brixton had increased to seventeen, perhaps 
supporting the earlier perception o f  insufficient 
vehicles. Five o f  the additional vehicles were 
suitable for  use by plain clothes officers. One 
problem with these vehicles was that they 
quickly became known to local criminals, 
reducing their effectiveness. Unfortunately, 
rotating or exchanging these vehicles with 
other police stations was very difficult because 
o f internal bureaucratic procedures for  
vehicles. In addition, maintenance and repair 
procedures for all vehicles could result in up 
to a third o f Brixton vehicles not being 
available for operational use.
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4. 6.3.3. Human Resources and Attitudes
In November 1981, a very basic attitude and 
opinion survey o f Constables, Sergeants and 
Inspectors wea undertaken. (N.P. Report 1982). 
This suxvey identified the following as being o f  
major concern o f these officers at that time in 
the following priority;
1) High risk o f public disorder
2) High crime rate
3) Difficulty in identifying and arresting 
criminals
4) High work load
5) Disaffected minority groups
6) Lack o f support in sections o f  the 
community
7) Working in a high stress situation for long 
periods
8) Exposure to the media which was often  
highly critical
9) A conflict o f objectives in seeking to 
enforce the law whilst maintaining a 
fragile peace.
A major concern in the conclusion o f  this 
survey was the apparent low morale and high 
levels o f  stress exhibited by the o fficers  
interviewed.
In March 1983, a more comprehensive survey 
was undertaken, including significant samples o f  
all officers at the station (A2(3) Report 
1983A):-
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Almost all o fficers (95%) thought the present 
buildings and facilities did not meet the 
demands in the station area very well. Four 
in five thought this o f the present supply o f  
vehicles and half thought this o f  radio 
equipment. Officers were least critical about 
the level o f manpower. Three quarters fe lt  
that the existing number o f officers met 
demands either very well or fairly well.
Asked about the relative merits o f re­
organisation and increase in resources, half the 
officers thought an increase in resources to be 
the more effective policy. Just under half 
thought re-organisation to be more effective.
Although four in five officers considered that 
present training prepared officers to a certain 
extent for the problems they meet, eight out 
o f  ten said they would like to see changes in 
the present system o f training. Asked about a 
list o f  seven subjects covered in training, most 
officers favoured an increase in five o f  them.
Three in four officers said that they found it 
quite difficult or very difficult to get 
information they needed on local problems and 
resources. Four in five saw possible benefits 
in having sufficient information available on 
computer although quite a large proportion 
(almost half) saw possible snags in this.
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Four in five officers expressed satisfaction 
with the type o f  advice and guidance they got 
from their immediate supervisors. However, 
many thought supervisors should spend more 
time giving advice o f this sort. A third o f  
officers thought sergeants and inspectors should 
spend more time giving advice to constables.
Over half the officers said their supervisors 
spent too little time or no time at all asking 
for their opinions and suggestions. A third 
said this regarding advice and encouragement.
Almost all o fficers thought it important for 
constables, sergeants and inspectors to meet 
regularly and exchange ideas and information. 
Most thought there was a fair amount o f  
chance for this to happen.
The majority o f  o fficers considered that senior 
officers did understand the problems that 
police officers in Brixton had to deal with 
although only one in seven believed that they 
fully understood. Four in ten officers thought 
the present lines o f  communication with senior 
ranks were not very good or not at all good.
Roughly half o f  the officers thought 
departments communicated with difficulty. An 
additional fifth  thought there was a total lack 
o f communication between departments. 
Conversely, a third o f officers fe lt  that 
departments communicated without difficulty. 
It appeared that uniformed patrol constables 
had the most difficulty.
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When asked about levels o f morale in the 
station, half opted for saying it was sometimes 
high and sometimes low. The majority o f  the 
remainder considered morale to be always or 
mostly low.
Most officers saw offending, particularly 
offending against property, as very common in 
the Brixton area. Two thirds thought the 
police could cope with the present level o f 
street crime In the area only with difficulty. 
Nearly a third thought street crime has risen 
beyond their capacity to cope.
Most officers thought the local public placed a 
fairly high importance on police performance 
o f quite a wide range o f tasks, particularly 
answering emergency calls and detecting 
offenders. Just over half the officers 
considered that the public were fairly 
satisfied with police performance and most o f 
the remainder (a third) believed that the public 
were not very satisfied.
The majority o f o fficers - three quarters - saw 
the public in the area as not very co-operative 
or not at all co-operative with the police.
Almost all officers favoured encouraging local 
residents to look a fter each other and show 
more concern for their area. Opinions varied 
regarding what e ffec t  an increased use o f  
volunteers would have on police workload. 
Most officers thought the level o f  actual police
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involvement in schemes should stay as it is at 
present, indirect involvement such as referring 
victims and giving advice when requested were 
the preferred police roles.
However, when a specific example was 
provided o f  the public actually voluntering to 
help police a negative reaction was discovered. 
There was a tendency for most officers to 
think somewhat poorly o f  specials in the 
station with half the officers seeing bad points 
about having specials and two thirds
considering relations with them to be poor.
Over half the o fficers said they would be very 
or fairly willing to run a crime prevention 
scheme or take part in a residents' association 
meeting. Officers were most unwilling to help 
run youth clubs and to give talks on self-  
defence.
The majority o f  o fficers thought that the 
amount o f  time spent on school liaison work 
should stay as it was, which as previously 
shown, was very poorly resourced by Police. 
However, almost two thirds o f  o fficers said 
that they personally would be fairly willing or 
very willing to give talks to children in 
schools. Nearly all officers agreed that the 
police need the help o f  schools and parents to 
deal with the problem o f juveniles.
A majority o f  officers indicated that they 
thought that working with social agencies was
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important in dealing with common problems 
and an even greater majority favoured more 
discussion with the local public about policing 
problems.
The vast majority o f officers thought that 
police in Brixton spent most o f their time 
reacting to problems and that trying to prevent 
problems before they arise would be a more 
effective way o f dealing with crime. Two 
thirds fe lt that the police could do more to 
prevent problems before they arise.
Once again however, when offered a practical 
example o f  how this could be achieved; most 
officers, especially those currently working on 
patrol, favoured working on relief with no 
continuing responsibility for a particular beat 
or area over working on one with such 
responsibility.
4. 6.3.4. Results o f  Surveys
The picture which emerged from this survey 
was one o f  confusion. There was a theoretical 
understanding by the majority o f  o fficers o f  
the issues involved and their possible 
solutions. Unfortunately, despite the
agreement that change was necessary, it was 
strongly resisted at the practical level. It was 
also apparent that o fficers did not understand 
'cause and e f fe c t ’ in the policing methods 
currently employed. Being unfamiliar with 
information systems and feedback they did not 
clearly understand how systems, methods and 
organisational changes could improve the 
existing problem situation ■
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These deficiencies are perhaps best illustrated 
by the virtual ignoring o f the third vital 
resource available to Brixton, the public them­
selves. Out o f  an establishment o f  69 
volunteer Special Constables, there were 
actually only 16. Encouragement, resources 
and practical steps to improve this situation 
were not forthcoming, perhaps not surprising in 
view o f the police attitude towards these 
public volunteers.
Similarly, although considering school liaison, 
multi-agency co-operation and crime prevention 
to be vitally important areas for the public to 
assist police, there was a marked reluctance 
to increase the meagre police resources
presently invested in these areas. As a result 
o f this lack o f  investment, the potential o f  
public resources was not exploited and even
considered unrealistic by the police themselves.
4. 6.4. RESOURCES TO DEMANDS
The major resources o f Brixton Police Station were the
human resources o f the police officers and civilians working 
there. As has been previously explained, the most 
predictive data was the number o f uniformed patrolling 
constables, therefore this will be dealt with first.
In the three years prior to 1981 the number o f  constables 
had fluctuated between 170 and 185, never reaching the
authorised establishment o f  190. For some months prior to 
April 1981 the number had averaged 172, which will be used 
as the figure for calculating the minimum Response Level 
for 1st Level policing.
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It was established from the response message data that a 
minimum o f 40 constables per day were required to deal 
with the service demands from the public. No allowance 
was made for direct demands to an o fficer  on patrol 
because at that time those appeared almost negligible.
The number o f constables required (40) then had to be 
doubled to allow for a 50% normal abstraction rate and 
duties o ff  the police station area (e.g. aid to other stations, 
court, etc., = 80 officers).
Essential posts inside the police station had to be manned 
24 hours per day and, using Home Office formulas, was 
calculated at 32 officers per day.
It was therefore calculated that the minimum response level 
in April 1981 was 112 uniformed constables per day.
However, on examination o f the actual response deployment 
on the streets suggested that due to the ENVIRON MENTAL 
POTENTIAL and the high proportion o f  HOSTILE areas, 
from which the majority o f the demands originated, 
additional factors had to be included. During the peak 
demand times, single officers could not be allowed to deal 
with incidents and between 2 - 6  o fficers were assigned to 
each incident wherever possible.
This type o f  deployment has now been included in the 
formula, usually requiring additional officers  in the street 
operational calculation (approximately one third more) i.e. 
30 officers, 112 + 30 = 142 Constables required.
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Unfortunately this calculation depends on adequate vehicle 
support in order to move the additional manpower 
effectively  and efficiently to the various demand requests. 
At Brixton, three street operational vehicles had been 
removed and analysing the data suggests that there was 
actually a requirement for 60 extra constables (two thirds).
If this figure were accepted it would have increased the 
minimum response level in April 1981 to 172 uniformed 
constables per day.
Once again, an examination o f the deployment data at that 
time showed that 52 uniformed constables were in fact 
removed from operational uniform response duties and 
employed on various specialist functions (squads etc). This 
resulted in 120 constables actually being available for  
response work.
The abstraction total at Brixton exceeded the suggested 
fifth o f resources and nearly totalled a third o f the 
resources.
This serious shortfall in manpower resources was made far  
worse by the inefficient deployment policies which had 
approximately the same number o f officers on duty at all 
times o f  the day regardless o f the actual demand profile. 
In addition, local practices had been allowed to develop 
which abstracted officers for training courses etc., when 
they were posted to the 'late turn1 periods (3 p.m. - 1 1  
p.m.) which were also the peak demand periods. This often  
resulted in there being less officers than normal on duty at 
peak demand times.
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In March 1983, the situation had altered dramatically. 
Since December 1981, there had been approximately 265 
constables attached to the station, which will be taken as 
the average for the minimum Response Level calculation;
It is estimated for the response data that a minimum o f 44
constables per day were required to deal with the service
demands from the public. Officers were now dealing with 
more incidents direct without waiting for station 
assignment, but these incidents were usually recorded on the 
message data so required no extra demand allowance. 
(Often assistance or other services were required).
Number doubled for abstraction = 88 constables 
Plus 32 inside posts = 120 constables
Plus 60 for HOSTILE areas = 180 constables
Minimum response level = 180 constables
Additional 50 constables for specialist duties = 230
constables.
Due to the increased potential for spontaneous disorder in 
1982 - 83, constables calculated for HOSTILE areas had to 
remain at 60, despite the increase in vehicles for first 
response. The remaining 35 constables were divided 
between the various duties, in particular peacekeeping duties 
when disorder problems were expected. Unfortuately, due 
to the lack o f  e ffective information and control systems, 
there were still a significant number o f occasions when 
insufficient constables were on duty at peak demand times.
In addition, in support o f  the Reactive Spiral hypothesis and 
as detailed in the Demand Analysis crimes and public 
demands continued to rise virtually unchecked despite the 
massive Increase in manpower resources.
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With regard to the civilian resources, in 1981 these were 
recognised as being insufficient. There was an authorised 
establishment for 46 civilian support s ta ff but the actual 
numbers were an average 30% below this establishment.
By 1983 this shortfall had been reduced to 20% and a s ta ff 
review had recommended an additional 6 civilian s ta ff were 
required due to workloads. Unfortunately due to policy 
restraints this increase was unable to be authorised.
In conclusion, the basic manpower requirements for a 1st 
LEVEL Response policing system were not fulfilled in 1981 
due to the high abstraction rate from uniform patrol duties. 
Similarly, in 1983, more than significant resources existed, 
but the ability to match these resources to demand 
requirements and patterns, did not.
Despite the adequate manpower and vehicle resources; due 
to lack o f  resource planning, deployment o f resources to 
meet demands, information systems and local procedures, 
there were still numerous occasions when there were 
insufficient officers to meet the peak demands. In addition 
there was little attempt to place officers in the areas 
which were known to have the highest demand.
The concept o f  resource management, not surprisingly in 
this type o f  information vacuum was almost alien to the 
running o f  Brixton police station. There was almost a naive 
helplessness regarding the existence or not o f  the resources 
required.
Consequently, despite the more than adequate manpower and 
some other resources, the police 1st LEVEL Response 
system was still unable to be effective and efficient in 
matching resources to demand in March 1983.
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4. 6.5. INCIDENT HANDLING
The practice o f  grading or deferring calls was not 
recognised as official police policy between 1981 and 1983. 
Consequently all calls for service were expected to be dealt 
with as soon as possible. It was considered inefficient to 
hand calls over to another relief at the end o f  a tour o f  
duty.
The majority o f  emergency calls would be answered in 
under two minutes. Officers responded very quickly to the 
most urgent calls, particularly when individual officers  
required assistance.
Unfortunately, many public emergency calls were re­
classified by police as 'non-urgent' due to pressure o f  work 
at peak demand times. Many non-urgent demands were 
then effectively  not answered, as officers were reluctant to 
hand over nonanswered calls to another relief.
The average number o f  officers required to deal with the 
first reponse to all calls, due to non-deferment, was found 
to be 3.5 officers.
Outside peak demand times, the average time to complete 
each incident was 2.5 hours. However, in peak demand 
times this could be reduced to below 50 minutes. Incidents 
were either incorrectly dealt with or ignored in order to 
achieve these reduced times. The incident levels per 
individual o fficer  at peak demand times reflected a similar 
finding and were not possible to achieve.
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Little attempt was made to plan and deploy an appropriate 
response to individual demands. Whoever was available, or 
willing, was expected to deal, even when it was clear a 
specialist unit would be preferable.
4. 6.6. QUALITY OF SERVICE
An examination o f police records revealed a very low 
standard o f incident recording with significant amounts o f  
information not obtained or recorded properly.
Similarly when the accuracy levels were examined, mistakes 
were common and up to 40% o f incidents recorded 
contained mistakes. Progress reports were invariably not 
provided to victims.
Examination o f the police records and victim interviews, 
indicated that correct procedures were rarely followed. 
Officers when interviewed, agreed with these findings and 
disclosed in many cases that they did not know the required 
procedures or referrals.
When victims, who had received police service, were 
interviewed they tended to be critical o f police behaviour. 
They considered that a majority o f  o fficers were 
disinterested and only concerned to obtain basic details and 
then leave as soon as possible. A voluntary Victim 
Support Group in Brixton reported similar views and 
experiences.
Expressions o f  public thanks by letter etc., were minimal 
and invariably referred to a small consistent group o f  
officers.
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4. 6.7. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
In summary, a basic 1st LEVEL Response policing service 
did exist in Brixton in 1983. Unfortunately, the system had 
limited effectiveness and efficiency, as has been described. 
However, it is important to remember that the performance 
measures used for analysis did not exist outside the project 
at that time. There were in fact no local or force 
performance measures in existence which would have 
enabled this type o f judgment to be made about the system. 
In addition, even if  there had been, the information required 
was not collected and would have been difficult to obtain.
It is now required to establish if a 2nd LEVEL, Squad 
Policing System existed at Brixton. The analysis has 
already indicated that a very high proportion o f manpower 
resources were allocated to specialist, functional duties. 
Evidence to date has indicated that maintaining an effective  
2nd LEVEL system requires the foundation o f an efficient 
1st LEVEL policing system.
7. 2nd LEVEL SQUAD POLICING
Definition Analysis; It was apparent that a number o f  police teams
or squads did exist which specialised mainly in a priority demand.
Their objective was to be effective in reducing this demand.
4. 7.1. FEATURES ANALYSIS
1. All o f the squads or teams were explicitly task and 
function based. However it was apparent that single 
objectives were not always clear. There were 
robbery and drug squads, but there were also 'crime' 
squads whose objectives were apparently multiple.
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As has been indicated the Squad system was not 
supported by an effective Response policing system. 
In fact the 2nd LEVEL system had abstracted nearly 
one third o f  the available manpower resources at 
Constable level.
Although the squads were intended to deal with high 
fear  crime and organised or group crime, an analysis 
o f their actual work revealed that very few results 
in these areas were achieved. Arrests tended to be 
o f  a random operational nature, rather than planned 
operations.
Once again, with very few exceptions, the squads 
were not directed effectively  against individuals or 
premisesAocations.
It was clear that the squads had little preventive 
e ffe c t  when judged against the yearly increase in 
crime reported.
The squads were formed directly in response to 
demands that were perceived by the police to be 
out o f  control by normal policing methods.
In theory the squads all had high levels o f  autonomy 
and in comparison to uniformed response officers, 
they did have. However they were often used as a 
central resource for numerous tasks other than their 
objective. In addition, i f  they managed to achieved 
their objective, the resulting paperwork, 
administration and court appearance, rendered them 
inoperative for considerable periods o f  time. In fact 
their autonomy was an illusion and not a practical 
reality.
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8. The squads had virtually no equipment, radios and
appropriate vehicles being the most obvious
deficiencies. This lack o f  suitable equipment 
appeared to be a major element in the success or 
failure o f any 2nd LEVEL system.
9. In the area o f crime, there did exist a reasonably
effective information system via the Collator 
system. However the system was not effective at 
producing intelligence from the information. It was 
largely left to the skills o f  the individual o fficer  to 
analyse the information available. Once again lack 
o f manpower and suitable resources reduced
effectiveness in this area.
10. In was found that each squad or team was virtually
self-contained with little meaningful contact or 
information exchange with any other group police or 
public. This isolation between the functional teams 
or squads was diagnosed as one o f the major 
information weaknesses in the Police Station. The 
CID and the uniform officers traditionally maintain 
different cultures and objectives which in itself was 
a serious barrier to effectiveness. Even worse
however, within the uniform and CID groups 
additional functional splits created even more
barriers. The most extreme example o f  this process 
was the isolation o f  the Home Beat Constables from 
virtually everybody else in the strictly divided and 
segregated police station.
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4. 7.2. RESULT OF ANALYSIS
By 1983, as a result o f the 1981 analysis manpower had 
been significantly increased and specialist squads manpower 
abstractions had decreased to approximately one fifth  o f  the 
total Constables available. However, an effective  
Response service was still not maintained in 1983. This 
again was due to inefficient deployment and abstraction 
rates caused by lack o f  information systems.
In 1982, specialist crime squads working to the type o f  
performance measures outlined in Chapter 3. were 
introduced to work at BRIXTON, mainly on drug related 
crime. Unfortunately by 1983 these small squads were 
expected to service over twenty police stations and became 
a centrally directed resource. In e ffe c t  services to 
BRIXTON became negligible and the BRIXTON based squads 
did not adopt similar performance measures.
There was no doubt from the analysis that although a 
number o f  2nd LEVEL features did exist in 1981 - 83, there 
were insufficient to maintain a stable system. In 
conclusion, a Squad Policing system did not exist.
What is now required is an analysis to determine if any 
elements o f  a 3rd LEVEL Geographical Policing system are 
present. Remembering that a fter  March 1983, it was 
intended to implement such a policing system.
8. 3rd LEVEL GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING
4. 8.1. DEFINITION ANALYSIS.
Even i f  the 'defined geographical area' were stretched to 
its limit and accepted at the total area covered by 
BRIXTON Police Station, then it would still not be provided 
with police service by a stable team o f officers with low 
functional divisions o f task.
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Total s ta ff turnover at Brixton was estimated to be in 
excess o f  one third per year, averaged at all levels. In 
addition, operational street officers were not effectively  
posted to beats, or small geographical areas for long enough 
periods to develop some measure o f knowledge and control. 
In practice almost all operational officers at Brixton 
reacted to events from any location on the area. Policing 
at the station was reactive and predominantly time based.
Functional divisions were also highly developed by 
organisational structure and in police attitudes. Even 
response street policing had developed into a narrow 
functional task o f  attending the scene and leaving as soon 
as possible. As was illustrated in the Environmental
Analysis incidents, members o f the public assisting the 
police were so rare that it was considered abnormal by both 
police and public.
4. 8.2. FEATURES ANALYSIS
1. There was a very low investment in preventive 
policing. One, full time Crime Prevention Officer 
provided advice to businesses and the general public 
on mainly physical target hardening. In addition, 
there were services provided by a Community 
Relations Chief Inspector, who appeared effective  
but was shared between four police stations and 
therefore a limited resource. Analysis o f patrolling 
street officers behaviour failed to observe significant 
levels o f preventive behaviour in every day 
operational policing. It was estimated that less than 
1% o f the total resources were invested in
preventive policing.
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2. No multiple objective teams could be found, even 
the operational street teams (relief) had developed 
response policing into a functional task. They had 
little concept o f the wider implications o f any 
demand they dealt with.
3. Functional divisions were the norm and actively 
encouraged as a method o f dealing with any new 
problem or an old problem that had become 
unmanageable.
4. Of the 170 - 185 uniformed Constables, only 14
were geographically based. These officers were 
Home Beat Constables posted for extended periods 
to a beat working to their own daily roster. It was 
difficult to quantify the actual work o f these 
officers; they handled very few response demands 
and appeared almost totally detached from the
everyday work o f the Police Station. Their actual 
work may have been preventive, but this was ad hoc 
and not part o f any planned local strategy. The 
remaining officers were all time based and function 
based.
5. The policy o f public involvement, reflected force 
culture at that time, a rejection o f  public 
involvement. The public were constantly advised 'to 
leave it to the professional police'. This culture 
was particularly evident at BRIXTON. Few if any 
resources were allocated as can perhaps be 
illustrated by the reduction to sixteen Special 
Constables, compared to the authorised establishment 
o f sixty nine.
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6. There were no geographic supervisors and almost all 
the effective decisions on resource deployment were 
made by Chief Inspectors and above. Although, a 
significant proportion o f these types o f  decisions 
were actually made by central policy and demands 
outside the Police Station.
7. In addition to their lack o f  authority over resources, 
almost all decisions on s ta ff and policing tactics 
were removed from operational Sergeants and 
Inspectors.
8. In practical terms, information systems did not exist
in an effective form. Information on criminals was 
'collated' by one o fficer  and a civilian, which if 
used properly could be effective in certain 
circumstances. Pre-planning o f  resource deployment 
was undertaken by one o fficer  on behalf o f the 
Chief Inspector Operations. However, this
deployment virtually excluded all data on past 
deployment and was invariably inaccurate on the 
actual day. Apart from these limited exceptions, no 
effective information or predictive systems existed.
9. As described in this analysis, the police manpower 
resources were in fact above minimum 'Response 
Level' but, the heavy functional devolvement, high 
abstraction rate and inefficient match o f  manpower 
resources to demands resulted in minimum manning 
not being achieved at peak  demand times.
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10. At the time o f  the first analysis, Environmental 
Potential linked to Directed Patrolling did not exist 
as a practice or a concept.
4. 8.3. RESULT OF ANALYSIS
In 1983, very little had changed, with the exception that 
instead o f  a maximum o f 185 uniformed Constables the 
number o f Constables had risen to 265. However, none o f 
the other features had significantly changed. Most 
importantly, there were still times when minimum manning 
levels were not maintained at peak demand times.
This serious deficiency, despite the massive increase in 
resources was suggested to be partly a result o f the 
absence o f information systems. Increased resources in 
isolation would not appear to be the solution to the Police 
Spiral.
It was clear from the analysis that a 3rd LEVEL, 
Geographical Policing System did not exist in March 1983. 
In addition police policy, procedure, behaviour and culture 
were strongly against the implementation and maintenance 
o f  such a system o f policing.
4. 9. THE POLICE SPIRAL
Finally, perhaps an examination o f the Police Spiral at Brixton 
Police Station in 1983 will help to focus on the more serious 
deficiencies o f  that policing system.
4. 9.1. POLICE RESOURCE
As indicated above, the total available resources were 
sufficient to provide an adequate 1st and 2nd LEVEL 
policing system. In addition, there was a vast untapped 
o f public resources which were not used or even considered
by police.
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4. 9.2. POLICE SYSTEM
The Police Station was almost totally closed to feedback  
from the general public or street level operational officers. 
Only central directions from higher levels o f the police 
bureaucracy produced responses from the police station. 
The System can best be described as simplistic, rigid, 
closed, reactive in the short term and functionally
orientated with increasing bias towards centralisation o f 
decision making.
Working in opposition to this process, almost as a reaction 
against it, was a street level 'anarchy' which took 
advantage o f the inappropriate bureaucratic structure, by 
redefining policy and practice.
4. 9.3. INFORMATION SYSTEM
In essence, there were no effective information system. 
Some attempts were made to collect and collate 
information, but this data was not analysed and turned into 
predictive intelligence.
4. 9.4. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
No structure or systems for resource management existed. 
It was clear that even senior police officers at the police 
station were unable to improve this type o f  management in 
the absence o f  a supporting Information system.
10. SUMMARY
Both the Police and the Environmental Spiral have been considered 
in relation to the data and analysis o f  Brixton Division during the 
period 1981 to 1983. The picture which has emerged is o f an urban 
environment and a police system, both in various degrees o f  decay. 
Perhaps what is now required in this summary is an examination o f  
the e ffec ts  on the core Reactive Spiral, to establish if this has been 
significantly a ffected  by conditions and events at Brixton.
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4. 10.1 THE REACTIVE SPIRAL
4. 10.1.1. Crime and Conflict (Demand):-
During 1980 - 81, the Demand on the 
individual police officers and the total police 
station at Brixton, were estimated by the 
project team to be amongst the highest, if 
not the highest in Britain.
By 1983, in theory, this workload should have 
reduced for the individual officer, due to 
increased manpower. However due to failings 
in the existing police system, a significant 
proportion o f officers appeared to have little 
work, whilst the remainder continued to have 
heavy workloads.
At the macro level the levels o f crime and 
conflict appeared to have increased in all 
categories between 24% and 43% between 1980 
and 1982/3.
The ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL for  
increased levels o f crime and conflict was very 
high. It could be predicted that the 
preceeding increases would continue at least 
and probably be expanded to even higher 
percentages.
4. 10.1.2. Police Reactive Services:
The nature o f the service provided by Brixton 
Police Officers could only be described as 
reactive. Police were found to be almost 
exclusively reacting to public demands, either
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at the direct request o f the public or as a 
result o f public behaviour in an officers  
presence, which forced  a police intervention. 
In support o f earlier hypothesis, public demand 
for this type o f  public service appeared almost 
insatiable. Despite the obvious increase in 
police capacity to provide this reactive service 
a fter 1981, they were still unable to satisfy 
the spiralling public demands.
4. 10.1.3. Police Resources;
Research and experience in the project showed 
that the most important and predictive police 
resource required by any police system were 
the number o f uniformed constables attached 
to a police station. At Brixton the authorised 
establishment o f uniformed constables was 190. 
However in 1980 and 1981 prior to the riot in 
April, the actual number o f constables was 
always below this level, sometimes as low as 
170 constables.
When the manpower resources required for a 
1st LEVEL Response Policing System were 
calculated prior to April 1981 it was found 
that the numbers o f  uniformed constables at 
that time as deployed, were totally inadequate 
for even that basic police system. Interviews 
with police officers revealed that during this 
period police were only able to respond to the 
most urgent demands and ignored all others at 
peak high demand times.
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After April 1981 and the Brixton Riots the 
manpower levels were immediately increased to 
over 300 constables but by 1982 had stabilised 
at approximately 265 uniformed constables. 
These manpower resources were sufficient to 
provide an adequate 1st LEVEL Police System 
and even an additional effective 2nd LEVEL 
system, had it not been for equipment and 
organisational problems.
4. 10.1.4 Police Preventive Services;
Prior to April 1981 dedicated police preventive 
services were limited to one full time Crime 
Prevention Officer and a number o f 2nd 
LEVEL Squad policing initiatives o f the
'SWAMP1 Catagory (SCARMAN 1981). At this 
time a 2nd LEVEL Squad Police System was 
being attempted without an adequate 
foundation o f 1st LEVEL Response Policing and 
was considered by both police and public in 
subsequent interviews to be a contributor to 
the April riots. Police were seen as unable to 
provide a basic service and yet were perceived 
as being selective and discriminatory in their 
Squad operations. The preventive aspect o f 
Squad policing appeared to be marginal in this 
type o f environment and at these resource 
levels and definitely represented a public 
conflict risk.
After April 1981, when the police manpower 
resources became more realistic, a more 
effective 1st LEVEL and 2nd LEVEL policing 
system was introduced. Unfortunately, despite
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the increased manpower crime and general 
demands continued to rise dramatically. In 
1983 for example, street robbery and theft 
increased by 66%.
It is suggested that at the macro level o f the 
Reactive Spiral, the lack o f effective  
preventive police strategies, despite the 
increased manpower, failed to reduce demands 
on police. In essence the Spiral was only 
speeded up with more officers beginning to 
cope less and less adequately with more 
demand.
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING, IMPLEMENTATION
5. 1. THE SYSTEM
The Problem Situation outlined in Chapter 4 concluded that the 
majority o f the problems described were system based, in police 
structure and organisational design. It was also suggested by the
ENVIRON MENTAL POTENTIAL analysis and predictions, that 1st and 
2nd LEVEL policing systems would be inadequate for the effective  
policing o f  Brixton in the Autumn of 1983.
In support o f this decision, Brixton was provided with a written 
package describing the essential elements and features o f such a 
system. For a number o f organisational and practical reasons the 
concepts and elements o f a Geographical policing system were 
presented in a different manner to the outline provided in Chapter 
3. However, the objectives, features and performance measures 
were identical to those already described.
The 'ideal' end states o f the system were presented as three 
interlinked Goals (Fig. S. 1). Beginning with an initial priority o f 
achieving a contract between the public and the police system, they 
jointly attempted to stabilise demands for police service. This type 
o f achievement was then suggested to assist in improving the 
public’s Quality o f Life. These improvements would then enhance 
the effectiveness and commitment to the original Police Public 
Contact, encouraging even higher levels o f joint achievement.
These goals were explained to be long term and very difficult to 
achieve. They were ideals that were consistently being strived for 
and only able to be achieved in a limited way each year.
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THE POLICE S Y S T E M  GOALS
FIG. 5. 1
In the short term however, there were objectives that could be 
achieved and significant progress could be made within short periods 
o f time. These objectives were presented in a sequence which
helped to illustrate the links and interaction between each objective. 
(Fig. 5. 2).
LE
AD
S
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Fig. 5. 2.
-  1 7 2  -
First a Geographical Policing system had to lx implemented at the 
police station with all the various structural and organisational 
changes required. This police system had to include an effective  
Police and Public Information and Planning network as a major 
priority. Once these systems were effective it would then be 
possible to plan and implement a Joint Policing Strategy, including 
both the Police and the Public.
This Strategy would have three major objectives:
(1) Resource Management, where the total police and 
public resources were planned against the total 
demands for police service.
(2) Conflict Management, where the specific service for  
victims o f conflict and its prevention were planned.
(3) Crime Management, where the specific  service for  
victims o f crime and its prevention were planned.
This type o f activity would then lead to the actual Resource 
Deployment o f the planned resources in the way decided by the 
Joint Policy Strategy.
The success or failure o f the various deployments would be 
evaluated and fed  back through the Police and Public Network in 
order that an improved Joint Policing Strategy could be devised. 
All o f the objectives described were designed in the long term to 
contribute towards the long term goals in Fig.5. 1).
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Police officers at Brixton now required a descriptive framework o f a 
3rd LEVEL Geographical Policing System which was comprehensive 
yet sufficiently flexible to allow them substantial involvement in the 
planning and implementation o f  such a system. This was achieved 
by providing them with the descriptive package outlined below, 
which was entitled 'Neighbourhood Policing'.
S. 2. THE MODEL 'NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING'
In order to establish a systematic framework for this change in 
police methods, a model for the implementation o f  Neighbourhood 
Police was illustrated in diagrammatic form (Fig. 5. 3) as described 
below:-
A 'Organisational function and structure' consists o f  elements
designed to re-organise a police station in order to fully 
utilise resources and thus increase the quality o f service to 
the public.
AA 'Response to immediate problems' recognises the need to
continue to police an area in the best possible way, whilst 
planning and reorganisation is taking place.
The organisational changes described above provided the 
essential framework for the next stages o f  implementation 
(Boxes B and BB).
B Information Improvement was directed at implementing a
comprehensive police/public information system in order to 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency o f local policing 
strategies.
BB 'Resource Management' suggested ways in which existing
police resources could be used in order to introduce 
resource flexibility and reallocation into preventive policing.
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The Information Improvement and Demand Management 
boxes had to be undertaken simultaneously before the 
emphasis on implementation changes to crime prevention 
and peacekeeping in Box C, the ultimate aims o f 
Neighbourhood Policing.
C 'Crime Prevention and Peacekeeping' described strategies
and methods whereby police officers could involve the 
public in 'self policing' activities designed to prevent crime 
and conflict in local communities.
'Planning and evaluation' was a continual process which 
ensured that the change process was implemented and 
managed in the best possible way.
It should be emphasised that the package was a TOTAL POLICING 
SYSTEM where each separate element is designed to fit  in with 
other parts o f the police system, thereby ensuring a co-ordinated, 
systematic approach to the task o f policing. In addition, the 
continual planning and evaluation ensures that the system remains 
dynamic, changing and adapting to the environment.
Once a decision had been made to implement Neighbourhood Policing 
at a Police Station, it was estimated that it could be implemented 
within a minimum period o f twelve months. It should however be 
noted that extremely high levels o f motivation and management skill 
would be required for such an achievement.
Experience at other sites had shown that an extended 
implementation period was both acceptable and sometimes preferred 
by the police and the public. The whole process was supported by a 
force Project Team, established to direct and co-ordinate 
implementation.
ELEM ENTS  ANO TASKS OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING SYSTEM
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The remainder o f this section describes more fully each o f the 
individual sections (Boxes A, AA, B. BB and C), together with a 
brief summary o f each individual element (i.e. Al, A2) and its 
function within the overall Neighbourhood Policing System.
As far as possible, the descriptions are identical to those given to 
Brixton Police Station in March 1983 and therefore have been le ft in 
the present tense. However, a small number o f elements were 
redesigned; ue. Resource, Crime and Conflict Management, due to in 
situ development by the station itself. Sector Working Parties were 
unique to Brixton and introduced as a local initiative some time 
after the initial implementation.
A
O R G A N I S A T I O N A L  
F U N C T I O N  &  S T R U C T U R E
A1 Set up Training Team.
A2 Set up Divisional Management 
Team.
A3 Set up Working Party.
A t Set up Divisional Information 
Unit.
A5 Training. I
A6 Beat Profiles.
A7 Geographic Responsibilities 
for Inspectors.
AB Develop/Write Sector Plans.
A9 Information to Public.
A10 Relief Teams.
All Permanent Beat Officers.
A12 Itfentify/Train/Employ Dedicated 
Communications Officers.
-  178 -
5. 3. ORGANISATIONAL FUNCTION AND STRUCTURE (A)
The aim is to make internal changes in the running o f a Police 
Station in order to make it more efficient, but also more responsive 
to a fast changing social environment. New ideas and methods are 
introduced by way o f a training package to ensure that a ll officers 
and civilians at a station clearly understand what is required from 
them.
A Divisional Management Structure is introduced which is based on 
the objective o f participation and enhanced responsibilities at 
constable level, particularly in relation to operational street policing 
and its support. An information system is established which provides 
adequate information and data for planning by this management 
structure.
Operational street officers are organised on a team basis linked to 
defined geographical areas. These officers are required to plan and 
implement effective short and long term policing strategy.
A1 Set up Training Team
The broad extent o f the change caused by the 
implementation o f  Neighbourhood Policing necessitates a 
Divisional training team which is responsible for initially, 
introducing Divisional personnel to the organisational 
changes and subsequently to new professional skills and 
attitudes.
The team comprises an Inspector, Sergeant and Constable 
from the same division, for Neighbourhood Policing theory 
recommends decentralised on-stte training designed to meet 
the individual needs of officers and their divisions.
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The Inspector has a dual role, not only co-ordinating all 
training but also acting as a change agent. He acts as a 
mediator and link between the project team and the 
division, for the process o f change itself creates difficulties 
that need careful and sensitive management. Unless the 
change is correctly managed the problems generated will 
obscure the direction o f practical implementation o f the 
project, resulting in local resistance.
A2 Divisional Management
A shorter, more efficient management chain operating 
within a framework o f  consultation and participation, which 
exchanges information through meetings between officers of 
different ranks organised into teams. This rests on five 
concepts:
1. It reduces the number of levels through which 
information must pass to improve communication.
2. By using an interlocking method o f ensuring that at 
least one member o f each team is represented on 
the level above or below, participation is widely 
spread.
3. Organising each level into teams has the e ffec t  o f 
pooling differing talents and skills.
4. It introduces a control mechanism whereby
delegation and co-ordination o f tasks fall on named 
individuals.
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5. The whole process has an inbuilt monitoring and 
evaluation mechanism so that individuals and groups 
can measure results achieved and make more 
objective assessments.
Research and experience have shown that participation by 
means o f discussion and debate, the examination o f options 
and proposals, and the explanation o f decisions, act as a 
powerful unifying factor. This participation encourages the 
free  flow of communication from the top to the bottom of 
the management chain, without undermining discipline or 
order within the force.
The teams are described below and shown in the diagram 
overleaf.—
(a) The District Management Team headed by the
Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) and 
Commander o f the Area and composed o f the 
District Chief Superintendent, Detective Chief 
Superintendent, and all Divisional Chief Super­
intendents. Whilst the District Management team is 
really a tool o f the Area rather than the Divisional 
Management, the interlocking principle ensures that 
it is directly connected with Divisional Management 
through the Divisional Chief Superintendent.
(b) The Divisional Management team headed by the
Chief Superintendent and composed o f the Detective 
Superintendent (where posted), Detective Chief 
Inspector, Superintendent, Chief Inspector Operations, 
Chief Inspector Administration, Detective Inspector 
and all relief (or shift) Inspectors. This team deals 
with all Divisional policy and planning.
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(c) The R elief (or Shift) team headed by the R elief (or 
shift) Inspector and composed o f his Sergeants and 
Constables as well as Permanent Beat Officers. In 
the case o f the C.l.D. it refers to the Detective 
Inspector, Detective Sergeant and Detective
Constables.
The adoption o f real rather than facade participation 
management is difficult to achieve. Careful 
monitoring and evaluation is necessary to ensure the 
correct transition is made.
A3 Station Working Party
Divisional Management is supplemented by a Divisional 
Working Party chaired by one o f the divisional Chief 
Inspectors (usually Operations) and consisting o f 
representatives from each function and rank (up to 
Inspector), i.e. reliefs, permanent beat officers, C.l.D. and 
Administration. Disparate ranks, levels o f experience and 
talents, operate together in a coherent manner so that they 
can identify local problems, examine alternatives, and 
propose solutions.
However, the working party is not a decision making body. 
Its purpose is to consider problems, initiatives and methods 
o f introducing organisational (or operational) change. 
Matters may be referred to it by reliefs or by the 
Management Group. It will make recommendations to the 
Chief Superintendent and his management group but he is 
not bound by the recommendation(s) made.
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Initially, the working party will be primarily concerned with 
short term problems. It may focus on any internal police 
matter on the Division or on an external matter amongst 
the community where it is apparent that police can take 
action which is likely to minimise or resolve the problem. 
A diagram o f how the working party fits into the 
management structure is given below:-
Fig- 5. 4.
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A4 The Divisional Information Unit (D.I.U.)
This consists o f a dedicated (meaning permanent) team of 
one Sergeant and two P.Cs. It may be an advantage to 
place a Detective Constable as one o f the two P.Cs. in 
order to improve CID/Uniform communication and to 
establish a provisional crime analysis system. Its purpose is 
to collect and analyse relevant information regarding:-
(1) Police resources - the o fficer  on the Division and 
how they are employed.
(2) Demands on Police - the incidence and distribution 
o f crimes committed, accidents, arrests, complaints 
by the public, calls for assistance by the public, etc.
By studying the two sets o f information in conjunction with 
each other (i.e. police resources and demands) it should be 
possible for the deployment o f  street duty police officers on 
the division, to be matched with peak demand periods.
A.5 Training I
Formal and informal training is given to all ranks from 
Chief Superintendent to Constable (Uniform and C.I.D) in 
order to provide necessary information and skills for the 
implementation o f Neighbourhood Policing with particular 
emphasis on:
1. Participative management
2. Crime Prevention.
3. Victim Support.
4. Community involvement.
5. Inter-agency co-operation.
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6. Conflict reduction (currently under development)
7. Police skills (including communication with the 
public).
Training is undertaken by the local team under Project 
Team guidance.
A6 Beat Profiles
A comprehensive profile will be written for each beat, 
containing detailed information about its physical and human 
characteristics. The profiles will be more comprehensive 
than those presently kept and should be stored in the 
Divisional Information Unit. They will be in two parts, one 
containing relatively static demographic information and 
details o f local community resources, the second containing 
crime analysis data, informal service demands and target 
intelligence requests from the C.I.D. all o f which need to 
be constantly updated.
The information will be used by the Inspector and his Relief 
Team when planning strategies to deal with problems on 
their sector.
A7 Geographic Responsibility
Geographic responsibility is a method o f giving each relief 
Inspector (and at a later stage, his Sergeants and 
Constables) a continuing and personal responsibility for a 
specific geographic area within a Division (a Sector). This 
aims to increase personal contact between police and the 
public and facilitate the identification o f long and short 
term local problems and their solutions.
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The Inspectors assume geographic responsibility first, in 
order to establish early contact with the community. 
Sergeants and Constables assume the responsibility later in 
implementation once relief teams, sector plans and directed 
patrolling have commenced. This allows the Working Party 
sufficient time to agree on the best system o f Geographic 
Responsibility for Sergeants and Constables.
A8 Develop Sector Plans
Sector plans set out the long term problem, priorities and 
strategies (prevention and detection) for each sector  on a 
division. They are developed by the relief inspector 
responsible for that sector, taking into account the needs o f 
the local community as well as the problems identified by 
police. Permanent Beat Officers and eventually all sector 
officers will be expected to be involved in this process. 
The important part o f station planning ensures that all_ 
operational officers are deeply involved in the management 
of their respective sectors. Their day to day work and 
achievements should then reflect this involvement.
Data from the Divisional Information Unit together with 
local knowledge (police and public) assists in the problem 
identification and prioritisation. The strategies include both 
police action through Directed Patrolling (AA1 and BB10), 
both well as joint police/public action, such as 
Neighbourhood Watch and Property Marking (AA3 and BBS). 
They also include particular measures designed to evaluate 
the success or otherwise o f the strategy.
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Sector Planning, its strategies and evaluation, is co­
ordinated and monitored by the Chief Inspector (Operations). 
All sector plans can be aggregated to produce an overall 
divisional plan.
A9. Information to the Public
Information is provided to the community on the proposed 
changes in policing methods and the importance o f the
public's active co-operation. This contact should also 
increase information to police on the views o f the
community, their problems and priorities. The very real 
fears that the community may have about some crime
levels should be acknowledged and steps taken to verify 
whether these anxieties are supported by the level of
reported crime or whether they are founded on rumour. 
This increase in police knowledge should be utilised for  
sector strategies.
A10. R elief Teams
R elief teams consist o f all relief officers, Permanent Beat 
Officers attached to that sector and if possible a C.I.D. 
officer for liaison. The aim is to work together as a team 
using each individual's skills and experiences to address 
identified problems in their geographic sector.
The team will be headed by the relief Inspector, who should 
ensure that regular meetings are held to elicit the views o f  
the officers and obtain their active participation in sector 
planning. In addition, he should inform them o f decisions 
made by the Working Party and the Divisional Management 
Team.
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A ll. Permanent Beat Officers (formerly known as Home Beat 
Officers)
Permanent Beat officers will be put back under the 
direction and control o f the relief inspector on whose 
geographic sector their beat lies and will also be a member 
o f the Inspector's relief team. Their principle task will be 
to act as the Inspectors spearhead, organising joint police- 
public crime prevention schemes.
The current Home Beat Officer will be renamed as a 
Permanent Beat Officer when he becomes part o f the relief 
team. Some o f the officers currently engaged as Home 
Beat Officers will not be suitable as P.B.Os. under 
Neighbourhood Policing and therefore some reselection may 
have to take place. This will have an added advantage o f 
raising the status o f  the new style P.B.O. who will then 
receive extensive additional training. The most important 
change in the training will be a considerable emphasis on 
intelligence gathering which it is hoped will encourage more 
law enforcement activity whilst keeping their current 
community pride.
A12. Dedicated Communications Staff
This will be a small number o f o fficers permanently or 
semi-permanently employed on communications duties. They 
will be specially trained in dealing with members o f the 
public by telephone or at the Station Counter, as well as 
directing resources in a more structured manner, e.g. 
Graded Response (BB10).
4» RESPONSE TO 
— IMMEOIATE PROBLEMS
AA1 Directed P a tro llin g  I 
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5. 4. RESPONSE TO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS (AA)
Despite the complications and demands produced by a major re­
organisation o f the Police Station, the level o f service provided to 
the public should not be allowed to decline.
Immediate crime and conflict problems which are causing the public 
most concern must receive priority from the police. The everyday 
patrol work o f operational street officers must start to reflect the 
improved flow o f information resulting from reorganisation.
Where there are urgent crime and peacekeeping problems, or 
overwhelming public demands, some aspects o f crime prevention and 
conflict reduction will have to be introduced immediately. However, 
it should be noted that such schemes will make heavy demands on 
police resources and therefore require careful planning.
The elements in this section will be implemented simultaneously with 
those in the A Box. It is expected that as officers become more 
familiar with the concepts, so their levels o f skill and achievement 
will increase.
AA1 Directed Patrolling I
Random police patrolling o f the past is changed into an 
activity specifically designed to give the o fficer a sense o f 
purpose and co-ordination. The job o f  each relief Inspector 
is to direct the patrolling o f  his officers. The main 
priority will be to direct officers in response to immediate 
short term demands, e.g. a spate o f autocrime in a 
particular area. Any surplus patrol time will be initially 
directed towards collecting the necessary information for  
beat profiles, and later towards the needs o f sector 
planning. At a later stage o f implementation the emphasis 
on directed patrolling will be towards the prevention o f long
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term problems (BB11). Directed Patrolling will be 
facilitated by the increased flow o f information from both 
the Divisional Information Unit and the public.
At the commencement o f each tour o f duty, every 
patrolling officer should be given a clear idea o f what he is 
expected to do and achieve when he leaves the station - 
not merely told which beat to patrol. The major thrust o f 
the Directed Patrol will be concerned with Conflict and 
Crime Reduction as described below.
AA2 Conflict Reduction
At this early stage o f implementation, the priority will be 
to sustain the level o f  response to immediate problems. 
However, it may be that conflict in the division is serious 
enough to warrant action immediately.
Critical locations, groups or individuals should be identified 
and officers with suitable skills or training (probably 
Permanent Beat Officers) should be tasked with conflict 
reduction. This reduction should be attempted by a mixture 
o f direct intervention, negotiation and contracting.
The concept o f conflict reduction can demonstrate to 
officers the possibility o f utilising a number o f strategies to 
reduce potentially very violent situations, other than by 
direct force. However, the deployment o f Territorial 
Support Units or Police Support Units may be required on 
those occasions where all other forms o f conflict reduction 
have failed.
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Where possible, through the use o f Directed Patrol, all 
street officers can be involved in these strategies. This 
will require the training and understanding o f  patrol officers  
before it can be effective.
AA3 Crime Reduction
Once again, efficient response to victims o f crime will be a 
priority at this stage. However, early crime reduction 
measures may be essential. I f this is so, then groups or 
individuals who are involved in crime should be identified 
and dealt with as soon as possible. Certain locations may 
also require a high profile police presence at certain times. 
At this stage, crime prevention initiatives such as
Neighbourhood Watch, Property Marking and Business Watch 
should only be introduced if either the public are highly 
motivated or if the area is identified as having high crime 
rates.
Police resources will be stretched at this stage o f 
implementation so careful consideration should be given 
before starting any schemes. In the worst crime areas, 
which are unlikely to be receptive to such schemes, early 
efforts should be made to generate the necessary 
'community awareness', so that Neighbourhood Watch 
schemes can be implemented at a later stage.
Further crime reduction may be possible through contact 
with other agencies. In particular the local authority could 
be approached to consider joint action in suitable short 
term initiatives.
B
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5. 5. INFORMATION IMPROVEMENT (B)
To ensure the successful implementation and management of 
Neighbourhood Policing, an efficient information system is essential. 
Information improvement is required in two areas; firstly, between 
the various levels within the police organisation; secondly, between 
the police and their local community.
The Divisional Information Unit, set up under 'Organisational 
Function and Structure' Box A, is the central point for the collation 
and dissemination o f this information. Under this stage of 
implementation its role is therefore expanded.
B1 Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit (D.I.I.U.)
The original Divisional Information Unit is now expanded by the 
addition o f the collator, the o fficer responsible for arranging 
duties and C.I.D. Officer(s), if one was not already working 
with the D.I.U. The expanded unit will draw together all the 
information facilities within the station, to provide a single, 
central, information and intelligence service to operational 
street officers, police managers and the public. This new unit 
is renamed the Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit. 
Due to the intelligence aspect o f the Unit it should be under 
the control o f the senior C.I.D. officer at the station.
Different types o f information will need to be provided. For 
example, street officers will require the distribution and types 
o f demands, whilst police managers will also need detailed 
information on divisional strengths, levels o f abstraction etc. 
members of the public will need to be provided with 
information on crime levels and police strategies. This
information will be disseminated through the Public Information 
Nework (B5).
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The increased flow o f information will normally require the use 
o f a micro computer to facilitate collation and analysis, 
particularly for use in Crime Analysis (B2) and the Management 
Information System (B3). The information produced by these 
systems is vital for the evaluation o f any strategies introduced 
under Directed Patrolling.
B.2. Management Information System
The D.I.U. will collect information on all demands made on the 
police station, as well as monitoring the level o f police 
resources available. This will enable police managers to more 
accurately match resources to public demand.
The collection o f this data will still be manual, but the 
collation and analysis is best undertaken by the use o f a 
micro-computer. The collation o f demand information will 
include the breakdown o f demands into different categories, 
e.g. types, time and location, but will not involve the recording 
o f any personal details.
It is important that all officers can understand and are able to 
apply the M.I.S. data to their work, in order to optimise the 
use o f the D.I.I.U. Accordingly, the accessibility and 
presentation o f information will be given a high priority.
B3 Crime Analysis System
Neighbourhood Policing is developing a simple crime analysis 
system for use on the same micro-computer already installed 
for the provision o f management information. This entails
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producing information on particular crimes, e.g. burglary, to 
enable high incident areas to be identified and common factors 
extracted. This is essential for strategies introduced under 
Directed Patrolling I and II in order to obtain the optimum use 
o f police resources.
B4 Public Launch o f Neighbourhood Policing
At this stage the internal police station reorganisation will 
have reached the stage where Neighbourhood Policing can be 
launched and supported successfully.
Extensive local media coverage should be sought and handouts 
made available containing brief details o f the scheme and the 
identities o f the sector officers involved. Short presentations 
should be given to community groups and statutory authorities. 
Wherever possible local group presentations should be given by 
the operational sector officers  involved, as part o f their normal 
duties.
The vital involvement o f the public in the scheme should 
always be highlighted together with practical suggestions as to 
exactly  what they should do, e.g. Community Involvement (C4), 
Crime Prevention (C5) and Conflict Prevention (C6).
B5 Public Information Network
The level o f contact between police and the public developed 
at the first stage o f implementation (A9) should by now have 
evolved into a Public Information Network with meetings held 
on a more regular basis. Direct contact between various 
sections o f the public and different levels within the police are 
illustrated in the diagram below:-
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PUBLIC POLICE
The aim o f the above system is to encourage a two way flow  
o f information between police and the public. More 
importantly, different sectors o f the public will be in contact 
with those officers most able to provide a solution to their 
particular problem (i.e. local residents with their local 
operational street officers).
INFORMATION AND FEEDBACK
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Although existing links with the public, local agencies and the 
media, will probably be sufficient for the Public Launch o f the 
new policing system, they will not be adequate for the future 
requirements o f Neighbourhood Policing.
Effective, formal, planned links have to be established between 
the police and all sections o f the public in the area. These 
links will not only gather information from the public but also, 
on demand, provide a far greater range o f information and 
data from the police to the public. This type o f planned 
network is essential if the public are expected to actively 
participate in the policing o f their area.
It may well be decided that the Sectors and the Divisional 
Information and Intelligence Unit could provide the main 
framework for this type o f Information Network.
BB RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
BB1 Geographic Responsibility for 
Sergeants/C onstables.
BB2 Police/Public Contact Points.
BB3 C rim e Investigation System .
BB4 C.I.D. T and S Team.
BB5 Resource Management.
BB6 Sector W orking P arties.
BB7 Crim e Management
BBS A lignm ent of Adm in.
BB9 C onflict M anagem ent.
BB10 S pecial C o n sta b u la ry
BB11 Graded Response to Demands.
BB12 D irected Patrolling I!
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s. 6. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (BB)
The continually high level o f  public demand for police resources 
poses serious problems for police. I f  police attempt to deal 
uncritically with a ll demands, resources will never be sufficient 
(Reactive Spiral).
An attempt has to be made to manage the demands through the 
appropriate deployment o f resources, until police crime prevention 
initiatives reduce them and limit their potential for expansion (Box
C).
In order to achieve this, further organisational changes in police 
structure and practice will have to take place. These changes will 
be mainly directed at reducing immediate demands thereby enabling 
police resources to be redeployed in long term crime and conflict 
prevention strategies.
The aim is to manage the demand for police services from the 
public at three levels. Firstly, by grading the response time and the 
personnel deployed to demands, according to established criteria. 
Secondly, by matching the number o f o fficers on duty to the 
expected level o f demand. Thirdly, by screening demands that 
require action and follow-up enquiries, so that only those which 
meet predetermined criteria are pursued. To ensure success, careful 
training o f police personnel and public education is necessary.
These organisational changes will take place simultaneously with the 
Information Improvement objectives in Box B.
BB1 Geographic Responsibility for Sergeants and Constables.
Geographic responsibility for Sergeants and Constables will 
encourage their identification with a sector. Under the
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sector inspector a team will develop which will have in 
depth knowledge o f an area and will be responsible for the 
planning and implementation o f sector strategies.
The organisation o f Geographic Responsibility can be 
undertaken by a number o f different methods. The time 
interval between inspectors and sergeants/constables being 
given geographic responsibility is necessary for the Working 
Party and Divisional Management Team to agree on which 
method to choose.
BB2 Police/Public Contact Points
Contact between police and the public takes place in three 
main areas: at the station front counter, on the telephone 
and on the street with patrolling officers. The aims are 
firstly, to increase the quality o f service provided to the 
public in order to increase public satisfaction with police. 
Secondly, to filter out demands on police which are better 
dealt with by way o f advice or referral to a more 
appropriate agency.
The D.I.I.U. should be tasked to undertake studies at the 
front counter and in the communications o ffice  to establish 
workloads and the distribution o f demands. Decision can 
then be taken on the appropriate staffing levels required to 
provide a satisfactory  service to the public. Improvements 
to the public waiting area and front counter can also be 
made, for instance, layout, seating and general appearance. 
Similar improvements may be made to the communications 
room layout.
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The quality o f the public's contact with officers on the 
street should be improved with communication training in 
'Policing Skills' (A5), as well as the implementation of 
Directed Patrolling strategies.
BB3 Crime Investigation System (including Case Screening)
Better management of limited investigative skills can be 
achieved by only applying them to those cases most likely 
to be solved, i.e. those with the best evidence. A set of 
weightings for evidence has been developed so that cases 
can be assessed more objectively. Those cases considered 
to have insufficient evidence will be screened out and 
victims given any necessary support and advice by Victim 
Support Schemes, and the Crime Prevention or Permanent 
Beat Officers. A diagram describing the Crime 
Investigation System is given overleaf. Serious crime will 
continue to be fully investigated even if they have 
insufficient evidence according to the weighting system. 
Time saved from case screening will enable officers to 
spend extra time on the remaining cases and therefore 
increase the likelihood o f a crime clear-up.
The concept behind the Crime Investigation System is that 
all crime will be thoroughly investigated by the first officer  
who attends (usually uniform) who will complete a crime 
report sheet at the scene. This report will then be handed 
personally by a C.I.D. o fficer  at a Duty Desk who will 
make a decision to either screen out the crime or continue 
with the investigation. The C.I.D. Duty Desk will normally 
be run by a Detective Sergeant attached to the D.I.I.U.
The Duty Desk will perform a number o f functions:-
(1) Supervise initial crime investigations.
CRIME INVESTIGATION SYSTEM
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(2) Decide as to further action (Case Screening).
(3) Provide additional training o f officers in crime 
investigation and recording.
(4) Collect data for information systems in the D.I.I.U.
BB4 C.I.D.Targetting and Surveillance Team (Directed Tasking).
The C.I.D. o ffice  would be split into two teams, one 
undertaking the traditional C.I.D. investigative role, the 
other a targetting and surveillance role with the aim o f 
arresting offenders.
The C.I.D. time saving by Case Screening will allow some
C.I.D. officers to be taken away from their investigation o f 
crimes already committed in order to form the Targetting 
and Surveillance Team with the objective o f preventing 
serious or persistent crime. This team will consist o f  
specially selected officers who will concentrate on crime 
matters which fall into the following categories:-
1. Priority Crimes
These are crimes which are given high priority 
either by police or public (although priorities may 
differ between the two).
2. Active Criminals
Individuals or groups known to be responsible for a 
high proportion o f crime in an area, not necessarily 
professional teams, and unlikely to be deterred by 
traditional routine policing.
3. Target Areas
High crime areas identified by the D.I.I.U.
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The team would be both receiving information and returning 
intelligence to the D.I.I.U., as well as being closely involved 
in the implementation o f sector strategies. Once the T &. 
S teams have started implementing these strategies their 
role would be formally termed 'Directed Tasking'. This is 
the equivalent o f uniform officers undertaking Directed 
Patrolling II (BB10).
BB5 Resource Management
All supervisory ranks at the police station need to 
understand the concept o f Resource Management. The 
diagram overleaf provides a framework for this 
understanding and subsequent planning.
First police must understand exactly which category they 
are in at present, and in which direction they are moving. 
Some stations may be striving to 'Reduce' demands on 
police resources but are failing and therefore decaying 
slowly but surely into a 'Response' category. Others will 
clearly be in a Response category.
It is important to remember that Resource Management 
includes a ll the resources available, police and public.
The remainder o f Box BB and Box C now include both types 
o f resources. Initially, police will have to improve their 
own resource management by ensuring that police manpower 
is deployed according to public demand.
Traditionally police manpower has been relatively evenly 
deployed across time and across geographic areas. 
However, it will probably be clear from information 
provided by the Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit 
that the majority o f  public demand is concentrated within 
particular time bands and within fairly small geographic 
areas on each division.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
DEMAND
STABILISATION
I _______________________
DEMAND DEMAND
REDUCTION RESPONSE REDUCTION
T
»
I
DEMAND
STABILISATION
_______________________________ I
DECAY
>
IMPROVEMENT
>
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The aim is therefore to provide additional patrol cover 
during known periods o f high demand at the expense o f 
known periods o f  low demand. Although this may involve 
police officers working more unsocial hours during certain 
hours o f  duty, i.e. 4 p.m. to midnight instead o f perhaps 2 
p.m. - 10 p.m. it may be possible to reduce the need to 
work unsocial hours at other times when public demand is 
low, i.e. less night duty.
Aligning manpower to demands may be tackled in one o f 
two ways - minor variations to hours o f duty within the 
existing relief duty rota, or a more elaborate fundamental 
change involving new relief structures and duty rotas. It is 
vital to maintain and develop the notion o f relief teams, 
notwithstanding initiatives involving split reliefs covering 
different hours or overlapping shifts. Whatever 
arrangements are made, it is important to have constant 
groups o f officers with their own dedicated Sergeants and 
Inspectors. These groups must be able to meet regularly as 
a team to discuss problems and priorities.
It has been found that i f  Inspectors are given the 
responsibility for day to day alignments and these are 
directed at specific problems, then sector officers will 
willingly co-operate with these requirements.
Alignment o f  duties to demands can be achieved with the 
minimum o f disruption, provided the widest consultation is 
allowed. It is a particularly suitable task for the working 
party to undertake, since the group involves representatives 
from all quarters o f the station. Providing they have the 
necessary detailed research data and clearly understand that 
a change must be made, they will usually come up with 
sensible alternative proposals.
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This objective is designed, in conjunction with 'Geographic 
Responsibility' (A7 and BB1) and 'Directed Patrolling' (AA1 
and BB10) to redeploy manpower across time and within the 
geographic areas o f maximum public demand.
Once an improvement can be detected and demands are 
being reduced, the public can become more and more 
involved in further reductions. Eventually, through Crime 
and Conflict Management, demands should become stabilised 
at a more acceptable level. At this stage, extensive
preventive tactics and strategies can be implemented jointly 
by ¡police and public. '
BB6 Sector Working Parties.
One o f the most impxrtant objectives for the Police is the 
involvement o f the residents in joint Police-Public Crime 
and Conflict Prevention strategies. This type of pxirtnershlp 
goes beyond the existing and propxjsed arrangements for  
'Consultation'. It includes the joint planning,
implementation and management o f local Prevention 
strategies in each Neighbourhood and community.
Consultation between the public and the police has 
increasingly been recognised as a major requirement in any 
successful policing strategy. Therefore, police are now 
required to place greater emphasis on the involvement o f 
local residents and local px>lice fo r  the policing o f specific  
neighbourhoods within each police station area. It is 
suggested that special arrangements will be required to 
make this co-opxratlon effective.
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In an attempt to improve the effectiveness o f local 
policing, it is suggested that 'Sector Working Parties', are 
required in each Sector.
The Division will be divided into Sectors, each the 
responsibility o f an Operational Inspector and his men. 
These officers are responsible for planning and policing o f 
these Sectors. It is considered essential that the residents 
of these Sectors should have an input into the early stages 
o f this process and are themselves a part o f these plans.
'Sector Working Parties' are envisaged as voluntary, non- 
statutory bodies, consisting o f the elected Ward Councillors, 
representatives of local residents groups, including
commercial and business 'residents' and three or four Sector 
police officers, including the Sector Inspector. Police would 
provide facilities for the meetings including a secretariat, 
but ideally would not wish to hold elected positions on the 
Working Parties. The meetings could be held bi-monthly or 
quarterly as desired.
It is hoped that each Working Party would establish terms 
of reference which would identify two main objectives:-
(1) A Consumer Panel, which would report back at a 
general level, local problems which mitfit benefit 
from a Joint Police-Public Crime Prevention 
strategy. It is envisaged, that this facility would be 
provided by the elected Ward Councillors on behalf 
o f the residents.
(2) An Action Group, which would jointly plan, 
implement and manage Police-Public Crime and 
Conflict Prevention initiatives in the Sector area,
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with the Sector Police officers. This facility would 
involve local group representatives, who would 
eventually include their groups in the various 
initiatives and strategies.
It must be emphasized that these are non-statutory, 
voluntary bodies. There is no intention to replace existing 
statutory consultation procedures. It is hoped that the 
Working Parties will be 'action orientated', concentrating on 
local neighbourhood problems, producing visible changes 
within days or weeks. When this is not possible they should 
be planning and implementing local long term joint 
strategies aimed at the root o f their crime problems.
The description o f Sector Working Parties provided in this 
outline can only be a broad proposal, meetings of those who 
wish to be involved will have to be held and precise terms 
o f reference agreed. Due to the operational nature o f the 
intended groups the Working Parties should be co-ordinated 
by the Chief Inspector Operations at Police Station in order 
to ensure that scarce police operational resources are fully 
distributed between the different Sectors.
BBT Crime Management
One o f the problems for police in dealing with crime, is the 
lack o f an overview which provides a link between the 
various states o f crime and the strategies for each stage.
Crime Management provides three categories o f police 
response to crime problems. Once a decision is made as to 
the existing problems, effective changes in police strategies 
can be planned within the Crime Management framework.
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CRIME
PREVENTION
CRIME
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CRIME
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CRIME
REDUCTION
CRIME
PREVENTION
>
DECAY IMPROVEMENT
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Crime Prevention;
Preventing crime has been a police ideal since the beginning 
o f modern policing. A large number o f  tactics options and 
strategies have been researched and implemented by most 
police stations. However, the majority o f these programmes 
are effective in the longer term and do not produce 
immediate reduction in crime. High levels o f crime may 
therefore be unaffected in the short term, especially if the 
public are too frightened or apathetic to be involved.
Crime Reduction:
When crime levels are unacceptably high, direct action 
against the groups, individuals or locations must be
instigated by police. This can be achieved through Directed 
Patrolling or Directed Tasking for specialist officers. The 
objective o f these tactics is to significantly reduce the 
levels o f crime in the high crime areas.
Crime Response;
When both Prevention and Reduction have been unsuccessful, 
or police resources are insufficient, police are reduced to 
responding to crime as it occurs. Police must provide the 
best possible VICTIM HELPING in these circumstances in 
order to maintain public satisfaction with the police service. 
Unfortunately, response alone cannot a ffec t the rising crime 
levels.
It is unrealistic to expect effective Crime Prevention when 
the public are experiencing high fear o f crime. Therefore 
Crime Reduction will usually be required as the next police 
initiative in a planned Crime Management Strategy.
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BB8 Alignment o f Administration
The introduction o f geographic responsibility and sector 
planning will make heavy demands on all relief officers, 
particularly inspectors. It is therefore important to both 
reduce the amount o f unnecessary routine administrative 
tasks and to reallocate tasks that may be undertaken by 
civilian staff, to the administrative and crime support units. 
Pressure on limited civilian resources may require ruthless 
pruning o f non-essential work.
The administration and support units must also ensure that 
their primary function as a support service for operational 
street officers is fulfilled in practice as well as theory. 
Analysis has shown that internal police administrative 
demands on operational street officers are often greater 
than those imposed by public demands.
BB9 Conflict Management
In Britain, police officers or 'peace' officers, are recognised 
as 'keepers o f the peace’ and 'peacekeeping' has always 
been a major objective o f the professional police service 
since its introduction in 1829.
However, unlike Crime Prevention, Conflict Prevention has 
been almost totally ignored as a practical strategy or 
theoretical concept. Usually, police react to existing 
conflict by trying to reduce it and i f  this falls then by 
managing the ensuing disorder to minimise injury and 
damage.
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Unfortunately, the concept o f Conflict Management as a 
total strategy for dealing with conflict, is almost unknown 
in police planning and tactics. In the past police have 
managed to cope by relying on simple, high profile uniform 
policing as a method o f peacekeeping.
With today's increasing conflict and actual public disorder 
this is no longer appropriate or even effective. However, it 
is very difficult to apply theories and concepts, despite 
their appeal, to actual fast moving street environments as 
an effective police strategy.
The diagram provides a simplistic yet useful overview o f 
Conflict Management. This practical framework can be 
used for operational planning and day to day police work.
The concept behind the diagram is that tension and conflict 
are not inevitable and therefore can be reduced and even 
avoided. Each police station can make a realistic 
assessment o f their present environment and own operational 
practices. Once this has been decided then decisions can 
be made about the effectiveness o f existing strategies and 
whether or not to move into a preferred category, through 
police supported initiatives.
Conflict Prevention
This is considered the 'ideal' category, where the majority 
o f potential conflict is detected and prevented at an early 
stage. Such prevention is achieved by normal everyday 
policing activities involving professional police officers, local 
community, volunteers and public agencies.
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For example, it should be normal practice for domestic and 
neighbourhood disputes to be referred to effective Conflict 
Mediation Service, staffed and supported by volunteers and 
public agencies.
However, if these types o f processes fail to work, or do not 
exist, then tension and conflict may rise leading to the next 
category.
Conflict Reduction
In this type o f environment the majority o f scarce police 
resources tend to be directed at reactive attempts to 
reduce and control the existing high levels o f tension and 
conflict.
Unless police strategies and resource deployment, including 
the resources o f volunteers and agencies, are carefully 
planned, with a significant investment made in long term 
prevention measures, then the slide into the next category 
is almost inevitable.
Disorder Management
Where there are existing high levels o f violence and public 
disorder, police may be reduced to managing this disorder. 
Containing it to defined areas, preventing escalation and 
generally 'keeping the lid on'.
This type o f policing strategy, however effective  and well 
supported by equipment and technology tt may appear, will 
not by itself reverse the upward trend o f rising disorder.
It is essential that joint police and public Conflict 
Reduction strategies are implemented, with the eventual 
aim o f Conflict Prevention processes being effectively  
introduced and maintained.
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The framework described allows events in the environment 
to be graded by police to decide which o f the three 
categories they are actually in, decide in which direction 
they appear to be moving and where they would actually 
like to be.
Conflict Management covers all policing situations from 
normality to riot. Strategies, tactics and even styles of 
policing which are appropriate to the actual situation can 
be selected. Maintaining the ’Queens Peace' will not 
happen by chance, it has to be planned and carefully 
maintained.
BB10 Special Constabulary
The Special Constabulary have the potential to significantly 
boost available police resources and are an existing example 
o f the public's willingness to voluntarily help the police. 
They should be considered as a vital part o f everyday police 
operational resources, and in theory could represent up to a 
third o f the total manpower.
People living on the division should be encouraged to join 
the Specials to both increase the commitment o f the public 
to the objective o f self-policing and to create a bridge 
between police and the local community. Their role should 
emphasise the crime prevention aspects o f Directed 
Patrolling where their local knowledge can be fully utilised.
I f  police are unable to usefully deploy and motivate the 
type o f people willing to volunteer fo r  Special Constable 
work, it is very unlikely they will be competent to usefully 
employ far less motivated public volunteers fo r  the range o f 
tasks required in Box C.
-  218 -
BB11 Graded Response to Demands
Graded Response is designed to control the occurrence o f 
immediate, indiscriminate response to public demands for 
police action. Instead, all demands are categorised to give 
an appropriate level and type o f response as indicated 
below: -
Response
Immediate
Delayed
Scheduled
Referred
Time Scale 
Urgent
As soon as possible 
By appointment 
Not applicable
Resource
Usually R/T (Area) Car 
Patrolling Officer 
Designated Officer 
Non-police agency.
Experience has shown that trained officers can schedule or 
refer a small but significant proportion o f demands.
The three main aims o f Graded Response are.—
(1) where possible, to avoid committing resources during 
times o f peak demand by delaying response 
deployment until a period o f predicted lower 
demands;
(2) where possible, to avoid committing resources during 
times o f low resource availability by delaying 
response deployment until a period o f predicted 
higher resource availability;
(3) to enhance the service provided to the public by 
arranging a time when a more appropriate resource 
is available to respond (e.g. when a permanent beat 
officer  is available to deal with a non urgent and 
long term problem with which he is familiar).
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Research shows that the public will accept delays in 
response to calls for assistance providing:-
1. their perception o f the demand is that it does not 
require immediate response
2. the delay is with their co-operation and consent
3. they know when police will arrive
4. the police arrive either just before or at the 
expected time
5. the police agree that their complaint is worthy o f 
police attention.
6. the complainant receives sympathetic and courteous 
treatment.
An essential ingredient for the introduction o f Graded 
Response is thorough training. This will involve not only 
the Dedicated Communications Officer (A13) but also all 
operational officers.
Communications officers will inevitably spend more time 
speaking to callers, eliciting details o f  the demands, 
referring them to other agencies and making appointments 
for officers to visit them. This may necessitate an
increase in staffing levels if the quality o f  service is to be 
maintained. Communications officers must have an 
understanding o f peak demand times in order to delay or 
schedule calls accurately, as well as information on the 
availability o f  particular officers.
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BB12 Directed Patrolling II
The empasis in 'Directed Patrolling I' (AA1) o f responding 
to short term demands now shifts to targetting long term 
problems requiring crime and conflict prevention. Whereas 
Directed Patrolling I concentrated on the detection o f 
offenders, this stage requires officers to take action to 
correct the root causes o f problems. For instance, a 
particular housing estate may be identified as having a long 
term problem of burglary. Analysis o f the burglary patterns 
and the common factors involved will enable officers to 
build a strategy specially tailored for the estate.
At this stage o f implementation divisions will be preparing 
their second round o f sector (and divisional) plans which are 
an essential component in the development o f strategies 
using Directed Patrolling II. These strategies will be 
complemented by the C.I.D. equivalent o f Directed 
Patrolling, Directed Tasking (see BB4).
The effectiveness o f any directed patrolling strategy will 
need to be monitored using information from the Divisional 
Information and Intelligence Unit (Bl) to ensure that the 
objectives given in Sector Plans (A8) are achieved.
Directed Patrolling II is a very important part o f  
Neighbourhood Policing for operational street officers. It 
provides, in a very practical way, the opportunity for them 
to become deeply involved with the system and also 
significantly contribute to its eventual success.
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7. CRIME PREVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING (C)
Boxes A, AA, B and BB will have created and maintained the 
changes necessary to embark on the third phase o f Neighbourhood 
Policing implementation.
The objective o f this section is to mobilise the public in joint 
police/public initiatives using the widest possible liaison between 
police and members o f the community. These initiatives should be 
designed to a ffect the 'root causes' o f crime and conflict in the 
area, concentrating on methods o f prevention rather than detection.
The Police/Public Contact will be achieved when the public take on 
their full role as a resource for the policing o f an area.
Cl Training II
The training given at the outset o f Implementation (AS) is 
intended to be a basic package o f information and skills to 
bring officers up to the level required to commence 
Neighbourhood Policing. When Box C is reached, selected  
officers will require additional skills training in order for  
them to start planning and evaluating initiatives to redress 
some o f the problems each relief team is tackling. The 
requirement for specialist skills on any relie f should reflect 
local problems. As far as possible training should take 
place on division.
Examples o f the type o f skills that could be provided would 
include the following areas: -
1. Sexual offences and related matters.
2. Drugs.
3. Licencing.
4. Conflict mediation.
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5. Traffic.
6. Juveniles and missing persons.
7. School visits.
It is not intended that these additional skills would in any 
way replace the appropriate Force departments staffed by 
specialists, e.g. Obscene Publications, Crime Prevention, 
Juvenile Bureau, Accident Prevention Units. It must be 
realised that these branches have extremely limited 
resources which at best can only provide specialist advice, 
support and co-ordination to divisional street officers.
An officer would be selected and trained to specialise in a 
skill identified as being needed on the sector by the relief 
inspector. This o fficer will then assume responsibility 
within his relief team as the Inspector’s representative for  
that particular problem and would train a deputy, and a 
small number o f officers from his relief to assist in dealing 
with that problem. In the 'ideal' system every sector 
officer would have basic policing street skills and in 
addition one primary special skill plus two secondary skills. 
The secondary skills would assist him to deputise for other 
officers.
C2 Victim Support
Neighbourhood Policing places great importance on 
increasing public satisfaction with police. As a significant 
amount o f contact between police and the public occurs 
a fter a crime has been committed, victim support is given 
a high priority.
Training I (AS) will already have equipped officers with 
extra skills in dealing with victims, though this will 
probably be limited to the initial visits by police.
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In order to reduce demands on police, any subsequent 
counselling and support should be undertaken by voluntary 
Victim Support Schemes. For these reasons police support 
and assistance must be given to all such local voluntary 
bodies who represent a valuable resource to the community. 
Victim Support Schemes could also assist in providing crime 
prevention advice to the public.
C3 Inter-agency co-operation
Neighbourhood Policing seeks to establish and maintain 
active communication and co-operation between police and 
statutory agencies on the division. For instance, local 
council departments (dealing with education, social services, 
housing, transport, recreation, the environment the elderly), 
the Probation Service and the Manpower Services 
Commission.
Initially police would liaise with each department on 
specific issues, with the eventual aim o f bringing all 
agencies together to form a panel for the joint discussion 
and solution o f community problems.
Examples o f the type o f problems involved would include:-
the closure o f roads on housing estates to through 
traffic,
the utilisation o f existing school facilities for  
children during the summer holidays, 
the use o f offenders under community service orders 
to assist the elderly,
liaison between planners and police over new housing 
security.
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In ideal circumstances, once all statutory agencies have 
been brought together as a panel, the police should attempt 
to expand it to form a 'Neighbourhood Committee'. This 
would comprise o f not only the statutory agencies but all 
voluntary and community groups providing a service in the 
area.
In addition, a significant proportion o f this committee 
should be representatives o f local residents. This 
committee (or committees, covering small areas on a 
division) could then comment and advise on the best way o f  
dealing with a whole range o f local problems. Police should 
remember that although initially many problems appear to 
have little to do with them, all too often problems which 
are un-resolved do become a demand on police.
C4 Community Involvement
Nearly all the crime prevention and conflict reducing 
initiatives require the community to work and act as a 
group. However, in some areas, through apathy and/or fear, 
residents have no concept o f 'community' and are not 
involved in any group self-help schemes. Unfortunately, 
these types o f areas almost always have high crime rates as 
well as high levels o f urban deprivation.
In these circumstances, Inspectors must plan ways o f 
encouraging and supporting local residents to become 
involved in any type o f community activity, e.g. youth club, 
tenants group/residents association, etc. Permanent Beat 
and Special Constabulary officers aided by other sector 
officers will play a prominent role in encouraging these 
activities. It will also enable these officers to obtain
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feedback from the community on local problems for  
incorporation into sector plans. Once confidence and 
interest has been raised these groups can then form the 
basis for local crime prevention initiatives.
At a more formal level o f community involvement the 
establishment o f Sector Working Parties and Consultative 
Committees will provide police and the community with the 
opportunity to discuss and solve joint local issues.
C5 Crime Prevention
At this stage all the prevention schemes put forward for  
implementation under Crime Management II (BB7) 
Neighbourhood Watch, Property Marking, cycle post-code 
stamping and environmental crime prevention - should be 
running. The aim is to consolidate these earlier schemes 
and to expand into the areas where the community was 
previously either unwilling or unable to give support.
I f  Neighbourhood Watch schemes are perceived to be 
successful by the public there is a possibility that their 
commitment will decrease and crime will edge back to its 
former level. To avoid this, Neighbourhood Watch schemes 
should be encouraged to broaden their base to include 
further community involvement, for example, play groups, 
youth clubs, environmental improvements and community 
care for the elderly.
C6 Conflict Prevention
Although to some extent, police can anticipate and 
intervene in events which have serious conflict potential, 
they can only deal with a small proportion. In a number of 
areas, Community Mediation schemes have been introduced 
by public volunteers.
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These schemes provide a referral agency for police in 
various domestic and neighbour disputes. In addition, 
trained voluntary mediation are available to intervene in 
conflict situations, particularly those with serious public 
disorder potential.
I f these types o f services could be supported by a Multi 
Agency approach it should exist to implement and maintain 
an effective Conflict Prevention Service.
C7 School Liaison
The high level o f juvenile involvement in crime necessitates 
a preventive programme o f education as well as the more 
traditional reactive approach.
The current practice for schools liaison is for Permanent 
Beat Officers to visit their local primary schools and for  
district based Juvenile Bureau officers to visit secondary 
schools. Neighbourhood Policing proposes to also use 
trained relief officers to visit schools on their sectors. The 
careful selection and training o f officers who display the 
skills required (see Training II, Cl) will be crucial to the 
success o f these visits.
The aim o f promoting greater involvement o f local officers  
in schools is to engender in the children a sense o f 
responsibility for their area and to present the police 
officers as a central figure in the community. It will 
therefore be increasingly important for all officers to 
realise that their own attitudes and behaviour must be 
examplary i f  the community and particularly children are to 
be set an example to follow.
Police/Public Contract
The philosophy o f Neighbourhood Policing rejects, outright, 
that crime and conflict control is purely a police 
responsibility and, without apology, accepts that the police, 
on their own, cannot significantly a ffec t  the rate o f 
increase o f crime and social disorder.
Following naturally from this statement is the idea o f 
regeneration and a police-public contract in which police 
would seek to shift the burden o f large scale crime 
prevention, assistance to victims, and some non-essential 
police tasks to the community.
I f  some o f this burden can be taken up by the public, the 
police can then be freed to concentrate their efforts in 
those areas where they are particularly skilled. This is not 
an abrogation o f police involvement in such tasks: it is a 
recognition that police should act as motivators and 
facilitators by providing skilled assistance to the community 
in a joint effort to prevent crime and maintain order.
Consultation is absolutely crucial to the police-public 
contact. Since the contract is a dyiamic entity which will 
need continual re-definition, the consultation must also be 
continuous. The purpose o f consultation are: firstly that 
consultation is vital to improve information-flow between 
police and public. This will, in the main, consist o f an 
explanation o f police policies to the public and, in return, 
an accurate perception by police o f the public's problems 
and its need.
The second purpose is to make the public aware o f the 
serious limitations on police and so reduce what are often  
unrealistic public expectations o f police. The third is to
-  229 -
mobilise public response to the public side o f the contract. 
This response must be specifically geared to a significant 
contribution to crime prevention and victim support within a 
victim-orientated philosophy.
It is argued that the police-public contract cannot afford to 
be merely a public relations exercise, designed only to 
increase public satisfaction, since one o f the unintended 
consequences o f increasing public satisfaction may well be a 
corresponding increase in public demand. Thus the whole 
thrust must be towards getting the public more involved in 
active crime and conflict prevention, additionally, providing 
support for their own victims.
Neighbourhood Policing philosophy suggests that: "The
'ideal' is a system in which professional police and a 
community establish a partnership which results in a 
significant proportion o f policing services within that 
community being provided voluntarily by community 
members. The primary goals o f such a police system are 
the prevention o f crime, reduction o f conflict and assistance 
to victims".
This definition emphasises the extent to which such a 
philosophy would depend on a significant contribution by 
community members. Since, initially, a systematic 
redirection o f police effort would involve committing 
additional resources to securing the contract, the pay o f f  
would only come if community responsibility for large scale 
crime prevention and victim support initiatives enabled 
police to redirect their own efforts towards those areas in 
which they are especially skilled.
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It should be noted that in this definition 'victims' is used in its 
widest sense - not only the victims o f crime but also members 
o f the public who suffer as a consequence o f noise, nuisance or 
indeed any social problems. In addition the victim could be an 
individual, group o f individuals or the community at large. The 
term 'voluntarily' is used to disguise between 'public purchase' 
services such as the statutory agencies (which in the present 
economic climate are a relatively fixed resource) and voluntary 
groups (which with a change in community values, could be 
capable o f expansion).
The next point concerning the contract is a need (without 
apology or defensiveness) to inform the public that it is 
impossible for police to significantly a ffec t levels o f most 
crimes on their own. This is not the same thing as stating 
that the Force cannot police without the consent o f the public. 
It is to forcibly and consistently reject the argument that 
crime control is exclusively a police responsibility.
5 . 8. PLA N N IN G  A N D  EV A LU A TIO N
Sector planning and Working Parties provide the largest proportion o f 
the police stations planning. Priorities o f strategies and resource 
allocation in the long term are recommended by the Station Working 
Party and Divisional Management Team. Decisions on all these 
matters are made at the appropriate time by the Chief 
Superintendent o f the Division.
However there is also a requirement within Neighbourhood Policing 
for each police station to develop its own evaluation unit. This is 
particularly important because without evaluation successful planning 
cannot be undertaken.
ACTION PLANNING BY SECTOR
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION MEASURE EFFECTS OF STRATEGY
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The Evaluation Unit at the police station is the Divisional 
Intelligence and Information Unit and the Planning units are the 
Working Party, the R elief and Management Teams. Eventually the 
decisions as to police methods and strategies will be taken at the 
Management meetings.
The Neighbourhood Policing system has to be dynamic and this is 
ensured by investing significant police resources in planning and 
evaluation; without the facility the system would eventually decay.
S. 9. SUMMARY
This chapter has described in some detail the package developed for  
implementation at Brixton in 1983. Although, as has been stressed, 
it was a total system the exact form of each element was very 
much dependent on the local policing environment. This degree o f 
flexibility is reflected in the description o f the package which 
includes special features exclusive to the Brixton model. At other 
police stations there were variations in priorities and allocation o f 
resources.
In many ways the 'Neighbourhood Policing' package acted as a check  
list to ensure that every aspect o f the Geographical Policing System 
had been considered and planned. It was not intended that the 
system should be constructed in a mechanistic manner, using the 
package guidelines as rigid specification.
The majority o f the model described in this chapter is concerned 
with internal organisational change to the micro organisation o f  the 
police station. This emphasis on organisational change was in 
response to the analysis o f need for radical structure and process 
changes. However, once these organisational changes were achieved, 
it became clear that by itself, the original 'Neighbourhood Policing' 
model was insufficient.
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Great difficulty was experienced by the operational managers at 
Brixton in linking the analysis o f the environment into policing 
options. It was apparent that yet another planning framework was 
required. This framework would have to deal with the problem o f 
linking the Environmental Potential into practical policing solutions 
for  operational street officers.
Although, 'Directed Patrolling' was given prominence in the package 
and explained to the essential, it was not made explicit exactly how 
to do it. Many o f the strategies required were new or had
previously only been used by specialist officers. It was also found 
that there was no common reservoir o f professional police knowledge 
regarding; best options, good practices, successes and failures.
The next Chapter describes a Directed Patrolling framework which 
was developed at Brixton in an attempt to answer these problems.
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CHAPTER SIX
6. DIRECTED PATROLLING
6. 1. POLICE BEHAVIOUR
The description o f  a Geographical Policing system provided by the 
Neighbourhood Policing package, its lists o f elements and tasks, is 
very comprehensive. It provides an outline and virtually a 
component or function list o f  such a THIRD LEVEL system. This 
list was intended to cover all the requirements o f this system, 
including the implementation and maintenance o f a Joint Police and 
Public Information/Planning network. Eventually a Joint Policing 
Strategy would be created by this network.
However, there are a number o f  problems with the implementation 
o f such a system, particularly in relation to the actual behaviour 
required from operational police officers. The ideal behaviour 
required has been described as that o f  a pro-social role model. 
Exactly how this behaviour fitted into Response and Enforcement, 
required in all policing systems, had not been made clear.
In addition, how did police contact the public and encourage them to 
be involved in self-policing or self-policing? Did this fit  into normal 
patrolling or was it a separate activity? It was preferable that all 
such police behaviour should be linked together in a comprehensive 
framework which provided the optimum response or tactic available 
to police officers.
6. 2. POLICE TACTICS
As a result o f these questions and problems, a number o f operational 
tactics were developed at Brixton for the use o f  all officers in 
contact with the public. These tactics were simplified into two 
basic response schedules which were then integrated as a simplified 
tactic for all police public encounters.
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6. 2.1. FIRST CONTACT TACTIC
The first response by any police o fficer to a member o f  the 
public must be that o f providing assistance or help in a 
pro-social manner. This initial and consistent police 
behaviour is illustrated in the diagram Fig. 6. I which 
describes the behavioural sequence involved.
FIRST CONTACT TACTIC
FIG. 6. 1.
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As shown in the behaviour sequence, police were required to 
maintain consistant behaviour as a Pro Social model. This 
behaviour would require high levels o f Victim Helping and 
Prevention.
On First Contact with the public, whether police or public 
initiated, police would continue this behaviour model. The 
police o fficer  would endeavour to be helpful and provide the 
best possible service. Often, this tactic would be effective  
and the contact would end successfully.
However, if the public failed to co-operate reasonably or 
committed offences, then police would respond with 
appropriate restraint or enforcement. This would continue 
until public co-operation returned, when police would co­
operate. In essence, police always co-operate on the first 
contact. After initiating pro-social behaviour, police 
responded by doing whatever the public did previously, i.e. 
co-operation or enforcement. This particular part o f the 
tactic was named 'TIT for TAT'.
THE FIRST CONTACT TACTIC was based on behavioural 
analysis and computer game theories (CHERFAS 1987). 
These theories had used 'Prisoners Dilemma' psychology 
research, 'Tit for Tat' computer game research and 'Animal 
Co-operation' in evolutionary biology research. It was 
predicted that this type o f behavioural response was 
extremely robust and effective in evolutionary survival and 
dealing with complex social situations.
6. 2.2. CONTRACTING TACTIC
In addition to an initial response tactic o f  'first contact', a 
framework for police encouragement o f public self help by
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Victim and Community Helping was also required. It was 
essential that such behavioural guidance was simple yet 
effective in the complex environment o f  policing. 
Eventually, a fter a number o f attempts and failures, a 
CONTRACTING TACTIC was adopted. (Fig. 6. 2).
Fig. 6. 2.
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This tactic was similar to the First Contact sequence and 
utilised the first two stages o f policing response i.e. Pro­
social model and First Contact behaviour. However, when 
it became clear that the public required, or would benefit 
from self help, then this was suggested by the Police 
Officer. In order to encourage and reinforce such behaviour 
then a very practical, operational version o f the Police/ 
Public Contract was introduced, as described below.
In essence, this entailed the police o fficer  listing the help 
he had already provided, explaining the limits o f future 
police assistance and then encouraging the individual or 
group to help themselves. This continued in a negotiating 
sequence, with ’contract' made as to future public behaviour 
and objectives. At a very simple level this resulted in the 
police o fficer saying "this is what I have done, what are 
you going to do?" Several options would then be provided 
or elicited and agreement on one or more reached. I f  the 
public declined, or were unable to help themselves Police 
would still provide the best possible service.
6. 3 PUBLIC CONTACT STRATEGY
What was now required was a linking o f  both tactics into a 
comprehensive strategy for police contact with the public. It was 
essential that such a behaviour guidance framework was simple and 
yet effective in the complex environment o f policing. The diagram 
at Fig. 6. 3 illustrates the strategy adopted:-
This strategy was quickly adapted for contact with the public in 
virtually all situations. It was in fact very simple to teach and 
practice. The above diagram appears far more complex than the 
practical use o f this strategy and police officers were trained in the 
strategy by simple examples and practical demonstrations by 
supervisory officers.
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PUBLIC CONTACT S TR A TE G Y
Fig. 6 3.
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6. 4. POUCE/PUBLIC CONTACT POINTS
The major output o f any police system is the service it provides to 
the public. This service can be measured and directed at three 
main Police/Public Contact points as descriped in Chapter Four:-
(i) The Front or Station Office in the Police Station.
(ii) Telephone or written communication to the Police Station.
(iii) The patrolling officer on the streets.
It was considered that the Public Contact strategy could be 
effectively  used at all three contact points in order to improve 
police service to the public and to increase public self-help. Super­
vision and direction o f the first two locations are more easily 
achieved by managers inside the police station. Initially it was 
expected that the improved organisational system and effective  
introduction o f  the Contact Strategy inside the station would quickly 
produce results.
However, a large proportion o f public contact takes place on the 
streets, a location which is far more difficult to supervise. In 
addition, a Police Contact strategy had to be integrated into other 
police strategies which were essential for an effective police 
presence on the streets. In response to these requirements the 
strategy was then integrated into a larger and more comprehensive 
DIRECTED PATROLLING strategy, which will now be described.
6. 5. DIRECTED PATROLLING
What was required at this stage was a clear plan o f  RESOURCE 
DEPLOYMENT on the streets outside the Police Station. This 
deployment would have to reflect the following:-
(i) The Environmental Potential
(ii) Victim and Community Helping
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(iii) Resource Management
(vi) Conflict and Crime Management
(v) The Public Contact Strategy.
In essence, Directed patrolling was a major output from all the 
various inputs into the Geographical Policing System. The
relationship o f these inputs to Directed Patrolling can be summarised 
as follows:-
(i) The Environmental Potential provided an analysis o f the 
'problem situation' and a prediction o f future trends. It 
also identified the major features requiring police attention. 
For directed patrolling it was found, for example, that 
RESIDENTIAL or NON-RESIDENTIAL areas required two 
different types o f police response.
These two categories became the major classification 
required for the planning o f police strategy. In addition, 
HOSTILE areas, could also require a specific strategy.
(ii) The levels and quality o f  Victim and Community Helping 
required from police by the public were also suggested by 
the Environmental Potential.
(iii) Once a Geographical Policing System had been successfully 
implemented, then the information on resources and the 
Structure for deployment would be available.
(tv) The concepts o f Crime and Conflict Management would
provide an implementation and analysis framework for these 
two specialised areas o f Resource Deployment.
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(v) Public Contact Strategy provided a behavioural and decision 
framework for each individual o fficer  involved in this type 
o f patrolling.
An important part o f this element was its 'self directed' 
nature. Direct supervision o f street officers is recognised 
as being ineffective, if not impossible. Therefore officers  
had to plan their own day to day activities, within the 
specific objectives laid down.
Once an o fficer  had planned his day or days, contracts were 
made with super-vising officers and subject to response 
demands, officers were then left to achieve their planned 
activities.
In the description that follows, directed patrolling strategies 
are primarily decided by whether an area is RESIDENTIAL 
or NON-RESIDENTIAL and the level o f  demands; HIGH, 
MEDIUM or LOW.
6. 6. RESIDENTIAL DIRECTED PATROL
Once a geographical area has been analysed as mainly residential 
then a specific type o f patrolling strategy can be planned.
In broad terms this strategy involved.—
(1) The implementation o f self-directed patrol by operational 
street officers.
(2) The development o f environmental and community crime 
prevention initiatives (self policing contract).
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(3) The development o f community conflict resolution/reduction 
initiatives (self policing contract).
In order to ensure effective resource deployment the residential area 
must now be further sub-divided into HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW 
demand areas. Each designation has a planned strategy (Fig. 6. 4).
RESIDENTIAL DIRECTED PATROL
POLICE STRATEGY
RESOURCES SUPPORTED PROBLEM DIRECTED NIGH INTENSITY
LOW MEDIUM
OEMAMO
HIGH
Fig. 6. 4
The three strategies were named;
(i) HIGH INTENSITY for HIGH Demand
(ii) PROBLEM DIRECTED for MEDIUM Demand
(iii) SUPPORTED for LOW Demand.
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Initially each strategy sought to respond to the existing situation 
effectively, then reduce demands and POTENTIAL to enable the area 
to be re-classified as a lower demand area. The LOW demand area 
strategies were particularly biased towards preventive tactics. Each 
Directed Patrolling Strategy will now be described in some detail.
6. 6.1. HIGH INTENSITY STRATEGY 
Description: -
This strategy is directed at maintaining police control over 
street crime and disorder in a residential area. The aims 
are to reduce both the levels o f public conflict and the 
opportunities for street crime and disorder. It is almost 
exclusively dependent upon police to implement and 
maintain.
The strategy can only be implemented a fter  consultation 
and with the support o f local residents. High level of 
continuous disorder may force police to implement this 
strategy immediately, but consultation should also begin 
immediately.
Opportunities for crime and conflict are reduced by:-
(1) Fast police response to demands (difficult for  
offenders to escape).
(2) High numbers of officers on patrol in specific  
problem areas at the appropriate times.
(3) Early intervention by police in conflict situations.
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This strategy can only be maintained for short intense 
periods, a fter which time it may become an excessive drain 
on police resources. It may also lose its
impetus/psychological e ffec t upon potential offenders in an 
area.
6. 6.1.1. Primary Objective:-
To reduce the demands on police to a pre­
determined level where it is considered a joint 
police/public approach to crime and conflict 
problems can be implemented and not 
overwhelmed by the volume and type of 
demands.
6. 6.1.2. Control:-
Chief SupertntendenL-
Overall policy direction/forward planning, inter­
station/inter-agency policy co-ordination and 
Management Objectives.
Superintendent:- (Uniform)
Overall Implementation and management o f 
station strategy and Operational Objectives.
Supertntendent/Chief Inspector (CID):-
Implementation and management o f station 
crime strategy, management o f D.I.I. Unit and 
C.I.D. operational objectives.
Chief Inspecton-
Week by week management o f station uniform 
strategy and operational objectives.
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Inspector (relief officers): -
Geographical responsibility and planning 
proposals for defined sectors. Management and 
Implementation o f agreed policy for that 
sector.
Time based duty officers function for whole 
station.
Inspectora (othersh-
Support of R elief Inspectors both administration 
and operational as decided under station policy.
Under this particular strategy it may be 
necessary for a special structure to be created  
in the short term (i.e. special C.I.D./Uniform 
Squad, but this should be absorbed into the 
normal station structure as soon as possible.
6. 6.1.3. Management Objectives
(1) Define the problem situation.
(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to
implement and maintain the strategy.
(3) Ensure that the total police station 
structure and operations are at maximum 
efficiency and effectiveness levels.
(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the 
resources required.
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(5) Plan and implement appropriate training/ 
familiarisation for all_ officers involved or 
affected.
(6) Plan and implement an appropriate 
intelligence, monitoring and criminal 
target system. (D.I.I.U)
(7) Identify problems suitable for multi­
agency approach (concentrating on those 
possible to implement very quickly).
(8) Plan or implement an appropriate Public 
Information Network.
(9) Begin negotiations with outside agency 
policy makers, re: environmental crime 
prevention and conflict reduction.
(10) Decide the appropriate measure to 
indicate 'success', and the various levels 
o f achievement required before a decision 
can be made to implement a Problem 
Directed Strategy.
6. 6.1.4. Operational Objectives:-
(1) Contain street crime to existing levels.
(2) Obtain a decrease in selected street 
crime, particularly those causing most 
public fear.
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(3) Reduce the levels o f public conflict
wherever possible in day to day policing.
(4) Obtain a decrease in any other incidents 
which are perceived by local residents as 
important.
(5) Increase the number o f patrolling officers  
to the required levels, whilst maintaining 
the support o f residents.
(6) Increase significantly levels o f victim
helping by all patrol officers to residents.
(7) Collect and feed  back the intelligence
information required.
(8) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation o f  
targetted individuals.
(9) Implement the operational aspect o f
public information network.
(10) Establish links with all significant group 
representatives in the area and provide 
community helping.
(11) Identify suitable targets for short term
crime prevention measures.
(12) Maintain police response times to agreed 
levels.
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When a residential area is analysed as a 
medium demand area, or has been reduced to 
this level by the above strategy, then the 
following strategy will be required:-
6. 6.2. PROBLEM DIRECTED 
Description-
This strategy is directed at implementing and developing a 
joint police/public approach to the crime and conflict 
problems o f a residential area.
Police patrol and response times are maintained at levels 
sufficient to prevent large increases in public demands.
Other police resources are invested in discovering the 'root 
causes' (i.e. the problems not the symptoms) o f crime and 
conflict in the area.
Once these are identified, attempts are made to involve 
residents in crime prevention through s e lf  policing and local 
agencies in environmental crime prevention and conflict 
reducing initiatives.
6. 6.2.1. Primary Objective
To reduce the short term response demands on 
police by developing a joint police/public 
strategy against the crime and conflict 
problems o f an area.
6. 6.2.2. Management Objectives
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.
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(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to 
implement and maintain the strategy 
(Geographical Responsibility?).
(3) Ensure that the total police station 
structure and operations are at maximum 
efficiency and effectiveness levels.
(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the 
resources required.
(5) Plan and implement an appropriate 
intelligence monitoring and criminal 
target system (D.I.I.U.)
(6) Plan and implement or develop an 
existing Public Information Network.
(7) Begin, or intensify negotiations with 
outside agencies providing services to the 
area, re: environmental crime prevention 
and conflict reduction.
(8) Collate, analyse and interpret, re: the 
'root' problems o f the area to plan three 
strategies:
1. Priorities for multi-agency 
environmental crime prevention.
2. Priorities for community crime 
prevention.
3. Priorities for conflict reduction.
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(9) Implement the agreed strategies 
incrementally (do not attempt too much 
too soon!).
(10) Decide the appropriate measure to
indicate 'success1, and the various levels 
of achievement required before a decision 
can be made to implement a Supported 
Policing Strategy.
6. 6.2.3. Operational Objectives
(1) Contain and where possible reduce levels 
of street crime.
(2) Expand the street crimes selected for
increased police attention.
(3) Expand areas o f conflict resolution for
operational officers.
(4) Reduce all short term response demands 
from the area to acceptable levels.
(5) Decrease the number o f patrolling
officers without affecting the other
objectives.
(6) Increase police resources in multi-agency 
activities.
(7) Increase police resources providing crime 
prevention and victim helping.
-  252 -
(8) Implement agreed crime prevention
strategies.
(9) Maintain high levels o f victim helping by 
remaining patrolling officers.
(10) Collect and feed  back intelligence
information required.
(11) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation of 
targetted individuals.
(12) Enhance the operational aspects o f the 
Public Information network.
In residential areas of low demand, reduced 
police resources will be available, therefore a 
different strategy is required.
6. 6.3. SUPPORTED STRATEGY 
Description—
This strategy is directed a t:-
(1) Maintaining an existing, successful joint police/public 
strategy o f  crime prevention and conflict reduction, 
or
(2) Introducing this type o f strategy into an existing low 
demand area within existing beat resources.
These objectives will be possible because o f the success of, 
or potential for, a high level of involvement by local 
agencies and residents. This will have contributed to 
comparatively low levels o f street crime and in particular 
low demands for  Response and Peace-keeping services.
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The opportunity for committing crime in the residential 
area will have been significantly reduced.
Police resources will not be increased in this strategy, any 
improvements or requirements for additional services must 
be provided from other agencies resources, or by voluntary 
public involvement.
It may well be essential to introduce this strategy into 
existing low demand areas which adjoin medium or high 
demand areas, as successful police action in these areas 
may display demands, particularly crime, into what were 
previously low demand areas.
6. 6.3.1. Primary Objective
To reduce police resources in the area to the 
lowest possible level, whilst maintaining the 
existing low levels o f demands on police by a 
successful joint police/publlc crime prevention 
and conflict reducing strategies.
6. 6.3.2. Management Objectives
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.
(2) Introduce/Improve/retain an appropriate 
police structure to maintain this strategy. 
(Geographical responsibility?)
(3) Ensure that the total police structure and 
operations are, and remain at, maximum 
efficiency/effectiveness levels.
(4) Reduce the police resources to the
minimum levels possible.
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(5) Re-allocate resources to other higher 
demand areas.
(6) Maintain an appropriate intelligence, 
monitoring and criminal target system. 
(D.I.I. Unit).
(7) Update officers training/familiarisation o f 
strategy objectives as required.
(8) Maintain an appropriate Public 
Information Network.
(9) Maintain/improve liaison with all outside 
agencies providing services to the area, 
re: environmental crime prevention.
(10) Where possible expand involvement o f 
agencies in environmental crime 
prevention.
(11) Where possible expand range o f 
community crime prevention involvement.
(12) Where possible expand range o f 
community conflict resolution.
(13) Decide the appropriate critical measures 
and their acceptable levels. (Violation o f 
these levels may indicate new strategy 
required).
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6. 6.2.3. Operational Objectives
(1) Contain and where possible reduce the
overall levels o f street crime.
(2) Contain and where possible reduce the
overall short term response demands on 
police.
(3) Identify and reduce future potential 
sources o f community conflict.
(4) Decrease the total number o f police
resources in the area to minimum levels.
(5) Maintain some o f these resources in
multi-agency activities (crime prevention).
(6) Maintain some resources in long term
group helping (victim and crime 
prevention).
(7) Encourage individuals and groups in the 
community to expand their 'self policing' 
activities where possible.
(8) Maintain agreed crime prevention 
strategies.
(9) Maintain the intelligence system 
operational input.
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6. 7. HOSTILE AREAS
Unfortunately, some areas o f  high demand, particularly residential 
areas, may have a history o f  public disorder and very HIGH 
ENVIRON MENTAL POTENTIAL. These 'symbolic locations' require 
special police strategies. Implementing a Hifpx Intensity strategy 
may precipitate violent street disorder. In addition, police resources 
may be inadequate to deal with this disorder for prolonged periods. 
The following strategy is designed as an alternative to a High 
Intensity Strategy in order to reduce an area to a Medium Demand 
classification where a Problem Directed strategy can then be 
utilised.
6. 8. LOW INTENSITY STRATEGY
Despite the name o f  this strategy, it still requires similar police 
resources to a HIGH INTENSITY strategy. It is only the public's 
perception that large numbers o f police are not involved. Consider­
able police resources will still have to be invested in mobile 
reserves for public disorder and in extensive intelligence networks.
However, the strategy should only be required in the following 
circumstances.
(1) There is a history o f  and/or a strong possibility o f violent 
confrontation with Police in the near future.
(2) There is a significant influx o f visitors to the area for  
criminal purposes.
The area where the strategy requires implementation will in reality 
be HIGH demand area, although criminal activity may have suppress­
ed reports to police o f  public needs. Due to the volatile nature o f  
such areas, it was found that the strategy had to be divided into 
three stages; PACIFICATION, STABILISATION and eventually 
NORMALISATION, Figure. 6. 5.
resources
(WORKLOAD)
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LOW INTENSITY D IRECTED PATROL
(RESIDENTIAL! 
POLICE STRATEGY
Fig. 6. 5,
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6. 8.1. PACIFICATION STRATEGY 
Description:-
This strategy is directed at maintaining police control over 
street crime and disorder in a residential area. The aims 
are to reduce both the levels o f  public conflict and the 
opportunities for street crime and disorder. The area may 
well be considered to have a 'symbolic' significance.
The strategy is almost exclusively dependent upon police to 
implement and maintain. Unfortunately it will often have 
to be implemented in the face  o f hostility from local 
residents.
Despite these problems, the support and confidence o f 
residents in police must be enhanced and maintained.
Opportunities for crime and conflict would be reduced by:-
(1) Introducing, at the times disorder is anticipated, the 
highest levels o f uniform patrol officers that can be 
maintained without themselves provoking serious 
disorder.
(2) Ensuring, fast and effective response to quell public 
disorder. This will include the detention o f those 
responsible. Reserve manpower resources on standby 
(mobile) may well be required.
(3) Targetting and neutralising o f individuals who are 
persistent/career criminals or involved in organised 
crime in the area.
(4) Early intervention by police in conflict situations.
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In addition, genuine attempts must be made by police to 
provide a good service to local residents, and to deal with 
their perceived grievances.
6. 8.1.1. Primary Objective
To reduce the levels o f  short term response 
and peacekeeping demands on police, in 
particular for serious disorder, to levels that 
can be dealt with by reasonable police station 
resources. In addition to gain the confidence 
and support o f  local law abiding residents for 
police actions.
6. 8.1.2. Control
Chief Superintendent:-
Overall policy direction/forward planning, inter- 
station/inter-agency, policy co-ordination and 
Management Objectives.
Superintendent (Uniform):-
Overall Implementation/ Management o f 
Pacification strategy and Operational 
objectives.
Superintendent/Chief Inspector (C.I.D):-
Overall implementation/Management o f crime 
objectives with Pacification strategy, 
management o f Intelligence system 
(Surveillance/Targetting).
Chief Inspector/Inspector (Uniform): -
Management o f Operational objectives, day by 
day.
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6. 8.1.3. Management Objectives
(1) Define the problem situation.
(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to
implement and maintain.
(3) Ensure that the total police station 
structure and operations are at maximum 
efficiency and effectiveness levels.
(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the 
resources required.
(5) Plan and implement appropriate training/ 
familiarisation for all officers involved or 
affected.
(6) Plan and implement an appropriate 
intelligence, monitoring and criminal 
target system (DJ.l.Unit and I and S Unit 
as required?).
(7) Identify problems suitable for multi­
agency approach (concentrating on those 
possible to implement very quickly).
(8) Plan and implement an appropriate Police 
Information Network, concentrating on the 
parts linked to local residents and their 
representatives.
(9) Initiate, where possible, multi-agency 
approach to urgent problems.
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(10) Decide the appropriate measures to
indicate 'success', and the various levels 
o f achievement required before a decision 
can be made to implement a Stabilisation 
strategy.
6. 8.1.4. Operational Objectives.
(1) Increase the number o f uniformed
patrolling officers to required levels 
without provoking serious disorder.
(2) Deal effecitively  with all outbreaks o f 
street disorder.
(3) Significantly reduce levels o f  street crime 
within a four week period.
(4) Hold, and if  possible, reduce this level o f 
s tr e e t . crime, a fter the initial four week 
period.
(5) Reduce the levels o f public conflict 
whenever possible in day to day policing.
(6) Collect and feed  back the intelligence 
information required.
(7) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation o f 
targetted individuals.
(8) Increase significantly levels o f victim 
helping (short term) by all uniform patrol 
officers to residents.
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(9) Implement the operational aspects o f 
public information network.
(10) Establish links with all significant group 
representatives in the area and provide 
group helping (short term).
At a pre-planned time, or when a reduced 
level o f  crime and conflict is reached the 
following will be required:-
6. 8.2. STABILISATION STRATEGY 
Descriptiorv-
This strategy is directed at 'stabilising' an unpredictable 
high demand area where, although street crime and disorder 
are largely under police control (i.e. not allowed to rise 
above certain levels), there is still a potential for escalation 
and conflict which requires a longer term police strategy.
The strategy is largely dependent upon police who will have 
to contain street crime and disorder to 'acceptable' levels, 
whilst increasing public confidence to the point where 
residents demonstrate their positive support for police. This 
will be particularly important at the group level.
Criminal influences in the area must be reduced to the 
lowest possible levels, especially elements o f  organised 
crime.
Attention must also be given to the possibility o f a multi­
agency approach to the crime and conflict problems o f  the 
area. Where considered desirable/possible physical changes 
to the environment should be initiated.
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There should already be a measure o f local residents
support for police actions and acceptance in the area o f the 
same regular uniformed patrol officers exercising their 
police powers.
A large proportion o f  police resources may still be required 
to deal with response and peacekeeping demands. However, 
a significant proportion o f the total police resources should 
be directed at supporting and encouraging residents,
particularly at the group level, to themselves support crime 
prevention and conflict reducing initiatives in the area.
6. 8.2.1. Primary Objectives
To reduce the short term response and
peacekeeping demands (and the potential for 
sudden escalation) on police to a level 
comparable with the surrounding medium 
demand areas. In addition, to gain the support 
o f residents for initial crime prevention and
conflict reducing strategies.
6. 8.2.2. Control
Chief Superintendent:-
Overall policy direction/for ward planning, inter­
station/inter-agency, policy co-ordination and 
Management Objectives.
Superintent (Uniform):-
Overall implementation/Management o f  
Stabilisation strategy and Operational 
objectives.
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S u p e r in te n d e n t /C h ie f  In s p e c to r  (C .I .D ):-
Overall Implementation/Management o f crime 
objectives with Stabilisation strategy, 
management o f Intelligence system 
(Surveillance/Targetting).
C h ie f  In s p e c to r/In s p e c to r  (U n ifo rm e -
Management o f Operational objectives, day by 
day.
6. 8.2.3. Management Objectives
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.
(2) Decide if  an existing police structure is 
appropriate to implement the strategy or 
if change is required.
(3) Ensure that the total police station 
structure and operations are at maximum 
efficiency and effectiveness levels.
(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the 
resources required.
(5) Plan and Implement appropriate training/ 
familiarisation for  an officers involved or 
affected.
(6) If not established, plan and implement an 
appropriate intelligence, monitoring and 
criminal target system (D.I.I. Unit and I 
and S Unit as required?)
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(7) Identify problems suitable for multi­
agency approach (including physical
environmental changes where required).
(8) Expand or implement an appropriate
Police Information Network, concentrating 
on local residents and their 
representatives.
(9) Initiate or intensify a multi-agency
approach to urgent and long term 
problems.
(10) Estimate the resources that can be re­
deployed in group helping (long term) and 
multi-agency development.
(11) Decide the appropriate measures to 
indicate 'success', and the various levels 
o f achievement required before a decision 
can be made to implement a 
Normalisation strategy.
6. 8.2.4. Operational Objectives
(1) Deal effectively  with all outbreaks o f 
street disorder with the minimum number 
o f officers.
(?) Decrease the number o f uniformed 
patrolling officers required to provide 
response and peacekeeping services.
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(3) Increase the amount o f crime prevention 
services provided by uniform officers.
(4) Maintain high levels o f victim helping by 
individual officers, particularly to 
residents.
(5) Significantly reduce levels o f street crime 
and disorder within a specified period.
(6) Expand areas o f conflict resolution for
operational officers.
(7) Collect and feed  back the intelligence
information required.
(8) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation o f 
targetting individuals.
(9) Implement or enhance the operational
aspect o f  the Public Information network.
(10) Establish or increase links with all
significant group representatives in the 
area and provide community helping.
Once again at a pre-planned time or demand 
level a change to the following will be 
required:-
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6. 8.3. NORMALISATION STRATEGY 
Description.—
This strategy is directed at removing any remnants o f 
'special' or 'symbolic' significance from a geographical area, 
thereby enabling it to be included in the normal policing 
arrangements for the police station.
Police resources should be incrementally removed from the 
area down to a predetermined level. I f  a special team of 
officers has been set up in one o f the earlier strategies, it 
should now be dissolved and absorbed into the broader 
policing strategies for the whole police station.
This strategy is dependent on the development o f a joint 
police/public involvement in policing, particularly crime 
prevention and conflict reduction. Local groups and 
individual residents in the area should become actively 
involved in the self-policing o f  their neighbourhood.
All agencies which provide a service o f any kind to the 
area should be encouraged to develop a joint approach to 
the problems o f the area. I f  necessary police should 
initiate this type o f development and strategy.
A proportion o f police resources should be devoted to 
encouraging various neighbourhoods in the area to develop 
into 'communities' (i.e. forming residents or tenants 
associations) in order that they may become involved with 
community crime prevention initiative (i.e. Neighbourhood 
Watch).
A proportion o f  police resources should also be invested in 
identifying and developing strategies against the major 
crime problems o f the area, and its sources o f  public 
conflict, as a long term objective.
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Police must make vigorous efforts to prevent the area 
retaining a special status, both in the minds o f the public 
and street police officers. This will require prompt replies 
and the production o f accurate data discounting views to 
the contrary.
At the same time senior police managers must be aware 
that it is always possible for  an area to decay and regain 
its original status. Therefore monitoring o f selected  
indicators must always continue and prompt action taken 
when required.
6. 8.3.1. Primary Objectives
To maintain short term response and 
peacekeeping demands at acceptable levels. To 
increase long term victim helping, peacekeeping 
and crime prevention activities by police. By 
these means to actively involve local groups 
and individuals in crime prevention and conflict 
reducing strategies.
6. 8.3.2 Control
Chief Superintendent: -
Overall policy direction/forward planning, tnter- 
station/tnter-agency policy co-ordination and 
Management Objectives.
Superintendent (Uniform): -
Overall implementation and management o f  
station strategy and operational objectives.
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S u p e r in te n d e n t /C h ie f  In s p e c to r  (C .I .D ) :-
Implementation and management o f station 
crime strategy, management o f D.I.I. Unit and 
C.I.D. operational objectives.
C h ie f  In s p e c to r :-
Week by week management o f  station uniform 
strategy and operational objectives.
In sp ecto rs  ( r e l i e f  o f f i c e r s ) :-
Geographical responsibility and planning 
proposals for defined sectors. Management and 
implementation o f agreed policy for that 
sector.
Time based duty o fficer  function for whole 
station.
In sp ecto rs  (o th e r) :-
Support o f R elief Inspectors both administration 
and operational as decided under station policy.
6. 8.3.3. Management Objectives
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.
(2) Decide i f  the existing police structure is 
appropriate or if  change is required (i.e. 
absorption o f  special structure into 
normal policing arrangements).
(3) Ensure that the total police station 
structure and operations are at maximum 
efficiency and effectiveness levels (N.P. 
Basic Package).
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(4) Estimate reduced levels o f  resources 
required for strategy and time scale for 
achieving reductions.
(5) Plan and implement appropriate training/ 
familiarisation for all_ officers involved or 
affected.
(6) Review the intelligence, monitoring and
criminal target system (D.I.I. Unit).
(7) Initiate a strategy to identify the sources 
of the major crime problems o f the area.
(8) Intensify a multi-agency approach to the
identified sources o f major crime
problems.
(9) Review the existing Police Information
Network.
(10) decide the appropriate measures to
indicate 'success', and the various levels 
o f achievement required before a decision 
can be made to implement a Problem 
Directed policing strategy.
(11) Estimate the various levels o f  remaining 
resources required for the specific areas 
o f the strategy.
-  271
(12) Plan a strategy to discount 'special' or 
'symbolic' significance in police/public 
beliefs and decide on monitoring o f core 
indicators in case decay begins.
6. 8.3.4. Operational Objectives
(1) Deal effectively  with all outbreaks o f 
street disorder with the minimum number 
of officers.
(2) Decrease the number o f uniformed 
patrolling officers required to provide 
response and peacekeeping services.
(3) Increase the amount o f crime prevention 
services provided by each individual 
uniform officer (long term victim and 
group helping).
(4) Maintain high quality o f victim helping by 
individual officers, but encourage 
voluntary groups (Victim Support) to 
expand the actual levels o f  help to 
victims o f crime.
(5) Maintain low levels o f street crime and 
disorder.
(6) Continue to expand areas o f conflict 
resolution for operational officers.
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(7) Collect and feed  back the intelligence 
information required.
(8) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation o f  
targetted individuals.
(9) Enhance the operational aspect o f the 
Public Information Network.
(10) Increase contact with significant groups in 
the area and provide community helping.
I f  the Normalisation strategy is successful a
change can now be made to the Residential
Problem Directed strategy.
6. 9. NON-RESIDENTIAL STRATEGY
As previously indicated, areas with no residents i.e. Industrial 
Estates, Shopping Centres, Airports, Stations etc., may require 
different strategies. I f  there are no residents who can be motivated 
to assist police voluntarily in their spare time, police tactics will 
have to reflect the professional business nature o f  any such area.
This strategy involves the development o f environmental crime 
prevention and commercial crime prevention (self strategy; HIGH, 
MEDIUM and LOW demand areas are identified and linked to; 
CONTAINMENT, PROBLEM DIRECTED and MAINTENANCE police 
strategy. (Fig. 6. 6).
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Fig. 6. 6
6. 9.1. CONTAINMENT STRATEGY
Description
A strategy directed at:-
(A) Containing high levels o f demands on police within a 
defined non-residential geographical area and 
preventing them from ’overspilling' into surrounding 
areas, particularly residential areas.
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(B) Maintaining police control over street crime and 
public disorder in all public places within the 
defined non-residential area.
(C) Reducing the demands on police, particularly 
response and peace-keeping, to pre-determined 
levels.
These objectives will be achieved by:-
(1) Fast police response to demands (difficult for 
offenders to escape).
(2) High numbers o f officers on patrol in specific  
problem areas at the appropriate times.
These strategies will have the e ffec t  o f reducing the 
opportunity for crime, but they are expensive in terms o f  
police resources. However, it is possible that police will 
have no alternative and have to accept these costs (i.e. 
Airports, Football grounds, etc.) until radical changes in the 
environment can be implemented.
The overall strategy will usually be very dependent upon 
police to implement and maintain, but wherever possible, 
there should be extensive involvement by other non-police 
security services (e.g. guards, watchmen, stewards, etc).
Normally there will be little resentment from the public 
using the non-residential area about the high levels o f  
police activity. However, i f  organised attacks are made on 
police, 'swarming' begins, or media complaints begin to be 
made, then the whole strategy may become inappropriate.
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9.1.1. Primary Objectives
To reduce the short term response and
peacekeeping demands on police from a defined 
non-residential area to a pre-determined level. 
This level will be considered appropriate for a 
joint long term police/com mereiai security 
strategy to be implemented without being 
overwhelmed by the volume and type o f 
demands.
9.1.2. Control
Chief Superintendents: -
Overall policy direction/forward planning, inter- 
station/inter-agency policy co-ordination and 
Management Objectives.
Superintendent: -
Overall Implementation and management o f 
station strategy and Operational Objectives.
Superintendent/Chtef Inspector (C.I.D):-
Implementation and management o f station 
crime strategy, management o f D.I.I. Unit and 
C.I.D. operational objectives.
Chief Inspector:-
Week by week management o f station uniform 
strategy and operational objectives.
Inspector (relief officers):-
Geographical responsibility and planning 
proposals for defined sectors. Management and 
Implementation o f  agreed policy for that 
sector.
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Time based duty o fficer  function for whole 
station.
Inspectors (other):-
Support o f R elief Inspectors both administration 
and operational as decided under station policy.
Under this particular strategy it may be 
necessary for a special structure to be created  
in the short term (i.e. special C.I.D./Uniform 
Squad), but this should be absorbed into the 
normal station structure as soon as possible.
6. 9.1.3. Management Objectives
(1) Define the problem situation.
(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to 
implement and maintain the strategy.
(3) Ensure that the total police station 
structure and operations are at maximum 
efficiency  and effectiveness levels.
(4) Estimate, acquire and allocate the 
resources required.
(5) Plan and implement appropriate training 
/ familiarisation for  aU officers involved 
or affected.
(6) Plan and implement an appropriate 
intelligence, monitoring and, if  required, a 
criminal target system (D.IJ.U).
-  2 7 7  -
(7) Identify problems suitable for a joint 
short term police/commercial security 
approach (concentrating on those possible 
to implement very quickly).
(8) Identify problems suitable for multi­
agency approach (concentrating on those 
possible to implement very quickly).
(9) Plan or implement an appropriate Public 
Information Network designed to reach all 
concerned non-residents.
(10) Begin negotiations with outside agency 
policy makers, re: environmental crime 
prevention.
(11) Decide the appropriate measure to 
indicate 'success', and the various levels 
o f achievement required before a decision 
can be made to implement a Problem 
Directed strategy.
6. 9.1.4. Operational Objectives
(1) Contain the high level o f street crime 
and/or public disorder to the defined non- 
residential geographical area.
(2) Reduce these levels o f street crime and 
disorder, particularly those types causing 
most public fear  to pre-defined levels.
-  2 7 8  -
(3) Obtain a decrease in any other offences
or incidents which are perceived as
important by the public in the area.
(4) Increase the levels o f police resources
available for short term response and
peace-keeping demands.
(5) Maintain police response times to agreed 
levels.
(6) Increase the levels o f police resources
available for crime prevention services.
(7) Increase, where appropriate, the levels o f 
victim helping to the public in the area.
(8) Collect and feed  back the intelligence 
information required.
(9) Implement the operational aspect o f the 
Public Information Network (commercial 
version).
(10) Identify suitable targets for  short term 
crime prevention measures.
(11) Establish links with all significant group
representatives and provide short group
helping.
After a suitable reduction in demands, a
change will be made to:-
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6. 9.2. PROBLEM DIRECTED STRATEGY 
Description:-
This strategy is directed at implementing and developing a 
joint police/public (non-resident) approach to the demand 
problems o f  a non-residential area.
Police patrols and response times are maintained at levels 
sufficient to prevent large increases in public demands.
A significant proportion o f  police resources are invested in 
jointly (with the non-residents concerned) discovering the 
'root causes' o f the crime problems in the area.
Once these are identified, attempts are made to involve the 
same individuals or organisations in preparing crime 
prevention solutions to these problems. These solutions
should contain a suitable fixture o f se lf policing (i.e. 
commercial security systems, alarms, watchmen, bolts and 
bars, etc.) and environmental crime prevention (i.e. changing 
the total environment in a way so as to reduce the 
opportunity for committing crime).
The responsibility for introduction, maintenance and cost o f  
all these systems remains with the individuals or 
organisations concerned. Police should act as motivators, 
advisors and co-ordinators o f  the various systems in order 
to ensure that they are both a cost effective benefit to the 
organisation or business concerned and are co-ordinated into 
the total 'Problem Directed' police strategy.
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6. 9.2.1. Primary Objectives
To reduce the short term response and peace­
keeping demands on police from a defined non- 
residential area by developing a joint 
police/public (non-resident) strategy against the 
crime problems o f business/organsiations in the 
area.
6. 9.2.2. Management Objectives
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.
(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to
implement and maintain the strategy
(Geographical Responsibility?)
(3) Ensure that the total police structure and 
operations are at maximum efficiency and 
effectiveness levels.
(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the 
resources required.
(5) Plan and implement or develop an
existing Public Information Network,
designed to include essential non­
residents.
(7) Begin, or intensify negotiations with 
outside agencies providing services to the 
area, re: environmental crime prevention.
(8) Collate, analyse and interpret, re: the
'root' problems o f the area to plan two 
strategies:-
-  2 8 1
(i) Priorities for multi-agency 
environmental crime prevention.
(ii) Priorities for commercial crime 
prevention.
(9) Implement the two agreed strategies 
incrementally (do not attempt too much 
too soon!).
(10) Decide the appropriate measure to 
indicate 'success', and the various levels 
o f achievement required before a decision 
can be made to implement a Maintenance 
Policing strategy.
6. 9.2.3. Operational Objectives
(1) Contain and where possible reduce the 
levels o f  crime and disorder, particularly 
in streets and public places.
(2) Reduce the levels o f  short term response 
and peace-keeping demands on police.
(3) Reduce police resources held on 'standby' 
for response and peace-keeping services.
(4) Increase police resources allocated to 
crime prevention services.
(5) Increase operational levels o f  long term 
victim and group helping behaviour by 
'front line' police officers.
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(6) Select a small number o f multi-agency 
and commercial crime prevention tasks.
(7) Implement the agreed crime prevention 
strategies.
(8) Develop the joint police/commercial crime 
prevention strategies at the operational 
level.
(9) Develop the multi-agency crime
prevention at the operational level.
(10) Educate individuals, businesses and
organisations in the area to understand 
the necessity for them to self police, 
then to participate in this.
(11) Develop the information and intelligence 
operational input.
(12) Develop the operational (day-to-day)
contacts in the Commercial Public
Information Network.
The successful implementation o f this strategy
will then allow for change to:-
6. 9.3. MAINTENANCE STRATEGY 
Description
This strategy is directed a t:-
(1) Maintaining an existing successful blend o f environ­
mental structure/professional crime prevention 
services in a non-residential low demand area.
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(2) Introducing this type o f  strategy into an existing low 
demand non-residential area within existing beat 
resources.
These strategies will be initiated or maintained by a low 
level o f policy response, peace-keeping and crime prevention 
services. They will be considered possible because o f the 
success of, or potential for, a high level o f involvement and 
co-operation between police and the various non-resident 
clients who require police services for premises, property 
and employers in the area. This will have contributed to 
comparatively low levels o f  crime and in particular low 
demands for Response and Peace-keeping services.
The opportunity for committing crime in the non-residential 
area will have been significantly reduced.
Police resources for committing crime in the non-residential 
area will have been significantly reduced.
Police resources will not be increased in this strategy, any 
improvement or requirements for additional services must be 
provided by the private or public bodies who have interests 
in the area.
It may well be essential to introduce this strategy into 
existing non-residential low demand areas (residential or 
non-residential). Successful police action in these areas 
may displace demands, particularly crime, into what were 
previously low demand areas.
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6. 9.3.1. Primary Objectives
To reduce police resources in the area to the 
lowest possible level whilst maintaining the 
existing low levels o f  demands on police by a 
successful joint police/public (non-resident) 
development o f a crime reducing environment 
and commercial crime prevention strategies.
6. 9.3.2. Management Objectives
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.
(2) Introduce/Improve/retain an appropriate 
police structure to maintain this strategy. 
(Geographical responsibility?)
(3) Ensure that the total police structure and 
operations are, and remain at, maximum 
efficiency/effectiveness levels.
(4) Reduce the police resources to the 
minimum levels possible.
(5) Re-allocate resources to other higher 
demand areas.
(6) Maintain an intelligence, monitoring and 
where appropriate, a criminal target 
system. (D.I.I. Unit).
(7) Update officers trainlng/familiarisation o f  
strategy objectives as required.
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(8) Maintain an appropriate Public 
Information Network with particular 
emphasis on business/organisational 
contacts.
(9) Maintain/Improve liaison with all outside 
agencies providing services to the area, 
re: environmental crime prevention.
(10) Where possible expand involvement o f 
agencies in environmental crime 
prevention.
(11) Where possible expand range o f 
commercial crime prevention involvement.
(12) Decide the appropriate critical measures 
and their acceptable levels. (Violation o f  
these levels may indicate new strategy 
required).
6. 9.3.3. Operational Objectives
(1) Maintain low levels o f  crime and disorder, 
particularly in streets and public places.
(2) Maintain low levels o f  short term 
response and peace-keeping demands on 
police.
(3) Decrease the total quantity o f  al£ police 
resources in the defined non-residential 
area to minimum levels.
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(4) Ensure that a proportion o f the remaining 
police resources continue to provide short 
and long term crime prevention services.
(5) Maintain the development o f the joint
police/commercial crime prevention at the 
operational level.
(6) Maintain the development o f multi-agency
crime prevention at the operational level.
(7) Encourage individuals, business and
organisations in the area to expand their 
everyday 'self policing' activities
wherever possible.
(8) Maintain agreed crime prevention
strategies.
(9) Maintain the information and intelligence
operational input.
(10) Maintain and where possible develop the
operational (day to day) aspects o f the 
Commercial Public Information Network.
6. 10. SUMMARY
In this chapter, the concept o f Directed Patrolling has been 
described in some depth. Initially, the development o f a police 
PUBLIC CONTACT STRATEGY was analysed and discussed. This 
development was then linked into operational street policing by the 
planning and implementation o f  DIRECTED PATROLLING.
This patrolling was specifically linked to the geographical demand 
profile and the ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL to produce a number 
o f options for improving police services and reducing public demand.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7. BRIXTON -  THE EVALUATION
7. 1. IMPLEMENTATION
By 1986, a 3rd Level Geographical Policing system called 
'Neighbourhood Policing' had been implemented at Brixton Police 
Station. The experimental project had by this time been running for 
two and a half years.
One o f  the first considerations o f the evaluation concerned the 
effectiveness o f  the implementation. It was clear from a number of 
other experimental sites that implementation had not been achieved 
at all these sites. However, at Brixton sufficient elements o f a 
Geographical Policing system existed to indicate that implementation 
had been successful. What now had to be evaluated was the 
effectiveness o f the system.
7. 2. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
In the Pre-Test evaluation in Chapter 3, it was concluded that a 
Geographical Policing System did not exist prior to 1983. In this 
chapter, a summary will be made o f the various evaluations made by 
the project at Brixton in the Post-test. This evaluation was 
conducted during 1986 using data from that year and, where 
appropriate, data from the preceeding three years.
The evaluation will be collated within an evaluation framework 
which utilises the plan and description o f a 3rd LEVEL Policing 
System (Fig.7. 1). Each structure or sub-system will be examined to 
establish its existence and effects. The methodology o f the various 
surveys listed in this Chapter are detailed in Appendix Two.
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It was predicted that the greatest changes would be to the internal 
organisation o f  the police station with significantly reduced e ffec ts  
on operational police systems outside the station. In addition, as 
the evaluation progressed through the framework, reduced e ffec ts  
were predicted in each subsequent structure or subsystem. Changes 
in the environment or public behaviour were considered to be the 
most difficult to achieve within the system.
With regards to people, it was expected that the first indications o f  
change would be in behaviour, with possible changes in attitude if 
the behaviour had become established.
There were low expectations o f behaviour change by police outside 
the station and the public in the areas being policed. Due to the 
relatively short duration o f the project, significant attitude changes 
among the police or public were not expected.
3. POLICE SYSTEM ANALYSIS (A)
Initially, police have a major responsibility to reorganise themselves 
and implement specific structures and systems. Unless this objective 
is achieved, further evaluation is pointless. In this analysis it was 
necessary to establish that a system as defined had been 
implemented, and was effective in achieving its objectives. The 
major question is, did an effectiv e Geographical Policing System 
exist?
7. 3.1. DEFINITION ANALYSIS
In April 1984, geographical responsibility was introduced for  
the majority o f uniformed Constables, Sergeants and 
Inspectors. This responsibility was achieved by dividing 
Brixton Division into four proportionate areas called 
'Sectors'. Each o f  the four reliefs was allocated one o f  
these Sectors as an ongoing geographical responsibility. 
(Fig. 7. 2).
Fifi. 7■ 2.
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Existing Home Beat officers within these new Sectors were 
re-selected and renamed 'Permanent Beat Officers'. These 
officers were attached to the reliefs for supervision 
and planning. This combination o f  o fficers were known as a 
R elief Team. By 1984 an increasing number o f relief 
officers were being used as Sector Officers, working in a 
similar manner to Permanent Beat Officers for periods o f  
six months.
These Sector and Permanent Beat Officers were by 1985 
responsible for all preventive policing on each Sector and by 
the end o f  1985 were also dealing with the majority o f the 
immediate response demands. The reduced number o f 
officers on the remaining relief shift duties acted as a 
support service and dealt with demands during low demand 
periods. Sector and Permanent Beat Officers adjusted their 
work patterns to cover the high demand periods. Changes 
to these relie f teams were reduced as far as possible.
By 1986, the majority o f  police services within a defined 
geographical area were consistently provided by a stabilised 
team o f dedicated police officers. In addition, there was 
considerable pressure from the majority o f  Sergeants and 
Inspectors, and approximately half the Constables, to 
remove the reliefs completely and change to a total 
geographic model, as developed by the Surrey Constabulary.
The existing R elief Teams were, by this time, identified to 
significant numbers o f  residents, organisations and businesses 
on each Sector; many o f  whom were greatly increasing 
their involvement with police by supporting and assisting 
these R elief Teams.
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7. 3.2. FEATURES ANALYSIS.
Ten main features o f a 3rd LEVEL system were identified 
in Chapter 2. It was suggested that a sufficient level o f 
resources must be allocated to each and that a significant 
e ffec t  must be detected. Each o f  the ten features is 
analysed in some depth and the major element o f Directed 
Patrolling has been illustrated with a case study.
7. 3.2.1 Proportion o f Preventive Policing
The available evidence suggests that the pro­
portion o f  resources invested in preventive 
activity had increased significantly. As an 
example o f this change, in 1983, it had been 
estimated that less than 10% o f police/pubic 
contact was initiated by police, with little o f  
this interaction able to be classified as 
preventive. (N.P. PROJECT 1983) The over­
whelming majority o f contact was public 
initiated, immediate response demands.
By 1986, police initiated contact (Brixton 
Report 1986) was estimated to have increased 
to 38% o f all police/public contact, broken 
down as follows:
1. Assistance to Public 48%
2. Crime Prevention 32%
3. Victim Helping 10%
4. Offender Detention 8%
5. Peacekeeping (prevention) 2%
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Operational, Geographical uniformed constables 
were found to have significantly (1% LEVEL) 
increased their time working on their sector 
and involved in proactive activities for up to 
45% o f each 8 hour tour o f  duty. (BRIXTON 
REPORT 1986).
It was found (N.P. PROJECT 1986) that at 
least 1 in 3 officers claimed theyspent more 
time (1% LEVEL) on.—
Giving information to the public 
Working with community groups 
Crime Prevention.
Police attitudes towards community involve­
ment were much more positive compared with 
pre-test levels. Willingness for police to get 
involved significantly increased (5% LEVEL) 
for:-
Giving talks to children in schools
Helping to run youth clubs
Spending a weeks attachment with
probation officers
Giving talks on self defence
Giving talks to trainee social workers.
There was also a significant increase (1% 
LEVEL) in the belief that police should spend 
more time on pro-active activity including:
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Giving crime prevention talks to residents
Talking to local people
Giving advice and support to victims
Liaising with schools
Discussions with leaders o f ethnic groups
Keeping an eye on likely offenders.
As can be seen, police behaviour on the streets 
had significantly changed towards Preventive 
Policing and those changes were reflected in 
police attitudes.
Prevention had now become a significant 
proportion o f everyday uniform Constables 
patrol activity.
In addition, it was estimated that over a third 
o f uniformed Sergeants spent up to 12 hours 
each per week in preventive activity. Over 
half the uniform Inspectors were also found to 
average 26 hours per week in preventive work. 
Chief Inspectors and above averaged ten hours 
per week in crime and conflict prevention.
Estimates o f  the total police station resources 
involved in prevention were difficult but 
calculated to be not less than 36% o f the total 
resources. This included two full time Crime 
Prevention Officers and a Licensing Officer, 
tasked to prevent alcohol related crime and 
conflict.
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3.2.2. Sector Teams
By 1986, five large Sector Teams had been 
estblished. Four were in symbolic high demand 
locations and a fifth  was in the central market 
and shopping area o f Brixton. These teams 
were by this time dealing with over two thirds 
o f  the total response and preventive demands 
o f  all the Sectors.
As they were based in the high demand areas 
o f  each Sector and adjusted their times o f  
work to peak demand times, they dealt with 
the majority o f  operational street policy. The 
teams had slightly less manpower than the 
remaining relief shift based teams. However, 
the workload o f Sector Teams was a third 
higher than relief officers.
It was concluded that Sector Teams were the 
most productive basic work units with a range 
o f multiple objectives being achieved.
3.2.3. Functional Division
Unfortunately, due to the complex nature o f  
the new policing system, functional divisions 
had actually increased. Inside the police 
station, new elements in the policing system, 
such as the Crime Desk and the Divisional 
Information and Intelligence Unit, had been 
responsible for increasing the number o f  
specialist tasks.
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On the streets, outside the station, large 
Sector Teams had been established. A large 
number o f  officers, however, remained on the 
narrow functional response based reliefs.
Whilst these officers were responding to 
demands from the whole o f  Brixton, they were 
increasingly accepting the geographical 
responsibility o f  the whole R elief Team. But 
at the time o f  evaluation the functional splits 
between the reliefs and Sector Teams were 
causing increasing difficulties. It was clear 
that the actual system o f geographical
responsibility devised by Brixton was increasing 
the functional splits in operational street 
policing. Recognising these problems, both the 
Senior Managers and the Operational uniform 
officers were pressing for changes and more 
radical systems o f  geographical responsibility.
7. 3.2.4. Geographical Operations
In theory, all operational uniformed street 
officers were geographically based in 1985. 
Analysis showed that under 10% o f these 
officers had not been involved in some 
geographical activity. The remainder had 
operated geographically for significant periods 
o f their duties.
Police attitudes towards geographical res­
ponsibility had changed dramatically. In 1983 
less than a third (28%) o f officers preferred  
geographical to time based operations. By
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1986 70% o f these officers  now preferred 
geographical responsibility (N.P. PROJECT
1986). Officers now considered local know­
ledge and local contact with both residents and 
agencies as higher priorities than at pre-test 
(significant at 1% level). They also considered 
benefits to be, work variety, team work and 
good supervision.
A majority o f officers (58%) agreed that 
geographical responsibility had led to 
improvements in the policing o f the area and 
wanted to see it continue either in its present 
form or with changes. Few wanted it 
abolished (10%). Around 1 in 2 officers fe lt  
they spent more time on their sectors in.—
Getting to know local people 
Patrolling on foot
Receiving information from the public 
Identifying crime spots and trends 
Working as part o f  a team 
Looking at long term problems.
3.2.5. Public Involvement Policy
There was an explicit policy o f  public 
involvement in Brixton policing. This 
involvement began between senior officers and 
the Lambeth Consultative Committee and 
continued down to Constable level.
Public involvement at the lower levels can be 
illustrated by the unique innovation at Brixton 
o f  the Sector Working Party concept in 1985.
-  298 -
This joint public and police working party was 
the basic foundation o f  local police planning 
and priorities.
There were also considerable resources invested 
in the policy o f  public involvement. Approxi­
mately 200 police man hours per month were 
dedicated to this work. The majority o f this 
work was in providing a secretariat for the 
Working Parties, preparing data and statistics 
and attending other public or agency meetings 
on police policy.
7. 3.2.6. Resource Deployment
By 1985, almost all uniformed resource deploy­
ment was the responsibility o f Sergeants and 
Inspectors. The only exceptions were in the 
urgent requirements for aid to other police 
stations. Invariably, even these decisions would 
be authorised by the supervising officers  
involved, if there was sufficient time for  
consultation.
A central duties o ffice  under the Chief 
Inspector Operations acted as a support and 
co-ordinating function in the resource 
management process. Even large operations, 
such as Festivals, raids and anti-robbery 
strategies, were pre-planned and resourced by 
Sector Inspectors and Sergeants.
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3.2.7 First Level Autonomy
Inspectors and Sergeants had increased 
autonomy in a number o f areas. Staff 
selection, training and development operational 
priorities, planning, strategies and management 
o f routine and special operations were devolved 
down to these officers.
3.2.8. Information System Resources
Each Sector and specialist function at the 
police station had designated officers who 
collected and processed information as part o f 
their operational duties. These officers were 
supported by the D.I.I.U. staffed by four police 
officers with some computer assistance. The 
Crime Desk and the Collator were linked into 
this central system. When the new extension 
to Brixton Police Station was opened in 1986 
all these functions were located in adjoining 
offices, supported by increased computer 
systems.
However, despite these improvements, the 
resources were still inadequate, leaving the 
information system erratic and sometimes un­
reliable. Insufficient electronic data
collection and processing made the system 
manpower-intensive and unable to cope with 
the new demands for service. Before the 
information system could show its true 
potential, high levels o f  investment in 
equipment and skills were needed.
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7. 3.2.9. 'Response Level'
The minimum Response Level for Brixton was 
calculated to be 200 Constables in 1986. When 
an addition for high potential o f 65 Constables 
was added it rose to 265. The actual man­
power at that time was 217 Constables. How­
ever it had been estimated that, due to better 
resource deployment and the advantages of 
Geographic Policing, the extra for high 
potential could be reduced to 35 Constables for  
a full 3rd LEVEL Policing System.
It had been found that since 1983, Constable 
manpower had steadily decreased. This was 
due to a failure to replace normal manpower 
losses each year. The average manpower level 
for Constables, each year, are shown below:
1983 1984 1985 1986
263 239 220 217
In support o f the concept o f  an accurate 
'Response Policing Level' a small research 
project was undertaken at Brixton and the 
surrounding stations o f Clapham, Kennington 
and Streatham. (BECKETT 1985).
It was found that the three significant in­
fluences on street crime levels were; the 
Environment, levels o f  uniformed Constables 
and the patrol behaviour o f these Constables. 
Once the powerful e ffec ts  o f the Environment, 
such as good or bad weather, had been identi­
fied and excluded from all the samples, then 
correlations as high as .85 were obtained 
between levels o f street crime and police 
manpower.
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The important aspect o f the manpower levels 
was the existence o f a Directed Patrolling or 
Tasking strategy. These findings contradicted 
other research evidence (¡CELLING ET AL 
1974) about the e ffec ts  o f police on crime. 
Whilst the findings can in no way be con­
sidered conclusive, due to the small samples 
and short time scales, they did provide some 
support and highlight the implications.
It would appear that, unlike other studies 
which just assessed numbers o f  police officers  
against changes in crime statistics, it is 
important to include the actual amount o f time 
spent in the High Demand areas and exactly 
what they do. Once this has been done, it is 
suggested that police can have a significant 
a ffect on levels o f street crime. These 
research findings reinforced the importance o f 
an effective Directed Patrolling strategy 
whatever the numbers o f patrol officers  
available. It was also suggested that the 
higher the levels o f  street crime, the quicker 
police can influence these levels. Low levels 
o f  street crime appeared to be far more 
difficult to influence despite increased 
manpower and a Directed Patrolling strategy.
7. 3.2.10 Directed Patrolling
Despite reducing manpower levels, Directed 
Patrolling linked to the Environmental 
Potential, was the major framework used by 
Sectors to plan their policing strategies.
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The evaluation o f the Environmental Potential 
in Chapter 3 and the descriptions o f Directed 
Patrolling in Chapter 5 were both developed by 
Brixton officers from concepts and frameworks 
provided by the project team during 1984-85. 
An overview and example o f this development 
can be provided by a summary o f the strategy 
to reduce high crime demands and implement 
Sector Teams as follows:-
CASE STUDY: The Anti-Crime Operation:
Brixton 1985
In 1984 the allegations of 'street crime' on 
Brixton Division began to increase at a 
tremendous rate. In the peak months of May, 
August, and November 1984 total allegations 
for robbery, theft person, burglary and auto­
crime were between 950 and 1,000 per month, 
with robbery and theft from the person 
showing the highest percentage increase.
It has been calculated that over the years 
1983/4 the trend increase in street robbery and 
theft allegations was 66%. The steepest rise 
in these allegations took place in the last six 
months o f 1984.
Although allegations o f crime are considered 
more informative at local level for police 
strategy planning, they do not allow com­
parisons with other British crime statistics.
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However, when classified Home Office crime 
statistics for 1984 were examined, a similar 
dismal picture emerged.
In 1984 there were an average o f 16,400 crime 
offences per 100,000 o f the population in the 
whole o f Lambeth. This was 1,000 greater per 
100,000 than the next worst crime area in 
England and Wales - Hackney. The National 
average is 7,000 crimes per 100,000 o f the 
population.
Up to 21st January 1985 street crime
allegations in Brixton had already reached 724; 
the predicted total for January was calculated 
as being well above 1,000 allegations.
The project team concluded that reductions in 
street manpower at Brixton in 1984 for a 
variety o f reasons (Miner's Strike etc)
influenced the rapid upward trend of street 
crime. In addition, the senior officers at 
Brixton were aware that concentrated anti­
crime operations could only have a short-term  
reducing e f f ec t  on crime. It quickly rises 
above the original level (Sea-Saw Effect 
BECKETT 1985).
Althou&i such short-term police measures can 
affect street crime in these areas, unless long­
term police strategies are directed at changing 
the physical environment (multi-agency 
approach) and the social culture (police/public 
contact), eventually crime will rise and once 
again overwhelm police short-term strategies.
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Unfortunately, once police street manpower has 
been allowed to fall below a certain level, the 
fragile restraint police exercise on street crime 
levels in these types o f areas will be com­
pletely overwhelmed and an explosion o f crime 
will follow.
It was clear that, in very simple terms, this is 
what happened in Brixton during 1984 and that 
ordinary police patrol tactics were insufficient 
to regain the situation. In addition, any in­
crease in police resources would have to be 
concentrated on the problem if it were to be 
dealt with successfully.
Once crime has escalated out of control a 
mixture o f short and long-term police 
strategies are required in order to regain 
control. During 1984 a number o f small, 
short-term anti-crime operations had been 
carried out in Brixton but with limited success. 
Although each operation had produced a 
number o f directly attributable arrests, there 
had been very little e ffec t  on the overall 
crime rate or trend.
This operation had to be directed at two 
important functions. First, it had to act as a
'first aid' or emergency measure to immediate­
ly reduce the escalating crime. Second, and 
more importantly, to be the first stage o f  an 
extensive long-term police strategy for  Brixton 
Division, based on a foundation o f  Geographical 
Policing and Directed Patrolling.
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The anti-crime operation began on Monday 21st 
January 1985 with the major focus being 
directed on Brixton Division, as this Division 
accounts for the majority o f street crime in 
Lambeth. Four major geographical locations in 
Brixton had been identified as 'high demand' 
areas where street crime was most heavily 
concentrated. These were as follows:-
(1) The Stockwell Park Estate and the 
surrounding roads leading up to Stockwell 
Tube Station, including the Overton 
Estate to the east of Brixton Road.
(2) The central market and shopping area in 
Brixton Road, Atlantic Road and 
Coldharbour Lane.
(3) Moorland Road Estate, including the 
surrounding Somerleyton Road and 
Coldharbour Lane.
(4) The area between Railton Road, Dulwich 
Road and Brixton Water Lane.
The Operation was designed to control all o f 
these locations and thereby substantially reduce 
the allegations o f street crime. To achieve 
this control, two distinct police strategies were 
adopted:
(i) high-profile uniformed patrols to prevent
and displace street crime;
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(ii) covert, plain-clothes operations using 
fixed observation posts and mobile 
surveillance teams, to identify and arrest 
those actively engaged in street crime.
It was emphasised to all officers, plain clothes 
and uniform, that the overall strategy was a 
Target Operation and not a 'stop and search' 
exercise.
Three 'high demand' areas were then selected  
as suitable fo r  covert surveillance operations.
'Alpha' Sector (the Stockwell Park Estate 
area)
'Bravo' Sector (the Moorlands Estate area) 
'Charlie' Sector (the Railton Road area).
High profile uniformed patrols were maintained 
on all surrounding Divisions, particularly on the 
periphery o f Brixton Division. In addition, a 
permanent Neighbourhood Unit o f uniformed 
Brixton officers  was started in the market and 
central shopping areas.
These uniformed patrols were designed to dis­
place crime into the controlled surveillance 
sectors where the offenders could be identified, 
targetted and eventually arrested.
The D.U.U. analysis o f the environmental 
potential in each 'hiçjh demand' area was 
utilised to develop the specific strategies used 
in the 1985 Anti-Crime Operation.
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The strategy adopted for the three surveillance 
areas, 'Alpha', 'Bravo' and 'Charlie', was how­
ever basically the same. Local criminals, or 
those frequenting the areas, were identified, 
targetted and in many instances arrested for 
various offences.
Most importantly, great efforts were made by 
police to keep these offenders in custody once 
arrested. This removed the increased potential 
fo r  offences committed whilst on bail by 
offenders who have very little to lose in these 
circumstances.
In the central market area a permanent uni­
formed Neighbourhood Unit was formed. This 
Unit, with its high-profile uniformed patrols, 
began to simultaneously displace crime, arrest 
offenders and develop a long-term policing 
strategy with the local residents and traders. 
The strategy required was implemented by 
means o f directed patrolling, planned by the 
officers involved.
Prior to the Operations the number o f 
Permanent Beat Officers in the Moorlands 
Estate had been increased to two. These 
officers were now assisted by a uniformed 
Sergeant in order to give greater emphasis to 
long-term strategies with the Estate, once the 
crime had been brought under control. Once 
again, these officers planned their own directed 
patrolling within the overall strategy.
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It was known that a permanent Neighbourhood 
Unit would eventually be required in the 
Stockwell Park Estate area, but this could not 
be provided within existing resources.
A slightly different strategy was planned for  
the Railton Road area. First, the street crime 
in the area would be reduced. Then a specific  
drugs operation would be directed against the 
drug dealers in the area. This operation would 
utilise men from the Anti-Crime Operation and 
the local Brixton uniformed officers who would 
eventually man the permanent Railton Road 
Neighbourhood Unit The Unit itself would be 
implemented once the number of drug dealers 
and their customers had been reduced to a 
level which could be maintained by normal 
uniformed patrols. A copy o f the original 
'Action Plan' for this strategy and unit is 
shown at Figure 7. 3.
RESULTS
There is little doubt that the Operation and its 
surrounding publicity was responsible for  
massive decreases in allegations of street 
crime in the months o f January, February, 
March and April 1985. The decrease was 
calculated to be 80% less than a similar period 
in 1984. (Four Area REPORT 1985). This 
significant percentage decrease was not 
repeated in surrounding Divisions.
a c t i o n  p l a n  NO: ACTION PLAN START DATE 
EVALUATION REPORT DATE 
C O - O R D I N A T O R
1st FEBRUARY 1985 
OCTOBER 1985
Inspector DOAK
TITLE:
'C SECTOR ACTION PLAN 
RAILTON ROAD
START
DATE
OBJECTIVE N o r m a l i s a t i o n  o f  R a i l t o n  Road
MEANS OF 
MEASUREMENT
TASKS
(1) Targetting and Surveillance of 
Street Drug Dealers.
5.2.85 :
D
rime books S 
IIU
11) Create a dedicated team of officers to form a Neighbourhood 
Unit consisting of 1 PS and 6 PC's 
to patrol Railton Road. i
L8.3.85 :rime books
(3) (i) Contain street crime
and reduce street drug
L8.3.85 r ime books ; 
IIU
ension
ndicators at ! 
LC1 .
:onsider small 
costal survey.
dealings.
(ii) Create an atmosphere of 
confidence with local 
residents thus reducing 
likelihood of conflict.
(iii) Reduce the number of 
incidents involving public 
disorder.
(4) After consultation and support 
of local residents, establish 
police office in Railton Road.
Consider
JULY
Meetings with 
Local residents 
»mail postal 
survey.
Establish contact with existing 
agencies, eg Community Youth 
Workers, Neighbourhood Housing 
Office, local chucches.
APRIL
1985
lee tings
16) With other agencies promote Tenants 
Associations in relation to Marcus. 
Garvie Way and Railton Road.
MAY 1985 ¡stablishment 
if Agencies 
issoc iations.
17) Training of officers on 'C' Sector 
in Surveillance techniques for 
necessary operations in Railton Rd.
Also to provide additional training 
for uniform officers to compliment the 
dedicated ofticecs patrolling Railton R<
JUNE 1985 'raining
loursea arranged
lumber of 
ifficer involved
IB) Dedicated Patrol to promote Crime 
Prevention initiative eg, Neighbour­
hood Watch leafleting.
MAY tequests for 
.'rime Prevention 
Information.
19) Review of policing strategy and 
manpower for RAILTON ROAD.
18.3.85 )IIU
' 'ension 
ndicators, DIO
F i R .  1 3 .
FREOUENCY
OF
MEASUREMENT
Weekly
Weekly
Monthly
¡Monthly
jMay 1986
I3 Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
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It should be noted that the dramatic decrease 
in street crime began suddenly, just before the 
Operation began. The crime allegations for 
January failed to  rise above the expected 1,000 
and were frozen at 843 by the end o f January. 
This sudden decrease in January is believed to 
have been influenced by the extensive pre- 
Operation media attention.
The Operation resulted in 125 people being 
arrested. Most importantly, 18 arrests were 
made for robbery and all o f these offenders 
were known and targetted because o f their 
active involvement in robbery and burglary.
The targetting strategy was maintained during 
the Operation. In 1984, between 1st January 
and 30th April there were 2,314 'stops' by 
police on 'L' District, resulting in 252 arrests. 
However, in 1985, during the same period there 
were only 2,047 'stops’ but arrests increased to 
575.
There appeared to have been two successes in 
this Operation; first, as previously detailed, 
allegations o f street crime were substantially 
reduced. A considerable proportion o f the 
local criminals responsible were arrested and 
convicted. However, most importantly local
public satisfaction with the Operation was 
obviously very high, as measured by letters to 
the local press, letters to police and reactions 
from the Consultative Group and Sector
Working Parties.
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The second success was the implementation and 
maintenance o f a planned strategy which 
continued to be effective after the initial 
operation had been withdrawn. There was no 
'inevitable' Sea-Saw Effect in the high-demand 
areas, with the possible exception o f Stockwell 
Park where a follow-up strategy was not 
possible for some months.
DISCUSSION
With regard to the development of Directed 
Patolling, this operation was the foundation of 
this policy and strategy at Brixton Due to 
the undoubted success of the initial tactics, 
Directed Patrolling became an accepted  part of 
everyday police operations. In addition, when 
linked to Geographical policing, it was found 
by uniform patrol officers to be far more 
effective.
Neighbourhood Units, or Sector Teams, were 
quickly established in the four main high 
demand areas in order to maximise the e ffects  
o f Directed Patrolling. This particular 
operation was undoubtedly a breakthrough with 
regards to police methods and effectiveness 
which proved to local police officers that 
major improvements were possible throu&i 
changes in street policing
7. 4. PLANNING AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (B)
As it has been established that the structure o f a Geographical 
police system did exist at Brixton in 1985, the next sub-system must 
now be examined. A major initial task o f the police is to establish 
a planning and information system between the police and the 
public. This is in order to plan and implement a joint policing 
system with the public.
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7. 4.1. FEATURES ANALYSIS
7. 4.1.1. Information System:-
The D.l.l.U. was set up as the centre and co­
ordinator o f the police information system in 
1983. It continued to develop and by 1986 had 
established several data collection routines and 
sub systems. Dissemination o f information to 
senior managers, reliefs, and sector officers 
was also established as a service.
Officers in the C.I.D. did not make great use 
o f this information system until late 1985 when 
a Detective Inspector was given the post of 
Crime Co-ordinator and linked into the D.l.l.U.
Uniformed officers made extensive use o f the 
information system and the majority (82%) had 
come across information produced by the
D.l.l.U. In addition, 77% had visited the 
D.l.l.U. for a special request or for information 
already available during the 12 months prior to 
being surveyed.
A majority (76%) claimed to be satisfied with 
the service provided by the D.l.l.U. including 
the quantity and quality o f information 
produced. Around a fifth  (21%) were 
dissatisfied and put forward suggestions for  
improvement.
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However the D.I.I.U. found that the routine 
data collection systems employed almost 
completely absorbed their available resources. 
Analysis and intelligence from the information 
placed an added burden which they found very 
difficult to cope with.
It would appear that the major success of the 
D.I.I.U. was to educate police officers as to 
the value o f an information system but then 
found it difficult to provide them with their 
newly understood needs.
In 1985 the Neighbourhood Watch Co-ordinators 
and the public involved in Sector Working 
Parties were allowed to contact the D.I.I.U. 
direct for certain types o f information. 
Although the public were delighted with this 
service it had to be at the expense o f other 
D.I.I.U. tasks and the system as a whole was 
inadequate for the demands being placed upon 
i t
Inside the police station the major structure o f 
information processing and dissemination was 
the cascade o f meetings. Of these meetings 
the most important was the relief meetings of 
operational street officers and their 
supervisors.
Prior to the Neighbourhood Policing System, 
meetings were sporadic with low expectations 
from their participants. In the Post-Test, 
uniformed Constables attitudes towards relief 
meetings were very positive. The majority o f  
officers (over two thirds) fe lt—
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the lines of communication had improved 
as a result
the meetings had achieved what they 
were set up to do 
they were worthwhile
they should be continued, either in their 
present form on with some changes.
A large majority (96%) had attended a relief 
meeting in the past twelve months with over 
half (54%) having attended within the previous 
two months.
high attendance levels were the norm 
high participation levels were evident - 
most had raised a matter for discussion 
and were satisfied with the outcome.
Another structure introduced was the Working 
Party, which was a police version o f a Quality 
Control Circle. This structure was less 
effective with 53% claiming they understood 
how it worked and 44% considered it 
performed very or fairly well.
Once the need for a public and police 
information system was understood and 
incorporated into the essentials o f all planning 
and evaluation, then the deficiencies of the 
existing system became more apparent. It was 
clear that the information system required 
careful and skilful replanning as soon as 
possible.
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Despite these structural, equipment and skills 
problems, it was clear that major improve­
ments had been achieved since the pre-test. A 
significant majority had noticed the following 
achievements during the past 12 months.
more information passed on to public 
more information received from public 
getting to know the public 
improved information exchange between 
officers
Many officers fe lt  that the lines of communi­
cation between senior management and officers  
had improved. They considered that senior 
officers were more understanding o f the day to 
day problems faced  by reliefs  and the system 
of judging police officers performance was less 
likely to be based on arrests and summonses 
only.
Compared to pre-test levels, constables were 
significantly less likely to claim there was now 
a need for change in the following:
recognition for a job well done 
suggestions passed up the rank structure 
a say in how the area was policed 
chance to see a job through to the end 
support and trust from supervisors.
It was clear from these findings that, despite 
the numerous problems with the police and 
public information system, it was very success­
ful as an initial attempt to implement such a 
structure.
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7. 4.1.2. Information quantity and quality
As has been already described, the quantity o f 
information required by the users totally 
overwhelmed the existing system. The 
collection and dissemination o f the information 
alone was well above the capacity o f the 
existing system. As a result, analysis and 
evaluation was difficult and the quality o f the 
information varied from outstanding to useless 
and was sporadic. Unfortunately the majority 
o f the information was of too low a standard 
to support the most effective operational 
results.
Despite these criticisms there was no doubt 
that the requirement for quality o f information 
had been established and both police and public 
were beginning to prioritise their needs in a 
much more effective manner.
7. 4.1.3. Analysis and Prediction
Until 1985, analysis and prediction using the 
data collected was rarely attempted. But in 
January 1985 this was required to support the 
Sector initiatives described earlier. By 1986, 
specific crime initiatives under the Crime Co­
ordinator also required analysis and prediction. 
Although considerable effort and time was 
required to achieve this type o f analysis, it 
was very successful and supported all the 
operational achievements.
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The major problems with this service were 
poor data collection and inadequate analysis 
systems and skills. It became clear that the 
ad hoc skills obtained were insufficient and 
specialist skills were required in this role. 
These skills will have to be recruited and 
trained in by the organisation. Routine 
analysis of the data into various categories of 
importance was also lacking in the system 
used.
7. 4.1.4. Police and Public Planning
Brixton was unique as being the only Neigh­
bourhood Policing site which innovated and 
established both Sector Working Parties 
(consumer panels and action groups) and 
internal police Sector Planning Teams (Quality 
Circles), all working in parallel with the 
Lambeth Consultative Group.
By 1986, the system had become so dynamic 
that Sector Working Parties demanded and 
obtained special representative places on the 
established Consultative Group. This was 
despite resistance from a number of existing 
Consultative Group members.
In e ffect, Sector Working Parties Meetings 
were better attended than Consultative Group 
Meetings. These were averaging around 18 - 
20 public spectators for meetings, whilst Sector 
Working Parties were all averaging between 45 
- 48 per meeting.
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Project analysis established beyond doubt that 
the Brixton Police and Public Planning System 
was the most powerful and effective o f any 
project site.
7. 4.1.5. Sector Planning
Responsibility for virtually all operational 
planning was devolved down to Sectors, 
(reversing the Force practices at that time). 
Once the police and public in a Sector had 
submitted their proposals, then the rest o f the 
police station planned how to support these 
objectives. Figure 7. 3 shows an example o f 
this process.
7. 4.1.6. Public Involvement
One o f the reasons that Sector Planning was 
considered successful at Brixton, was that the 
police on Sectors and reliefs were not allowed 
to become insular or continue with inadequate 
police working practices. Due to the extensive 
public consultation and involvement at Sector 
Working Parties, police plans had to reflect 
public priorities in balance with police 
legislative priorities. This joint planning 
committed police and public to realistic 
objectives which both were responsible for  
achieving.
Analysis showed that public involvement was a 
major influence in Sector Planning on 
Brixton Division.
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This success was recognised by surrounding 
police Divisions who also began to introduce 
similar structures and systems.
7. 4.1.7. Level o f Autonomy
It was recognised by the Senior Managers at 
Brixton Police Station that, with a system of 
operational Sector Planning and Public 
Involvement, high levels o f autonomy for the 
geographical teams were essential.
Therefore, broad objectives and policies for the 
whole Division were planned at Chief
Superintendent level. These co-ordinated with 
Force goals and requirements. However, 
everything else was devolved to the Sectors. 
On some occasions it was fom d that Sector 
requirements were contrary to Force goals and 
priorities. Provided these alternative priorities 
were supported by evidence they would usually 
be authorised.
7. 5. JOINT POLICING SYSTEM (C)
This part o f the system was an important measure o f  the public 
support and assistance towards policing objectives. The majority o f 
the features involve the public input to operational policing.
7. 5.1. FEATURES ANALYSIS
7. 5 .1.1. Formal Public Assistance
No significant increases emerged in formally 
organised public assistance to police. Virtually 
the only area for such involvement at the
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present time is that o f Special Constables. 
The table below shows the total number o f 
Special Constables at Brixton each year.
1983 1984 1985 1986
28 17 13 11
The main barrier to this type o f development 
appeared to be the police themselves. 
Although they maintained an organisation and 
support for Special Constables, it did not 
appear to be very effective in recruiting and 
supporting existing officers.
No great efforts were ever made to discourage 
Special Constables, but more importantly 
neither were they specifically encouraged by 
the majority o f uniform patrolling officers or 
their supervisors. There were exceptions at 
Brixton when some Sector Officers began to 
involve selected Special Constables in Sector 
work.
However, there were significant attitude 
changes (1% LEVEL) among the majority o f 
officers. Increasing from 42% to 76% in 1986 
those willing to work with Specials and from 
22% to 70% those considering that relations 
between Regulars and Specials were good at 
Brixton.
In areas outside the police organisation there 
were other significant developments. The local
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Consultative Group had, on their own initiative, 
established a formal system of volunteers, who 
had some standing in the community, to assist 
police in operational matters.
A rota was established and volunteers were 
available on call to police. I f  a sensitive 
operation was planned or implemented these 
community representatives would be informed 
that the operation was taking place and 
provided with all details. On numerous 
occasions, they were actually taken on the 
operation to witness police action.
Although viewed with initial suspicion by many 
operational officers, this formal assistance 
became established as a vital part o f all 
sensitive policing operations. In a very short 
time after its inception such public assistance 
was incorporated into police instructions and 
formal procedures. This aspect o f formal 
public involvement in policing was considered 
very successful by both police and public. It 
had the e ffec t  o f preventing speculative 
rumours and disinformation among the alienated 
groups in the community.
7. 5.1.2. Informal Public Assistance
In contrast to police unease and suspicion with 
formal public assistance, Neighbourhood 
Watches and Business Watches were actively  
encouraged and supported. In fact, the major 
problem for police was limiting the enthusiasm 
o f both public and police for implementing 
such schemes.
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It was recognised at Brixton at an early stage 
that such informal structures required signi­
ficant police support and resources. Therefore 
a policy decision was made, contrary to 
general Force policy, to severely limit the 
number o f Neighbourhood Watches and concent­
rate on getting a small number o f successful 
schemes in the most problematic areas.
Consequently, as a result of this policy, 
although the number of watches were amongst 
the smallest at any Metropolitan Police 
Division they were established in the high
demand areas or vulnerable displacement areas. 
This policy resulted in Watches where no other 
Division had succeeded. The majority were in 
high density, council Estates and a significant 
number had a majority o f black residents. In 
the Rail ton Road area two such Neighbourhood 
Watches were the foundation o f a re-
emergence o f residents' influence over a 
symbolic location with drug related crime.
By 1985 these informal organisations had 
become the main source o f public participants 
in the Sector Working Parties. They also 
provided some o f their most active individuals 
who represented Sectors at the local 
Consultative Group.
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However, one o f the most important con­
tributors o f the informal Watch Groups was 
their establishment in the most HOSTILE High 
Demand areas. As has already been illustrat­
ed, they provided a catalyst for pockets o f 
supportive residents in these areas. The 
establishment o f these self help groups in 
problem areas became one o f the major 
objectives o f the Sectors Directed Patrolling 
strategies, as indicated in item 8 o f Fig. T. 3.
5.1.3 Victim Support
A voluntary Victim Support scheme had been 
established in Brixton since 1982. However, at 
the pre-test stage in 1983 police co-operation 
and support had been criticised at Brixton. 
The initiative for the scheme had not come 
from the Police, but from the nationally 
organised victim support organisation.
It was clear in 1983 - 84 that the existing 
police reporting and investigation procedures 
had difficulty in accommodating the support o f 
crime victims. In fact, the classification 
system for crime, with its high priority on 
property, frustrated some o f  these efforts. 
Attempts to change locally to a more victim 
orientated system o f classification were 
complicated by the national classification 
requirements.
However, by 1985, initiatives had been taken 
independently by Brixton Police Station to 
provide better victim support by police in the 
initial investigation and to refer more cases to
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the Victim Support scheme. In addition, a 
service o f further reports to victims o f crime 
was introduced by police. Crimes which were 
'screened out' by the Crime Desk as being 
incapable o f further investigation, all received 
letters acknowledging their crime and giving 
details o f the Victim Support Scheme.
7. 5.1.4 Community Mediation
Attempts were made in 1985 and 1986 to set 
up a group o f trained voluntary Community 
Mediators, to be available for intervention 
and referals in local matters o f conflict. 
This time the initiative came from the local 
police at Brixton, but unfortunately there was 
insufficient corresponding enthusiasm from 
voluntary organisations.
Public awareness of this type o f service did 
not appear to be very high in Brixton, despite 
the urgent need for support in this area. 
Outside Brixton however, a number of 
successful schemes were initiated in other 
parts o f London.
The failure to implement such a community 
mediation service in Brixton resulted in police 
having to almost totally accept responsibility 
for conflict prevention and reduction. This 
requirement was very demanding on police 
resources and therefore a serious deficiency in 
the implementation o f an effective  
geographical policing system.
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7. 5.1.5. Lay Visitors
In contrast, an effective Lay Visitors Scheme 
to visit prisoners in police cells was pioneered 
by the Lambeth Consultative Group. This 
initiative was supported at top policy level in 
the police, with existing procedures being 
changed to accommodate this process.
After a trial period, the Brixton pilot Lay 
Visitors System was considered very successful 
and adapted by Home Office for 
implementation nationwide. The system 
appeared to fulfil several functions:
(i) Monitor prisoners' welfare and treatment 
in police custody.
(ii) Inform and educate the public about 
police procedures and powers, dispelling 
alarmist propaganda.
(iii) Function as a rumour control service 
regarding individual prisoners, by giving 
factual information to a concerned 
community very quickly.
In many ways accredited Lay Visitors found 
themselves acting as Community Mediators in 
conflict situations. By 1987 senior Lay Visitors 
were attempting to include a full Community 
Mediation Service as a separate service linked 
to local religious groups.
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7. 5.1.6. Procedural Changes.
Numerous police procedures were forced to 
change as have already been described. The 
Neighbourhood Policing System initiated and 
anticipated many o f these changes. But, 
outside the experimental sites there were still 
obligatory Force and National procedures 
which effectively  obstructed improvements in 
policing.
However, these obstructions were quickly 
recognised by the police organisations and using 
the feedback from all the experimental police 
sites, including Brixton, the years o f 1983 - 
1986 saw some most radical changes to 
policing in both the Surrey Constabulary and 
the Metropolitan Police. For the police, 
changes and improvements to procedures and 
techniques have now become the norm. In 
recognition o f this 'new state' o f normality, 
planning and managing change are now included 
on all supervisor and management training.
Professional agencies outside the police had 
similar problems with political policies. Many 
local authority procedures were genuine 
attempts to provide and improve services to 
the public. However in Lambeth and 
particularly Brixton, the dominant political 
ideology at the time, sought to exclude police 
from these procedures in a very bureaucratic 
and formal manner.
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It was quickly recognised by the front line 
agency workers that this was impossible, as 
close effective liaison with the police was 
essential for their work.
This situation led to unauthorised and unofficial 
local authority links between police and front 
line agency workers. Whilst these
arrangements worked adequately for the 
majority o f the time, they also caused some 
serious problems. In addition it was a very 
inefficient method o f providing the best quality 
o f service to the public.
Fortunately, the Lambeth Counsultative Group, 
whilst not recognised by the political party in 
power, were still able to act as a beneficial 
third party influence between the police and 
the local authority. This influence had the 
e ffec t  o f reducing some o f the worst aspects 
o f this unco-ordinated situation.
In contrast to these types o f local problems, at 
national level, increasing legislative 
requirements for statutory joint agency 
approaches were being introduced.
5.1.7 Environmental Changes
Paradoxically, one o f the best examples o f  the 
effectiveness o f a police and local authority 
partnership was in the HIGH Demand area o f 
Rallton Road and the Central Market. After
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the riots o f 1981, there was an extremely 
effective partnership between the local 
authority public works, housing and the police, 
regarding the development o f this area.
Extensive physical and environmental changes 
were planned and implemented by 1985. The 
major thrust o f these changes was to improve 
the residential and community facilities to 
reduce the tension ridden, crime supporting 
environment. Simultaneously with the 
beginning o f these changes, the Sector teams 
in the Market and Railton Road improved and 
concentrated the policing services to local 
residents and businesses.
There was no doubt that the physical environ­
mental changes contributed to substantial 
increases in residents’ and visitors' Quality o f  
Life in these areas. It was also significant 
that during the 1985 riots, local residents 
forcibly prevented rioters from damaging 
properties in the Railton Road area; unlike 
1981, when this area was a deliberate target 
for property destruction by local residents.
A number o f other environmental improvements 
were also initiated, Le. removal o f walkways in 
the Stockwell Park estate and other crime 
prevention inittaties, but none were as 
effective or co-ordinated. It appeared that 
high levels o f liaison and co-operation were 
essential for the maximum benefit to be 
obtained from environmental improvements.
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7. 6. POLICE MANAGEMENT (D)
The elements in this section o f  the Geographical Policing System 
outlined in this section are intended to be practical and valid 
performance measures o f everyday operational policing. In 
particular, these measures proved to be the most difficult to create 
and validate.
The lists o f measures for Box D, in Chapter 3 were not available at 
the time o f evaluation in 1986. In fact, the tests were formulated 
as a product o f that evaluation. At the present time the measures 
are still under development and are slowly being introduced into 
everyday use as operational performance measures.
Therefore, for the purposes o f  this report, exact figures, percentages 
and ratios were not collated in many cases. Only qualitative, and in 
some cases subjective, measures were available. However, even at 
this level o f  evaluation, significant changes were apparent. These 
were mainly due to dramatic improvements over previous achieve­
ments. In the following evaluations for Box D only major changes 
or failures will be included as evidence.
7. 6.1. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
7. 6.1.1. Response Management
Brixton retained its position as generating one 
o f the highest levels o f  public 'calls for 
service1 per head o f the population, when 
compared to the rest o f Britain. In addition, 
there was some evidence o f additional demand 
increases being stimulated by improved and 
increased police services. Unfortunately, due 
to internal police reluctance and a lack o f  
effective systems, grading or differing o f  less 
urgent demands was almost totally absent.
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Far greater success was achieved in matching 
the resource deployment profile to the demand 
profile. It was not unusual to find that
between 80% and 90% o f street resources were 
correctly deployed in time and location. 
This success helped the police response to 
urgent calls and approximately 85% o f these 
demands resulted in a police o fficer  attending 
within 90 seconds. However, in reflection o f 
the turbulent environment and the potential for 
violence, an average o f three officers would 
always attend the first urgent response, in fact 
additional officers were deployed to all 
demands in approximately 78% o f all public 
'calls for service'.
Due to increased co-operation and interaction 
between uniform patrol officers specialists such 
as Traffic officers and C.I.D. personnel, 
civilian and uniform, up to 38% o f all demands 
resulted in the deployment o f these specialist 
officers in response to uniform requests. This 
compares with pre 1983 figures as low as 12%.
The number o f post-incident visits fluctuated 
depending on geographical location. In high 
demand areas with Sector Teams providing the 
policing service, two or three post visits were 
the average. Outside these areas post incident 
visits remained unusual.
Despite improvements in internal police admin­
istration procedures, each incident demand was
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still averaging 2i hours to complete. On in­
vestigation it was found that this was due to 
increased victim care by police officers and in 
cases where persons had been arrested, increas­
ed interrogation and investigation for additional 
offences.
It also became clear that despite the failure to 
reduce time for each incident, more demands 
were being dealt with by the same, or often a 
reduced number o f officers. This was found to 
be due to almost every patrol o fficer working 
to their capacity o f  approximately three signi­
ficant incidents per tour o f duty. In many 
cases officers were working overtime to 
increase this to four or five incidents per 
continuous tour o f duty. In e ffec t  the work­
load had become equally distributed amongst 
the available officers with few er examples o f 
excessive or insufficient individual workloads.
Officers on relief, still dealing with response 
demands, continued a heavy bias towards these 
types o f demands (90%). But, all sector 
officers and permanent beat officers had 
developed a 60% reactive, 40% proactive 
balance o f  incident demand type.
Prior to 1983, referals to Victim Support or 
other service agencies initiated by police, were 
less than 5%. However, by 1986 this had risen 
to 16% o f all public calls for  service. A large
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percentage o f the increase was due to im­
proved administration and co-ordination
between the Crime Desk and the local Victim 
Support Group.
Unfortunately these types o f successes were 
not reflected in the levels o f police procedure 
and recording errors. Sample checks on
various records and incidents revealed un­
acceptably high error rates and it was clear 
that supervision at sergeant level and self 
checking by each individual were deficient and 
inadequate.
During 1985, strict financial restraints had 
been imposed on Brixton Police Station in 
common with all Metropolitan Police Stations. 
In particular this requried overtime to be 
planned and maintained within budget. Due to 
the high levels o f autonomy and control over 
their resources achieved by the Inspectors, they 
were able to reduce unplanned overtime to less 
than 10% o f all incurred overtime.
Remembering the uncertain and hostile 
environment o f Brixton, even in 1986, this 
was a considerable achievement. Unfortunately 
this overtime reduction was Imposed at a time 
o f significant reduction in street manpower at 
Brixton. This reduction had been caused by 
the failure to replace Constables transferring 
from Brixton in the normal wastage procedures.
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Once again, the links between street manpower 
and crime became clear. A number of street 
crimes began to rise in correlation with 
decreases in street manpower. The only way 
in which the Senior Managers at Brixton Police 
Station could counteract these increases was by 
authorising additional overtime, thereby in­
creasing the levels o f street manpower. This 
additional overtime was recognised as being in 
definance o f central instructions and many re­
quests were made, together with the evidence, 
for understanding and action in these cir­
cumstances. Unfortunately in an atmosphere 
reminiscent o f pre-1982, data and facts were 
ignored in preference for perception and 
opinion.
The previously described 'see-saw' e ffec t o f 
adequate policing followed by inadequacy now 
became the norm at Brixton in 1986 as 
authority for additional overtime resources was 
obtained or refused depending on the levels of 
public concern at the time. However, there 
was once again clear supporting evidence for 
the e ffec ts  o f patrolling officers on levels o f 
street demands.
By 1986, it had been established by a number 
o f research projects that there was a
correlation between levels o f se lf certificated  
sickness and morale in police officers. At 
Brixton it was found that there had been a 
reduction in the overall levels o f such sickness.
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However, amongst relief officers the levels had 
not decreased and even risen slightly. The 
decreases were amongst the Sector Officers, 
who by now formed a significant percentage o f 
the total patrol strength. It would appear 
some evidence for a decrease in sickness levels 
for officers with a geographical responsibility 
compared to officers with a time based 
responsibility.
7. 6.1.2. Demand Reduction:
The major demand reduction strategies were 
specialist crime squads, traffic operations and 
Sector Teams in the HIGH DEMAND areas. 
All of these strategies were considered 
successful and illustrated the powerful effects  
o f careful planning, concentrated directed
police activity and sufficient resources to 
obtain an objective.
Sector Teams were one o f the most successful 
strategies, in the areas that they operated, 
demand reductions o f up to 55% were recorded 
within the first three months. Initially
resources were directed at reducing crime 
demands but this inevitably increased local 
conflict and faced police to concentrate the 
majority o f Sector resources on conflict 
reduction. There was no significant success at 
reducing the proportion o f service demands in 
these areas. In fact, it was found that service 
demands began to increase as people gained 
confidence in their local police officers.
-  335 -
Although these service demands began to in­
crease it was found that essential information 
about local crime and conflict, began to be 
provided as a result o f these new service 
demands. This information now enabled police 
to reduce crime and conflict demands even 
further, but most importantly provided data for 
effective prevention strategies to be imple­
mented. This type o f interaction helps to 
illustrate the complexity o f dealing with public 
'calls for service' and the knock on e ffec t o f 
changes in police strategy.
The e ffects  o f specialist crime and traffic  
squads were less complex. Without doubt they 
caused significant decreases in demands for 
their particular objective, sometimes up to 
80%. However, once they had finished or
moved on, the e ffec t  was not permanent nor 
were there as significant additional benefits in 
other areas unlike the multiple objective Sector 
Teams.
It was considered that where any particular 
demand had increased above certain levels then 
specialist reduction strategies were the most 
cost effective solution. But in LOW DEMAND 
areas, or where the levels o f a particular 
demand were moderate, then intensive demand 
reduction strategies were less effective and 
certainly not cost effective. Longer term 
prevention strategies were considered more 
appropriate in these circumstances.
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7. 6.1.3. Demand Stabilisation
Initially, when the theories and concepts o f a 
Geographical Policing System were being creat­
ed, it was thought that demands on police 
would be significantly reduced by police 
strategies. The Reactive Spiral predicted that 
police resources invested in preventive 
strategies and tactics would eventually reduce 
public calls for service and then stabilise at a 
publically acceptable level. Increases in 
demand on police each year would be very 
small, easily capable o f being dealt with by an 
increase o f  public participation and volunteers 
to help police.
This was not in fact what happened at Brixton 
in the period 1983 - 86. First, there was an 
increase in general demands for service in the 
geographical areas where prevention strategies 
were implemented. This demand increased as 
follows:-
1984 1985 1986
9% 10% 25%
As can be seen, this was contrary to the 
predictions o f the Reactive Spiral. Even more 
disturbing were the increases in demand for 
police services and resources in the specific  
prevention strategies. As has been previously 
noted, prior to 1982 police investment in these 
types o f areas was negligible, possibly less than 
a f% o f any police station.
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After 1982, the increase was forced by public 
demand up to 10 - 11% o f total resources, and 
still the demands continued to increase. This 
increase in demand was in addition to the 
previous increase in general demands for 
service.
An analysis o f the situation showed that police 
had in fact, fallen into the trap o f Just 
providing another service which demanded in­
sufficient return from the public who wished to 
participate. Police were attempting to 
maintain and manage large crime and conflict 
prevention strategies which were not supported 
by a reciprocal manpower and resource 
commitment from the general public or public 
agencies. It was also apparent that the public 
involved in these schemes were not self 
motivated to maximise the e ffects  or benefits 
o f such strategies. In e ffec t many o f the 
schemes were ineffectual with an outward 
facade o f meetings, signs and paperwork but 
produced few  tangible results.
This general finding was highlighted by what 
police considered were the few  successful 
strategies in the specific HIGH DEMAND 
areas. Here the public were encouraged and 
motivated to become self-reliant, using police 
only as a support service. These schemes were 
qualitatively different and almost without 
exception evolved into Residents and Tenants 
Associations. Once they had reached this level 
o f development the requirements for police 
resource reduced considerably.
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There is little doubt that Demand Stabilisation, 
as originally conceived did not work. What 
appeared to happen was that the nature o f the 
demands initially increased then changed into a 
different type o f demand, from response to 
preventive support. Perhaps in the future this 
increase and qualitative change can be
anticipated and linked to a more effective  
strategy o f increasing public self help and 
responsibility in their own preventive
strategies. Then perhaps Demand reduction 
and stabilisation will become a possibility.
7. 6.2. CRIME MANAGEMENT
In the early stages o f the Neighbourhood Policing project, 
the CID officers at Brixton found it difficult to come to 
terms with the concept o f Crime Management. They 
accepted the traditional view o f their work that they were 
skilled investigators o f crime that had already occurred. 
Virtually all CID officers, regardless o f rank, considered 
themselves as investigators. The higher the rank, the more 
important the cases investigated. Management o f Police 
crime resources, planning and implementation o f police 
crime strategies etc., were not seen as central to any CID 
managers function.
Eventually the Detective Chief Inspectors role was 
nominated as being the 'Crime Manager' and changes began 
to take place.
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7. 6.2.1. Crime Response:
The initial response to virtually all crime 
demands was a uniformed patrol officer, 
consequently in all but the most minor cases, 
an officer would be on scene within twenty 
minutes.
Obviously, serious or urgent crimes were dealt 
with as emergencies, obtaining a response with­
in approximately 90 seconds in the control or 
HIGH DEMAND areas. Due to the lack o f 
graded uniform response procedures, very few  
crime responses were graded or deferred.
By 1986, the quality o f the initial investigation 
had improved considerably. Uniformed officers 
were achieving good levels o f investigation, 
providing sufficient care and support for the 
victims o f crime, and exercising good judge­
ment about calling in specialist officers or 
forensic investigation at an early stage. 
Unfortunately their levels o f recording these 
actions were well below what was required.
Once the initial crime response and investi­
gation had been completed it was reported 
back to a central 'Crime Desk' inside the 
police station. This desk was a project 
initiative originally developed at the Netting 
Hill project site and rapidly adopted by Brixton 
in September 1984. The purpose o f the Crime 
Desk was to examine the allegation o f crime, 
the evidence obtained by the investigation so 
far and then make a decision as to whether 
any further investigation was warranted.
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A decision on the 'solvability' of any crime 
was assisted by a matrix system which awarded 
points if certain types o f evidence, such as a 
description o f a suspect, were available.
Allegations o f crime which scored above a 
certain number were then screened in and 
allocated to a public o fficer for further 
investigation. In addition certain types of
crimes, or those considered o f a serious nature 
also had a priority which allocated additional 
points. Approximately 27% o f all crimes were 
screened in fo r  further investigation.
One of the major concerns o f this Desk was
the support given to victims o f crime and
every victim was sent a letter with standard 
details o f the police action, information on 
victim support services and with appropriate 
crime prevention advice. In addition, police 
made direct referral to the local Victim 
Support in approximately 18% o f crimes when 
they were particularly concerned about the 
victim involved.
Although this concern regarding victims was 
working well in the areas described above, it 
was being a ffected  by the priority crimes 
classifications. Originally, these had reflected  
the Home Office national classification system 
which tended to discriminate in favour o f 
property crime. This counter bias tended to 
neutralise the other areas o f excellent victim
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support work undertaken by the Desk. As a 
result a new Victim Orientated priority crime 
system was introduced. This gave a higher 
priority to crimes against people as opposed to 
crimes against property.
Attempts were also made to improve CID 
involvement in interrogation o f suspects already 
in detention, investigation o f their involvement 
in other offences and the recovery o f stolen 
property.
Due to the high individual workload o f each 
CID officer  these attempts mostly failed. 
Officers were continually removed from such 
work in order to deal with serious major 
crimes, leaving such work to less experienced 
uniform officers.
6.2.2. Crime Reduction
It was important for police to understand their 
limitations in the areas o f  crime reduction. A 
large proportion o f crimes are committed out 
o f sight o f police and certainly cannot be 
detected by a patrolling street Police Officer. 
Because Neighbourhood Policing was mainly 
concerned with local policing it had to 
concentrate on those crimes which could be 
a ffected  by local officers, the majority o f 
whom patrol the streets. Therefore priorities 
were given to 'Street Crimes'.
-  342 -
Remembering the importance o f organised
crime in the ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL 
one o f the highest priorities had to be given to 
street crimes linked to organised crime and 
also which caused injury to high fear to
people. The most obvious crime in this
category was the sale and possession o f illegal 
drugs. However, as drug crime is initially 
victimless and little if any allegations are 
made by the public regarding drug crimes, 
police success can only be gauged by the
numbers o f types o f arrests they make. Local 
police officers are unlikely to seize large 
quantities o f drugs due to the distribution 
network utilised by drug dealers. This ensures 
that only the minimum quantity o f drugs 
required for sale are available on the streets 
to avoid expensive drug seizures by patrolling 
officers.
The arrests for drug offences were as follows:-
1983 1984 1985 1986
504 169 255 364
Prior to 1984 the emphasis on drug arrests was 
by stop and search, with the majority o f  
arrests being for small qualities o f drugs 
carried for personal use. In 1984 this policy 
was changed, and the priority became drug 
dealers. As a result over 85% o f arrests were 
for possession o f drugs with intent to supply 
others. Initially, police had to develop new
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methods and techniques to obtain arrests and 
convictions. This change accounts for the 
initial low number o f arrest in 1984 compared 
to the 1983 figures. However, by 1986 street 
drug dealers were an endangered species and 
the huge financial rewards for this particular 
type o f drug market had been significantly 
reduced in the Brixton area.
The next important area o f street crime for 
Brixton was considered to be street robbery. 
This crime was committed by groups of 
criminals against people and generated high 
public fear. The major emphasis in this
category was to reduce the number o f
robberies committed and the figures per year 
were as follows:-
1983 1984 1985 1986
1399 2073 1855 2365
38% 48% 38% 28%
reduction increase reduction increase
It is proposed that these increases and
decreases are not fust random fluctuations of 
the figures, but are related to changes and 
deficiencies in the number o f officers
patrolling the streets and exactly what they 
were doing.
In 1983, as has already been explained, 
significant numbers o f extra officers were 
provided to Brixton and began to patrol the
-  344 -
streets. Despite the fact that their patrols 
were undirected, their presence was sufficient 
to deter street robbery. In 1984 officers were 
being lost through natural wastage and not 
being replaced. Additionally, Brixton was being 
required to provide considerable assistance to 
other police stations and forces particularly 
during the miners strike. By 1985, this aid 
had been stopped and despite the reduced 
number o f officers, by use o f the Directed 
Patrolling strategy described earlier (the 1985 
anti-crime operation), police were once again 
able to make a significant impact on robbery 
offences. In 1986, Brixton was unable to 
maintain this stragey due to totally inadequate 
manpower and drastic overtime restrictions. 
The station was once again reduced to sporadic 
special operations without the maintenance o f 
a continual Directed Patrolling policing. 
Evidence in support o f the sea-saw e ffec t is 
provided by these figures.
It is also important to note that the 1985 
reduction was contrary to a general 
Metropolitan Police increase or 11% that year. 
Ironically, this smaller than usual force 
increase was directly a result o f the Brixton 
reduction.
Another important street crime is residential 
burglary particularly those committed by small 
groups. There is no doubt that the public 
continue to find such crime fearful and expect
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police to regard them as a priority. The 
figures for burglary are as follows:-
1983 1984 1985 1986
3353 4209 3274 3622
2% 25% 22% 11%
increase increase reduction increase.
Once again the figures are related to police 
activity. A minor increase in 1983 is followed 
by a significant increase in 1984. This is 
followed by the 1985 reduction in the face o f 
a full geographical policing strategy. By 1986 
only the public self help Neighbourhood 
Watches remained consistent to the 1985 police 
strategies. Their limitations have already been 
discussed, but perhaps they helped to moderate 
the percentage increase that year.
The number o f police specially employed in 
crime reduction remained almost identical to 
the levels in 1983, less than V 5th o f the total 
constable strength. In particular the Robbery 
Squad developed successful targetting 
operations but were only able to be effective  
when supported by Sector Officers and linked 
directed patrols.
In general the CID remained totally overloaded. 
Added to their difficulty in coming to terms 
with efficient crime management systems, their 
individual caseload and responsibilities were 
excessive. This can be illustrated by the fact
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that at one time in 1985 there were over 70 
outstanding arrest warrants with nobody in the 
CID able to execute them. Annual estimates 
o f  CID workloads calculated that some officers  
were supposed to be dealing with in excess o f 
400 investigations per year. The recommended 
minimum per o fficer  is 100 per year.
7. 6.2.3. Crime Prevention:
As has been previously intimated, Crime 
Prevention was a growth endeavour at Brixton 
with an almost insatiable public demand. 
Even with the careful planning and restricted 
policy o f Neighbourhood Watch, police were 
still finding it difficult to cope. The 
observations in the section on Demand 
Prevention are particularly appropriate to this 
area o f Crime Management and do not require 
expansion.
One area which has not yet been considered 
for Prevention strategies is the involvement o f 
youth in crimes. It was estimated in Brixton 
that approximately 75% o f all crime and up to 
90% o f robbery and burglary were committed 
by young people under the age o f 21. This 
finding is not peculiar to Brixton as similar 
estimates have been made for a number o f  
other areas all over Britain.
Unfortunately, this is one area that police have 
very limited positive e ffec ts  whereby they can
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influence youth to engage in more social 
behaviour. Police experience would indicate 
that by the time such individuals and groups 
come to their notice for crime, a significant 
proportion refuse to change their behaviour and 
continue into a criminal 'career'.
In Lambeth, the use o f a multi agency 
approach to this problem was ineffectual. 
Local Authority policing obstructed an 
effective partnership with police and local 
schools were even more obstructive to police 
involvement. Unfortunately this attitude 
rebounded directly on both bodies. The major 
problem o f the local authority was juvenile 
crime and damage, with local schools facing 
increasing crime and violence inside their 
premises.
Realistically, police are a minor element in 
these type o f crime prevention measures and 
can only try to persuade more influential 
groups and bodies o f their responsibilities in 
these areas. For example, there was no 
evidence that police had any influence as pro­
social models on local juveniles they were 
regularly in contact with. Perhaps the only 
effective influence they had was in reducing 
their opportunity to commit crime due to 
improved police intelligence on their behaviour 
and criminal activities.
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7. 6.3. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Although 'peacekeeping' has always been a primary function 
o f police, only at Brixton in 1985 did the concepts o f 
conflict research and its management begin to be applied to 
operational police work. Perhaps due to the intense and 
continuous nature o f conflict in Brixton new, improved 
methods o f  policing had to be developed. The remainder o f 
this particular section give an overview o f these 
developments, which are gradually being adopted and 
implemented throughout the Metropolitan Police and in 
other police forces.
First, these developments recognise the importance o f 
geographical location. Some locations are supportive o f 
disorder, due to their easy access and escape, or
opportunity for anonymity. Many even have a culture and 
history o f disorder. In all instances police must control the 
location before the conflict or disorder occurs.
In order to deal with this requirement, the strategy o f 
Defenders and Enforcers was developed. The Defenders are 
local officers who know the area well and as their title 
implies, defend the area tenaciously against disorder. 
Officers employed in this capacity are trained and equipped 
to deal with minor to major disorder including full riots. 
Ideally they should never leave their area, always occupying 
and controlling the public streets and spaces. At Brixton 
these officers were mainly Sector Officers.
Enforcers are mobile, riot equipped officers who act as 
support and reinforcement for Defenders as required. They 
move quickly from location to location dispersing large 
crowds so that they can be controlled by Defenders. All
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the officers involved use the Contact Strategy as a guide to 
their behaviour and tactics. The Contact Strategy was 
found particularly effective in the majority o f conflict 
situations.
Secondly, the importance o f  various stages in conflict and 
disorder was recognised. Once an area was no longer 
considered normal and increasing levels o f disorder were
imminent, then immediately different types o f policing i.e. 
LOW INTENSITY, HIGH INTENSITY, PRE RIOT and RIOT,
could be utilised. Once a riot had been quelled then POST
RIOT back to LOW INTENSITY and normality could be 
implemented. Lined to the contact strategy this was just a 
conflict version o f directed patrolling. Each specific stage 
o f this sequence in time required recognition and the 
implementation o f the appropriate police strategy. 
Obviously, unsuspected spontaneous disorder had to be dealt 
with immediately and effectively  but was unlikely to
escalate into full and widespread rioting without developing 
through the stages described. However, e ffective Disorder 
Management in response to spontaneous disorder was still a 
major police priority.
Another important development in Conflict Management, 
was the realisation that a large proportion o f what had 
been previously considered 'Service Demands' were in fact 
aspects o f  conflict. Culturally, police downgraded service 
demands as being 'not real police work', crime was 
considered the most important and desirable task. This was 
despite the fact that service demands could total as much 
as 85% o f total police demands.
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When these types o f demands were closely examined, it was 
found that over 60% were in fact related to Conflict 
Reduction and Prevention. Domestic and neighbourhood dis­
putes, insulting and desorderly behaviour, particularly by 
children and juveniles all featured strongly in service 
demands.
Once the importance o f these demands, as being the early 
stages o f a descent into criminality, were understood, police 
began to view them more positively. With this
understanding came performance measures and then higher 
levels o f  effectiveness.
7. 6.3.1. Disorder management
By 1986, Police in Brixton had developed con­
siderable expertise in the area o f Disorder 
Management. They had adopted Force policy 
o f 'early intervention' as a basic foundation for  
their strategy. Particularly in the HIGH
DEMAND and symbolic areas, police would 
usually respond within 90 seconds, as for other 
emergencies. But within 4 to 5 minutes, 15 to 
20 local officers could be available at the 
location and the average length o f such 
incidents was 14 minutes.
Local police officers, particularly the Sector 
Teams, had become very skilled in public 
disorder situations. They knew the local 
people usually involved and could isolate them 
from outside agitators intent on causing 
disorder. I f the participants could not be
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persuaded to desist very quickly (contact 
strategy) they would Immediately intervene and 
arrest the offenders. Any attempts to release 
the prisoners or continue the disturbances 
would meet a similar police response.
The major strength o f these officers was that 
they were known and knew the majority o f  
people likely to be involved. Over a period o f  
time the Sector Teams had built up 'contacts' 
with individuals and groups regarding the 
tolerable levels o f street behaviour and were 
able to cite these agreements when breached 
by disorder. Outside agitators were often  
surprised to find a lack o f local support for  
their disorder, an element which had been 
essential for escalating disorder. In addition, 
it was local policy to ensure the arrest o f  all 
participants, at a later more convenient time if 
they could not be detained immediately. One 
o f the major strengths o f these tactics was 
that they had been developed by the Sector 
Teams themselves and were strongly supported 
by senior managers at Brixton.
When major disorder erupted in September 1985 
these tactics were quickly expanded to evolve 
into the Defender and Enforcer tactics 
previously described. In this particular disorder 
the officers devised fast moving, vehicle 
supported riot tactics, as opposed to the 
defensive almost static tactics, used by the 
majority o f the force at that time.
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A good indication o f  Brixton's effectiveness at 
Disorder Management was the progress and 
outcome o f the riot in September 1985. The 
riot began on Saturday 28th September at 
approximately 4.30 p.m. For the rest o f that 
day the riot was dealt with according to 
existing public order strategies and tactics, 
with large numbers o f police officers from 
other areas assisting Brixton.
During the lull on the morning o f Sunday 29th 
September a conference was called o f all 
Sector Inspectors and Sector Teams. As a 
result the Defenders and Enforcers concept was 
created. By 12 noon o f that day only Brixton 
officers were on the streets. Sector Inspectors 
took full operational control o f their Sectors 
with Defender teams. Once this control had 
been established non Brixton Police Officers 
were introduced as required but worked under 
Sector control. Mobile Enforcer teams, guided 
by a local officer, were deployed as required.
By Sunday evening, the expected prolonged 
sequence o f violent disorder had been 
neutralised by the effectiveness o f the new 
tactics. By Tuesday o f that week all
external assistance was withdrawn and no 
further disorder occurred.
It was clear from analysis a fter the riot that 
the new tactics had stopped the riot sequence 
and prevented further riot. These successes
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were in contrast to previous riots in Brixton 
where sporadic rioting had continued for days. 
In addition, Brixton quickly ceased to be a 
manpower drain on other police stations by not 
requiring prolonged assistance. This is in 
contrast to Tottenham's riot for example, 
where up to 80 extra officers per day were 
still being required six months later. Some o f 
the extra officers required were in fact from 
Brixton on a number o f occasions.
In 1986 it was noticeable that up to a third 
less officers were being injured by the public 
in street disorder and 60% more prisoners were 
being arrested as the result o f public disorder.
7. 6.3.2. Conflict Reduction:
This aspect o f conflict was mainZy the
responsibility o f uniform patrol officers, 
particularly Sector Officers. They anticipated 
the locations and times that conflict or 
disorder was likely to occur and by their very 
presence and known effectiveness, reduced such 
incidents. In addition, Sector officers  
targetted known troublemakers ensuring that 
they were arrested for any offences  
committed.
It was found that once the initial high levels 
o f crime in a HIGH DEMAND area had been 
reduced, there still remained almost endemic 
conflict behaviour, particularly from juveniles.
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In some areas this conflict increased, perhaps 
as a result o f police restricting the opportunity 
for  criminal acts. Firm action by police over 
an extended period reduced overt conflict and 
incidents o f disorder in the HIGH DEMAND 
area by 85% or over, indicating the potential 
for police success in these circumstances.
One indication o f police success in conflict 
reduction was the increase o f public street use 
in the vicinity o f existing symbolic locations. 
Officers involved in these types o f conflict 
reduction initiatives, conducted short sample 
surveys o f  public street use as a performance 
indicator o f operational success.
It was found that between six and eight weeks 
after an initiative began the nature o f street 
use would change. There would be a reduction 
in the number o f Juveniles frequenting the 
location and an increase in adults o f various 
ages. This increased broadening o f  public use, 
further reduced the number o f 'resident' 
Juveniles. Another important indicator o f  
public confidence was the increase in cars 
parked in the area to the extent that for the 
first time in years, police officers in these 
areas had to involve themselves in traffic  
regulation and restrictions.
Police success was to the extent that even the 
organised criminal drug gangs found it difficult
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to recruit people to cause disorder in those 
areas and were increasingly having to confront 
police themselves, often with the support o f 
illegal firearms.
On a number o f occasions it was clear that for  
various reasons, tension in a particular area 
would begin to rise and there was a strong 
possibility o f  escalation towards a riot. As a 
result Brixton police developed different police 
strategies linked to discrete sequences in 
time as previously described.
The strategy was considered so successful that 
together with Defenders and Enforcers, was 
adopted as the basis for public disorder 
strategies and contingency plans for all police 
stations in the Police AREA to which Brixton 
belonged. These strategies were published in 
some depth in the national Police Magazine 
(JUDGE 1985). This article also provides some 
insight into street level Conflict Management 
and Directed Patrolling (APPENDIX ONE).
As police increased their skills in conflict 
reduction, they began to establish major links 
between juveniles and alcohol as being major 
elements in conflict escalation. Juveniles 
often began to cause increasing problems in a 
particular area, starting with minor 
hooliganism, graffiti and vandalism escalating 
to serious public disorder and crimes such as
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robbery and burglary. If this pattern o f 
behaviour was linked with alcohol abuse the 
problems increased significantly. In addition 
alcohol abuse by other, apparently respectable 
individuals and groups often led to similar 
violent disorder and assaults.
In the short term, police began similar conflict 
reduction strategies where these types o f 
problems were regularly taking place, 
however, it was recognised that such initiatives 
could only be maintained for short periods 
outside the HIGH DEMAND areas and better 
preventive measures were required.
6.3.3. Conflict Prevention
Initially it was unclear to the public at Brixton 
as to exactly how conflict could be prevented. 
Attempts had been made and failed, to develop 
a voluntary conflict mediation service. 
However, the Local Consultative Group were 
acting as community interveners in the most 
serious cases, but there was still no consistent 
operational conflict prevention strategy.
The first conflict prevention strategy developed 
by police was in the area o f  alcohol abuse. 
Initially the major locations for this type o f 
disorder were located and the source o f  supply 
identified. These usually fell into three
categories.
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(i) Pubs and Clubs
(ii) Off Licence Premises
(iii) Illegal drinking establishments.
The full time police licensing o fficer  then 
began to liaise with Sector officers in order to 
deal with abuses by all these sources. In the 
case o f illegal drinking establishments, they 
often catered for groups who were unwilling to 
use existing licenced premises. As a result a 
small number were encouraged by police to 
obtain licences' and operate within the law. 
Others were closed by police action.
With regard to the legal licenced premises they 
were involved in schemes to prevent alcohol 
sales to juveniles. The majority o f licence 
holders and the companies they worked for 
were very supportive in these strategies.
The next prevention initiative was in regard to 
juveniles. An example o f  this strategy can be 
provided by a description o f police action on 
the Moorlands Estate. This council estate was 
notorious locally for juvenile problems, but the 
local residents had already shown considerable 
initiative and self help by organising a club for  
local youths. Two local Permanent Beat 
Officers became involved with this club and 
assisted the organisers with various activities. 
For the period that they were involved there 
was a significant reduction in the incidence o f 
conflict and disorder on that estate.
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It was the intention o f this project to expose 
juveniles to influences other than negative and 
anti social peer groups. Although there was a 
measure o f success with this and a number o f 
other similar projects, there was no conclusive 
evidence that police officers in isolation acted  
as pro-social role models for exposed juveniles. 
However there was anecdotal evidence from 
juveniles that perceived instances o f incorrect 
or excessive behaviour by police officers, 
legitimised in the youths view, their own anti­
social behaviour. Perhaps this is another 
reason for police to act as though they were 
effective role models. These findings are 
supported by other evidence that exclusive 
youth cultures, devolved o f adult influence, 
increase antisocial behaviour.
It may be that conflict prevention strategies 
directed at these two particular areas may be 
effective and worthwhile for police 
development. Particularly in the case o f 
juveniles, conflict types o f behaviour may be a 
precursor to criminal behaviour in many 
instances. If this is so, it may be more 
effective for police to seek to influence this 
type o f  street behaviour, rather than the 
ineffective juvenile crime prevention strategies 
already discussed.
Officers involved in these types o f prevention 
strategies were confident that levels o f tension
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and public alienation from police and each 
other were significantly reduced. Indeed at 
the Sector Working Party meetings this 
viewpoint was supported by residents in these 
particular areas. However the e ffec ts  were 
very localised and by 1986 still not extensive 
enough to have a significant e ffec t on 
residents in Brixton as a whole.
A final area o f Conflict Prevention in which 
the police at Brixton became proficient was 
the planning o f major or important police or 
public events such as raids, music festivals etc. 
Every event was carefully evaluated for its 
disorder potential and plans made accordingly. 
Police made it quite clear to all interested 
parties that should disorder occur it would be 
dealt with firmly and effectively. On a 
number o f operations in 1985 and 1986 this 
resolve was demonstrated. In addition police 
made very effort to inform the community o f 
its actions and reasons for police tactics. This 
was supported by links with local consultative 
group members and late in 1986, even by local 
elected  representatives.
7. 7. GOALS (E)
It should be remembered that the Goals o f  the Geographical System 
were 'ideal' end states, unlikely to be achieved or contributed to for  
a considerable time. Initially predictions were made that within the 
first four to five years only changes within the police system 
would be achieved.
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Unexpectedly, there were some indications that police could 
influence Quality o f Life measures far more quickly than 
anticipated. There were a number o f significant changes recorded 
which correlated with policing changes.
7. 7.1. QUALITY OF LIFE
7. 7.1.1. Crime
By 1986 the ratio o f  crime per head o f the 
population was the highest in Britain with an 
average o f 19,842 per 100,000 o f the 
population in the whole o f Lambeth. The 
National average was 8469 per 100,000 o f the 
population. By way o f example, more than 1 
in 10 o f all street robberies committed in the 
Metropolitan Police District occurred in Brixton 
which accounted for more than 10% of the 
total robberies recorded by the Metropolitan 
Police. Brixton suffered more than twice the 
number o f  robberies than any o f  the other 74 
Metropolitan Divisions. The only year this 
depressing trend had been interrupted was in 
1985 when the reduction in street robberies in 
Brixton had actually improved the total 
Metropolitan Police figures in this categories.
However, as previously described, for the 
fifteen  month period from December 1984 to 
April 1986, there were significant decreases in 
crime particularly street crime. This decrease 
correlated with the effective implementation o f  
Geographic Street policing and Directed 
Patrolling.
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7. 7.1.2. Conflict
Conflict and tension remained at high levels in 
Brixton throughout the period from 1983 to 
1986. In 1985 a major riot took place, as 
previously described. During 1986 almost 
double the number o f serious public order 
incidents occurred than on any other
Metropolitan Division. One o f the reasons that 
extended riots did not develop was almost 
directly due to the expertise o f local officers 
and the superior tactics they had developed.
In many ways Brixton became a focal point for 
conflict and debate in many areas. Activists 
and organisations which had nothing whatsoever 
to do with Brixton would use the Central 
Market area as a focal point for
demonstrations and protests. It was apparent 
that Brixton was destined to remain a focal 
point for conflict and disturbance. However, it 
appeared that because o f police skill in 
handling this conflict it was becoming accepted  
as normal and caused less stress to both police 
and public.
7. 7.1.3. Fear o f Crime
Surprisingly, despite the increase in crime, 
which a public attitude survey in 1986 showed 
that the public were aware of, there was a 
slight drop (5%) in the publics fear  o f crime, 
when compared to a similar survey in 1984. It 
would have been predicted that an increase in 
crime would have increased public fear o f 
crime over this period o f  time and, therefore,
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a stabilisation o f the public's fear o f crime 
must be a significant positive result. This is 
particularly important when viewed against the 
large increase in the rate o f crime.
T. 7.1.4. Community
Another success in the publics Quality o f Life 
were the strong indications o f an increase in 
the sense o f community.
A 22% increase in people who claimed to 
know all/most o f their neighbours to talk 
to (significant at the 1% Level).
An 8% increase in people who had 
provided VICTIM HELPING to neighbours 
(significant at the 5% level)
A 7% decrease in the belief that people 
'keep themselves to themselves' in the 
Area (significant at the 5% level).
These findings indicated a significant increase 
in members o f the public in Brixton having 
been involved in VICTIM HELPING within the 
previous 12 months. There was no evidence 
from other Police Stations o f similar increases 
in pro-social behaviour.
7. 7.1.5. Public Satisfaction
There was also a significant increase in the 
public's satisfaction with the police service 
provided to victims, with over 50% o f those
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victims interviewed being satisfied or very 
satisfied with police VICTIM HELPING. 
(BRIXTON REPORT 1986). The majority also 
considered that their case had been 
investigated thoroughly and competently.
7. 7.1.6. Desire to Move
Despite the increased crime and continuing 
high levels o f general conflict, there was a 
slight increase from the pre-test situation in 
the publics satisfaction with the area and no 
change in the desire to move to another area.
7. 7.1.7. Public Behaviour
With regard to the public’s behaviour on the 
streets, it was difficult to quantify any general 
changes in Brixton. However, as has been 
previously mentioned, in the specific HIGH 
DEMAND areas, particularly during the high 
risk periods, a considerable increase in general 
public use o f the streets had been noted.
Finally, perhaps a fitting comment and 
observation on one particular HIGH DEMAND 
area and symbolic location, RAILTON ROAD, 
was made in a recent newspaper investigation 
on 'BRITAIN'S TOUGHEST STREETS', 
(SUNDAY TELEGRAPH 1988). This article 
proposed that from the public's point o f view 
RAILTON ROAD was the only location 
examined which had lost its symbolic nature 
and been normalised as planned by the 
Directed Patrolling Strategy.
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However, the credit for this achievement, 
unaware o f the huge effort and police 
resources invested in this success, is given to 
the local residents who have 'unwittingly 
succeeded where the Metropolitan Police had 
failed, and have made the Brixton end o f 
Railton Road a safe place in which to walk at 
night'. However, some o f the local residents 
were more aware o f the joint police and public 
investments and its effects , and said, "Money 
has been poured into the district ever since, 
the small criminal and prostitution area has 
been pulled down, and we've got a lovely set 
o f bobbies on the beat".
7. 7.2. POUCE PUBLIC CONTRACT
7. 7.2.1 Public Involvement
By 1986 there was a massive increase in public 
involvement in policing. There were over 61 
Neighbourhood Watch Schemes involving 7,000 
active participants. This contrasts with the 
complete absence o f such public activity prior 
to 1983.
7. 7.2.2. Multi-Agency Involvement
In addition there had been a slight increase in 
professional agency, including the Local 
Authority involvement in policing services. 
Approximately fi% o f such individuals had 
significant contact and involvement in policing 
services. (BRIXTON REPORT 1986). Of 
course, political ideology and preventive 
restrictions were mainly responsible for this 
low figure.
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7. 7.3. DEMAND STABILISATION
7. 7.3.1. Demand Increase
With the decrease o f manpower resources and 
the increase in public reactive calls for  
service, demands began to outstrip resources:-
1983 1984 1985 1986
Constable manpower 263 239 220 217
Response demands
per week (average) 464 506 557 694
% increase in
demands 6% 9% 10% 25%
Demands for police preventive services 
escalated in 1984 and were a major area o f 
investment in 1985, to support the enhanced 
geographical policing. In 1986, when
geographical policing declined, the public 
continued to demand more o f a desired police 
service, without the required reduction in 
response demands.
1983 1984 1985 1986
% increase in
preventive service 7% 20% 60% 86%
7. 7.3.2. Ratios
The ratios o f Response demands to Preventive 
demands were estimated as follows:-
1983 1 984 1 985 1 986
Response
Preventive
98% 91% 88% 84%
4% 9% 11% 16%
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7. 7.3.3. Stabilisation
It was considered that Demand had not 
stabilised, a reduced number o f officers were 
faced with ever expanding demands for both 
reactive 'calls for service' and servicing o f 
preventive policing strategies. Added to the 
removal o f the geographical bias in 1986 and 
perhaps a lack o f public initiative in self 
policing all demands spiralled as predicted by 
the Reactive Spiral.
7. 8. PUBLIC PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR (F)
The major concern o f this element is the level o f 'bystander inter­
vention' or willingness to help neighbours in aspects o f crime and 
conflict. This aspect o f the evaluation was very difficult to
measure. However, police officers considered that there was a 
significant improvement (5% LEVEL) in the public's willingness to 
assist police. Members o f the public were more likely to assist
police at the scene o f  a problem, telephone police in serious cases 
and act as witnesses at court. In one particular incident (Appendix 
One) the public intervened in a violent riot to protect their own 
area and community.
There was also an improvement in levels o f  co-operation and support 
between neighbours where over 1 in 2 (57%) looked a fter each 
others house or flat whilst vacant. This improvement reflects the 
increase in community spirit which has been previously reported. 
The proportion o f  the public claiming they would like to spend more 
time in voluntary work had more than doubled from the pre-test 
(16% to 38%) as an indication o f changes in public attitudes in this
area.
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7. 9. LOCUS OF CONTROL (G)
There were considerable changes in the public's attitudes and beliefs 
which contribute towards a belief that they can influence their own 
environment. In particular, there were changes (5% LEVEL) in the 
proportion o f those who claimed:
Police should get the help o f the local public in preventing 
crime.
People in the area could do more to prevent crime on their 
own.
Neighbourhood Watch Schemes are a good idea.
They would be willing to get involved in such schemes.
In many ways this result was unexpected, particularly as it was an 
element o f the system over which police had minimal influence.
7. 10. SATISFACTION WITH POUCE (H)
7. 10.1 Contact with Police
In contrast to the pre-test survey, a higher proportion o f 
the public approached officers in the street. Ninety 
percent o f these street encounters were to the public 
satisfaction. A lower proportion o f the public were calling 
at the police station.
Community Groups considered that police worked more 
closely with them in the post-test and had also noticed 
increases in the friendliness o f police. They also thought 
that policing had improved significantly over the past 12 
months noticing more police foot patrols than before.
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It was found that proactive contacts with police had 
increased in a number o f categories.
More claimed they were given a talk or meeting 
with police in the past six months (13% increasing 
to 26%).
More claimed they had attended a joint police - 
community meeting (22% increasing to 33%).
More claimed they would take part in joint police - 
community group initiative (12% increase).
A much higher proportion o f Community Groups (73%) knew 
who their Permanent Beat Officer was and considered that 
police were now working much more closely with them than 
before; but, as predicted by the Reaction Spiral, still 
considered they required more contact and service.
7. 10.2 Police Service
With regard to the police service in matters o f  conflict one 
o f the most significant indicators was in the number o f 
letters o f appreciation that were sent by local residents to 
the police a fter a number o f public order incidents in 
various HIGH DEMAND areas in 1986. This type o f 
positive response was very unusual and the first time such a 
volume o f public comment had been made.
7. 10.3 Victim Helping
A majority o f  victims o f  crime were impressed by the way 
both uniform and plain clothes officers dealt with their 
case. They were also satisfied with the way police dealt 
with their case. (N.P. PROJECT 1986). This finding 
contrasts with information in 1983 from the Victim Support 
Scheme, who considered that nearly three quarters o f 
victims were less than happy with police action. (BRIXTON 
REPORT 1983).
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7. 11. AGENCY: PROFESSIONAL HELPING (T)
There can be no doubt o f the dedication and determination o f the 
Local Authority to help their local residents. Many o f their 
policies, strategies and schemes were focused on this priority. But, 
the majority o f these plans deliberately excluded police which is 
directly the opposite o f the requirements within the Geographical 
Policing System.
The major example o f where this policy was ignored and a partner­
ship with the police was forged are the outstanding achievements o f  
the Railton Road area. Perhaps when viewed against the failure o f 
other independent schemes, such a partnership can be viewed as 
successful.
7. 12. PUBLIC: VOLUNTARY HELPING (J)
In contrast, police/public partnerships with voluntary agencies in 
many other areas were very successful. It appeared that those
volunteering for such work were satisfied with police liaison 
and viewed it as effective. An important finding was that the 
individuals involved were willing to work for significantly longer 
periods o f time in their voluntary capacity. In addition there was a 
22% increase in people who stated that they would like to be 
involved in COMMUNITY HELPING (significant at the 1% level).
However, a surprising result in the post-test public attitude survey 
was an 8% drop in those who were involved in the work o f  
community groups as were pre-trial. But as stated, those who were, 
worked more frequently.
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7. 13. SUMMARY
Once again the processes o f the Extended Reactive Spiral (Fig. 7. 4) 
will be reviewed in order to summarise the Brixton evaluation in 
this Chapter.
The evidence in the analysis clearly showed significant changes in 
police organisational structures, systems and practices. There was 
now a distinct bias towards an open system, responsive to environ­
mental feedback. This was in contrast to the previous closed, fixed 
response structure. Although police were still reactive in the short 
term, they were also responsive in the medium and long term to 
changes in policy, strategy and day to day operational procedures.
One o f the best examples o f these changes was the information 
system. Clear changes in police behaviour and attitudes had 
occurred during the new policing systems operation. The system 
also recognised the public as customers o f the police service and 
made great effort to include them. Planning and tactics were 
becoming increasingly dependent on the information system as a 
basis for decision making. Unfortunately these successes highlighted 
a serious resource and skills deficiency within this sub-system.
Resource management was found to be both an accepted managerial 
policy and a practical everyday operational tool. Perhaps this 
change was the major success within the police system at Brixton. 
Effective and efficient use o f existing resources was such, that 
significant improvements in police service were possible, despite 
reductions in resources. Directed Patrolling was a major feature in 
this effectiveness.
IHE EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL
Fig. 7 .4
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Most importantly, the quality o f the police human resources, 
significantly, improved. The difference in behaviour between 'time 
base' and 'geographical' officers became a decisive measure o f  
improved quality. Without doubt, geographical officers provided the 
best value and quality o f work.
However, there were considerable problems with heightened conflict 
between sector and relief officers. There were also increases in 
functional and structural specialisation, which was contrary to the 
original concepts and strategies. Although considerable planning and 
design had been invested in the application o f the geographical 
system to operational policing, there were numerous structural and 
system defects in the system devised.
Surprisingly, despite the large increases in crime and conflict during 
the three year evaluation period, public satisfaction with police at 
the macro level, had remained constant. In addition, there were 
several indications that identifiable groups within the community had 
actually increased their satisfaction with police. The findings at 
this micro level were as yet not large enough to be reflected  in the 
general trend.
It had been recognised at the outset that significant improvements 
in such an ambitious concept as the public's 'Quality o f Life' would 
be very difficult, both to e ffe c t  and measure. Nevertheless there 
were trends towards a number o f  improvements, some o f them signi­
ficant. In particular, crime prevention awareness was high, increases 
in contact/helping neighbours and willingness to volunteer were very 
important trends.
Continuing these improvements, measures o f the Locus o f Control 
produced significant development. It was clear that particularly in
-  373 -
attitude and belief, the public were changing towards being 'inner 
directed'. No longer were they willing to accept the environmental 
effects  on their lives as unchangeable. Particularly in the area o f 
crime prevention, the public accepted their own role in self-help.
The police themselves had invested considerable proportions o f their 
resources in Preventive Services. But it would appear that despite 
improvements in public self-help, they were insufficient and this 
service was itself feeding the core Reactive Spiral.
Increased contact with police, expanding public expectations, despite 
significant reductions in crime at one period, continued to increase 
'calls for service' or demands on police. In addition to increased 
reactive derriands, increased preventive demands were added to the 
publics needs. A major failing o f the preventive strategy was not 
to obtain sufficient reciprocal self-help input from the public 
receiving the service. In future this requirement will have to be 
obtained as a major priority.
Despite the large increase in demands police were now able to 
maximise the efficient use o f their resources with a Geographical 
Policing system. It would also appear to be possible to calculate 
and plan the precise manpower requirement needed for each LEVEL 
of policing. Perhaps this will help to destroy the myth that police 
have no e ffec t  on the publics Quality o f Life. The available 
evidence in this study suggests that police effectively  assist to 
influence the social environment in a number o f limited but 
important areas.
-  3 7 4  -
CHAPTER EIGHT
8. DISCUSSION
8. 1. THE PROBLEM SITUATION
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that there are at least three broad 
areas o f problems faced  by todays police.
The first is the external environment, outside the police service, but 
an area in which police are expected to provide certain services and 
exert a level o f  control or influence. An analysis o f this problem in 
that Chapter, describes the importance o f the Reactive Spiral and 
created the concept o f a linked Environmental Spiral. Both Spirals 
were linked by a process described as Environmental Potential which 
increased or decreased the speed o f decay in the Reactive Spiral.
The second area o f problems was described as the Macro, total 
police organisation. This particularly included the highest level o f  
planning, control and 'support' services provided by the Headquarters 
Departments, senior officers and Force Policy.
The third was the Micro, actual police station and its operational 
street officers who are the genuine 'front line' o f the total police 
service.
Both o f  these problems areas were developed into the concept o f  a 
Police Spiral, whose rate o f decay could be significantly influenced 
by the Environmental Potential and more directly by the Reactive 
Spiral.
In the previous Chapter it was proposed that as a direct result o f  
the Neighbourhood policing experiment at Brixton between 1983 and 
1986, a number o f changes took place. The majority o f these 
changes were to the Police Organisation within the Police Spiral.
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Outside the police station and more specifically within the processes 
o f the Environmental and Reactive Spirals, it was suggested that a 
number o f  changes and improvements within these systems correlated 
with policing changes designed to a ffec t them.
Beginning with the Police Spiral, discussion and comments will now 
be developed regarding the linked Spirals. It is also considered 
important to follow this with details o f  other published attempts to 
evaluate aspects o f  the Neighbourhood Policing Project which would 
dispute some o f the proposals made.
8. 1.1. THE POLICE SPIRAL
The first major cluster in the total system is the physical structure 
and organisation o f the police system. This framework creates a 
physical environment particularly for police officers just as buildings 
and roads do for the public. The evidence from the project suggests 
a very strong influence on operational street officers who are 
exposed to geographical responsibility, both on their behaviour and 
their attitudes.
Alternatively, a time based environment also has a major e ffec t  on 
officers. It should be possible to utilise this finding as a method o f 
shaping police behaviour. Geographical behaviour is multi objective 
and contains higher quantities o f  pro-active activities. Time based 
behaviour is narrower, often with single objectives and almost always 
reactive.
It would also appear that the two behaviours are inevitably in 
conflict with each other. Split level policing systems, including both 
behaviours, have inevitably decayed into the more powerful time 
based, reactive behaviour. Remembering, however, that time based 
actions tend to increase the Environmental Potential and Reactive 
Spiral, the Brixton system was deliberately biased heavily in favour 
o f  geographic behaviour.
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Although the system had many successful aspects, high levels o f 
internal conflict were created between the remaining numbers o f 
time based officers and the vastly expanded geographical teams. 
This conflict became so dysfunctional, that plans for a total 
geographical system were evolved 'bottom up' by the majority o f  
operational officers.
Total geographical policing is a unique system devised by the Surrey 
Constabulary at Camberley where reliefs were completely removed.
The Surrey geographical model is simple and yet radical to the 
existing cultural norms o f  street, time based policing concepts. It 
was developed as a result o f experience in the Surrey and 
Metropolitan experimental sites. The unique aspect o f  the model is 
that it removes the operational conflict o f time based and 
geographical behaviour by making all street officers geographical.
Existing response time based shifts or reliefs are developed into 
Area or Sector Teams, which have total twenty four hour policing 
responsibility for ALL the policing needs o f  a geographical area.
Officers no longer work as a rotating eight hour, time based relief, 
but are spread through the twenty four hour period. An innovation
o f the system is the creation o f  a Headquarters Sector. These
officers work under an Inspector and have time based responsibility 
for  all the central services at the police station.
Initially the model was unique to Camberley in Surrey. Early 
evidence and evaluation indicated minimum conflict between
operational and headquarters officers. In addition, due to a careful,
planned and participative implementation, the resistance o f street 
operational officers was significantly reduced. In June 1988 the
Chief Constable o f  Surrey announced that the experiment had been 
evaluated internally and accepted as Force policy for all police 
stations in Surrey.
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To date, no Metropolitan police stations have converted to this 
model However, given the evidence o f  success from both Brixton 
and Surrey, it would appear that the adoption o f  the Surrey 
geographical system and the successful aspects o f  the Brixton system 
could produce a vastly superior model o f  3rd LEVEL policing. It is 
interesting to note that in 1988, both Brixton Police Station and the 
Lambeth Consultative Group produced independent public reports 
indicating their preference for an adoption o f  this style o f  policing. 
The police failure to implement was based solely on their inadequate 
manpower levels.
With the adoption o f a geographical policing system, there is a 
requirement for substantial organisational changes to the existing 
bureaucratic methods and policing structure. Planning, decision 
making and organisational links or networks, have to be invested in 
street level operational Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors. Of 
course this type o f  organic system inevitably produces conflict with 
existing bureaucratic structures and methods but, if police stations 
are ever to become the true foundation and most important part o f 
any police system, this type o f  change is suggested to be essential.
There was clear evidence from the Brixton Project that if  the 
majority o f  strategic and day to day operational decisions were 
made by geographical street officers, a far higher quality o f policing 
service was provided. One e ffe c t  o f  this type o f  organic system is 
the requirement for effective and skilled management and consider­
able investment has to be made into suitable management training 
and development.
The remaining significant element o f  the policing system is the 
change from a closed, short term reactive structure to an open, pro­
active system. It was suggested in the first chapter o f this project 
that such a change was essential and the post test evaluation 
supported the benefits o f  an open police system. At Brixtori, this 
openness was considered a major element in the total 3rd LEVEL 
system.
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At the systems level, the speed o f reaction to events, general 
ability to deal with the unexpected and plan for the expected, was 
greatly enhanced. Psychologically, both police and the public had 
more confidence and trust in the new open police policing system.
Unfortunately and in contrast to this success, the Information 
Network in the police system had numerous defects. The lack o f 
police skill and knowledge in this area became a major problem. 
After years o f surviving in a virtual information vacuum the 
transition to an effective information and knowledge based system 
was very difficult.
Years o f neglect and failure to invest in technical and human skill 
training could not be overcome within the short life o f the project. 
However, the awareness o f the need for these types o f resources 
and facilities was quickly highlighted. By 1988 both the 
Metropolitan Police and the Surrey Constabulary had invested 
substantial amounts in information research, development and 
equipment.
Some questions still remain however regarding the design o f the 
most appropriate information systems. In a traditional bureaucracy 
such as the police, it is always very tempting to replicate this 
structure with large, centralised information systems. In fact, this 
trend has already begun with Command and Control operation 
systems, centralised crime reporting system etc. But evidence from 
the project suggested that decentralised, organic, networking system 
would be more appropriate to public needs. Fortunately, the Neigh­
bourhood Policing Project introduced the concept o f  police station 
computer systems (HART 1983), resulting in their introduction to all 
police stations in the Metropolitan Police.
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As a result o f this implementation, decentralised small local 
computer networks and large centralised computer system co-exist at 
the present time in the Metropolitan Police. Both systems have 
their supporters and it would appear that a synthesis o f the best 
aspects o f both systems could well result.
In many respects, the separate police structure and its supporting 
information system, interact and blend into almost a physical 
structure which then becomes a system for delivering services and 
'getting things done'. Exactly what is done and how the service is 
delivered now becomes a separate element, cluster or node, which 
has been called Resource Management.
Prior to this project in 1981, strategies and tactics were very much 
at the individual level, with no central recognised body o f  data and 
evidence as to the best and most effective police practices. Part 
o f  the project was the collection and testing o f  such existing 
knowledge, its integration into compatible techniques and the 
creation o f  new knowledge.
Initially, these activities were combined under a general heading o f  
Resource Management. Unfortunately, this concept was extremely 
difficult for many police officers to accept. They strongly resisted 
data and analysis in favour o f perception and opinion. Gradually and 
in response to increasing Home Office and Local Authority pressure, 
police o fficers began to accept and implement this concept. Within 
the Neighbourhood Policing Project, resource management had by 
now increased in scope and included two important sub-categories,
Crime Management was slightly novel, in that for the first time it 
linked together all the various police and public responses to crime 
in a unified and planned system. Within this framework it was now
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possible to analyse the existing problem situation with some 
accuracy and then plan appropriate interventions and strategies. 
Police activities connected with crime have a high status within 
police culture and consequently this type o f resource management 
was quickly accepted.
In time, police managers from Sergeant upward¿, also began to 
accept the wider issues o f  equipment and manpower planning are 
deployment. They understood that the overview provided by the 
Resource Management framework reinforced their responsibilities in 
these matters and began to utilise its guidelines.
However, there still remains a majority o f  police activity (up to 
85%) which was not specifically addressed by either framework. 
This police work was traditionally categorised as 'service' demands 
and had a very low status in police officers opinions. Analysis o f  
this type o f activity revealed that over 65% o f such public demands 
could be classified as peace-keeping, where individuals or groups 
were in conflict with each other. In a blinding glimpse o f the 
obvious, it was realised that if  this traditional peace-keeping 
element was re-identified as a police priority and properly planned, 
a significant proportion o f  everyday police service could be 
enhanced.
As a result o f  this research and by utilising the latest research into 
conflict, public order, negotiation and mediation, the Conflict 
Management framework was created. This collation had a number 
o f advantages:-
1. It enabled a previously low grade activity to be 
reintroduced as a proper activity for police officers.
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2. It increased the range o f  high status police activity to over 
80% o f the total police demands and services.
3. It illustrated the urgent requirement for the growing 
concept o f  Conflict Prevention and facilitated its 
development.
4. It gathered together a data base o f  theory, strategies, 
tactics and practice within a logical planned framework.
5. It was also found that conflict prevention with Juveniles, 
before they progressed into crime, could be effective in 
diverting them away from such activities. In e ffec t, this 
type o f  prevention began to link into Crime Prevention.
Resource Management, with its two sub-categories o f  Crime and 
Conflict, has now provided an opportunity for considerable research 
and development at the actual police station. It provides an action 
research framework which can be utilised by operational street 
officers and their managers in everyday police work.
8. 1.2. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SPIRAL
Describing police behaviour, whether by public or professional police, 
as pro-social or helping behaviour was a radical concept in this re­
search. But it is argued that it is essential as a concept and allows 
a paradigm change for the whole o f  policing theory and methods.
Once it was considered that helping and preventing victim« was not 
fust a police activity, but also an obligation on every citizen, 
policing became a community activity and responsibility. This 
allowed the formation o f  a Police/Public Contract and as noted by 
the Police Foundation (1987) this contracting, when used by police 
officers as an everyday operational tool with individuals and groups, 
was very successful
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In addition, a clear definition o f professional policing behaviour and 
its various categories o f  victim helping, preventing and community 
helping enabled resource deployment to be planned and evaluated. 
Individual police officers behaviour could also be prescribed and 
developed away from unnecessary enforcement behaviour. However, 
it also enabled the development o f  the First Contract strategy which 
ensured that police action was appropriate and always utilising a 
superior behavioural strategy, able to impose enforcement when 
required.
It was also found that by using these concepts within the police 
system that beneficial changes could be made. Once changes were 
made to crime priorities and victims classified as more important 
than property, increases were obtained in public satisfaction and 
quality o f  police service. The imposition o f  a geographical police 
system also reinforced and rewarded the adoption o f  the pro-social 
behaviour paradigm by individual police officers.
Changes and improvements o f  this nature could not have been 
introduced and co-ordinated without the adoption o f policing as pro­
social behaviour. The paradigm also allows appropriate changes o f  
public behaviour to be explained, justified and encouraged. Often, 
appeals to the public to help their police are too wide, non specific 
or even beyond their capabilities. In the pro-social paradigm the 
required behaviours are specific, explicit and easily within the ability 
o f  almost every member o f  the public.
Public satisfaction with the police is often  a moving target, with 
public expectations matching or overtaking improvements in policing. 
This is particularly true when public expectations are out o f  touch 
or not kept informed o f  police realities. Without doubt, the open 
3rd LEVEL policing system and in particular its geographical 
structure, counterbalance and restrain excessive public expectations. 
Public satisfaction with policing then includes satisfaction with their 
own input into the local policing services.
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The ultimate measure o f  public satisfaction and a most important 
performance measure o f  any police system is considered to be its 
successful input and enhancement o f  the publics Quality o f Life.
It was strongly argued in Chapter Two, that the traditional crime 
performance measures used to Judge policing were totally inappropri­
ate. In many ways, adherence to these types o f measures could 
actually decrease the overall quality o f  police service to the public. 
For these reasons, in this project the ultimate goal and performance 
measure was considered the publics Quality o f Life.
In a number o f  ways this was yet another paradigm change. By 
thinking differently  about the end result and designing a police 
system to achieve the appropriate performance measure, a superior 
policing system could be created. Remembering that the design o f 
the 3rd LEVEL policing system and its various performance measures 
in this project, is still very experimental. Future research in these 
areas, particularly the police support for the publics Quality o f Life, 
should improve considerably on these early attempts.
A major output o f the public's Quality o f  Life, back into the En­
vironmental Spiral, is its influence on the Publics Locus o f Control. 
In essence this means that the public are influenced to increase 
their own levels o f  self-help and take more control o f  their own 
lives. The project suggested that there are two major ways in 
which the police can directly support this process.
The first way is by police resources being invested in Community 
Helping activities. Obviously, this support has to be carefully 
planned and evaluated but this project gives a number o f  examples 
o f  where police support for Community organisations and initiatives 
were successful In many ways the major impact o f  such initatives 
as Neighbourhood Watch is mainly an increase in Community Helping 
behaviour. Nevertheless, such longer term achievements may be 
more important than the stated short term objectives with regard to 
Crime Management.
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A second police success was the Directed Patrolling strategy o f  
'Contracting'. It was independently noted by the Police Foundation 
that Contracting as a method o f  obtaining public participation and 
self-help  was found to be significant (IRVING 1986). Hopefully, this 
finding can now be utilised in an improved future design o f Directed 
Patrolling strategies.
Increases in the publics control o f  their immediate environment and 
community may now feed  back into levels o f pro-social behaviour, 
particularly bystander intervention. There was some evidence o f this 
type o f  increase in Brixton but only within the safety o f  assisting 
police. Spontaneous, independent public bystander intervention will 
probably be more difficult to influence.
The sum total o f  the Environmental Spiral is a decrease in crime 
and conflict in the surrounding environment, which now influences 
the inner Reactive Spiral.
8 1.3. THE REACTIVE SPIRAL
Within the original core Reactive Spiral the rate o f increase o f 
crime and conflict would appear to be the most dependent variable 
in the spiraling sequence.
It is interesting to note the change o f  emphasis in crime and 
priorities away from property into victims. These changes have
important implications for police both in their priorities and 
strategies o f  Crime Management. In addition, increasing legislation 
and the new criminal offences it created, are a potential Increase in 
levels o f crime. All o f  these factors are beginning to combine and 
place totally unrealistic demands on limited police resources.
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Inceasingly, conflict demands are becoming a new priority. Conflict 
now has a much higher profile, perhaps because o f  changes in public 
expectations and tolerance. This means that the potential for  
increased reactive demands on police has at least doubled if public 
expectations o f police continue as they have in the recent past.
Both the police and the public must understand the strictly limited 
resources and effectiveness o f police reactive services. This 
response is a very limited public service, provided to help people 
temporarily incapacitated, not able bodied adults; too lazy, careless 
or irresponsible to look a fter themselves. Nor is it available for 
those evading their responsibilities as citizens and neighbours.
Increasing public violence against the police officers who are 
attempting to provide this service illustrates another aspect o f 
public irresponsibility which cannot be allowed to continue. If the 
psychological fear o f detection and punishment or cultural norms are 
unable to influence these increasing trends, then technology must be 
developed as a cost effective deterrent. Research into non-lethal 
force for police officers may provide the means for individual 
officers to subdue large numbers o f  offenders. As alien as this may 
appear to British policing, this development is almost inevitable if 
the present violent trends continue.
In addition, technology could assist response services by independent­
ly recording the scene when police arrive. Lengthy and expensive 
disputes as to what officers saw and heard could be significantly 
reduced. Unfortunately, the development o f  this type o f  police 
technology and professionalism is very slow and spasmodic.
Outside the police, competition to provide services in the private 
sector ensures that services are efficient and cost effective. How­
ever the police have no competitors to ensure that high standards
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are maintained and developed. There are no alternatives to the 
police and there are no formal mechanisms at street level to allow 
the customer to make effective choices regarding the type and
quality o f  service they require.
One method o f  exposing these services to market forces and o f  in­
creasing their value in the publics perception, is to allow licenced 
private companies to provide similar services. Another solution is to 
redesign existing police services within a geographical system,
exposed to the market forces o f  consumer panels in the form o f  
Sector Working Parties.
Regardless o f  the option which is eventually adopted, there will have 
to be radical changes in policies and practices regarding police re­
sources. As with all other employers, the available pool o f recruit-
able manpower is rapidly shrinking and the competition for this pool
will inevitably increase.
There are a number o f options, all o f which will perhaps have to be 
adopted to some degree. First, police will have to invest heavily in 
new technology. To the extent that the abilities o f  each individual 
are more than quadrupled by the supporting technology.
Second, restrictive standards will have to be re-examined. Both 
physical requirements and levels o f achievement before Joining the 
police. Human resource development will have to be adopted by the 
police in order to raise the abilities o f  new recruits and to maxi­
mise the achievements o f  every individual employed.
Third, existing police cultural restrictions on the e ffectiv e involve­
ment o f  the public will have to be dealt with. There appears to be 
two aspects to this concern. One, which is exclusive to the police 
is a version o f the professional versus the volunteer syndrome. The
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other is a joint police and public almost irrational fear  o f 
vigilanties. Often police use the emotion and illogical fear  o f the 
vigilante argument in order to enhance the less powerful case o f 
exclusive police professionalism.
An example o f  this process in the case o f  the volunteer Guardian 
Angel subway patrols in New York. Here impressionable juveniles 
under the direction o f adults join gangs, train to be effective  
fighters in order to protect the weak and endangered people on the 
subway. For the first time, the youth and gang culture has been 
exploited to provide an exciting pro-social alternative to the existing 
anti-social criminal gangs. Predictably, the New York police are 
totally opposed to this initiative.
This study leaves little doubt that police preventive services must 
receive one o f the highest priorities if  the Reactive Spiral is to be 
effected . It also concludes that the public are the only effective  
and economic resource for the majority o f this prevention. But 
most importantly the bulk o f  this prevention must be directed at 
juveniles who are responsible for the majority o f all Crime and Con­
flict demands on police. As a result o f  these logical conclusions, 
emotional or self interested police objections to initiatives such as
the Guardian Angels must be reconsidered. If police trained and 
supervised such initiatives it is very unlikely that the spector o f  
vigilante would ever become a reality.
At a more mundane level o f  juvenile crime prevention, this cannot 
be a major initiative o f  the police. It is essential that they are a 
junior partner in the types o f multi agency programmes now under 
consideration (NACRO 1985).
To reinforce the importance o f  the processes described it should be 
remembered that when the simple reactive spiral is extended to 
include other important processes within the police organisation it is 
suggested that the problem situation becomes more complex.
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An increasing reactive bias in police resource deployment and the 
ineffectiveness o f  these resources against the rising demands, a ffects  
the openness o f  the existing police system. The inability to cope 
encourages a narrowing o f  objectives and selective attention to the 
major reactive demands.
This narrowing o f  objectivity and reduction in available resources 
reduces investment and maintenance o f  police information systems, 
particularly the more subtle feedback systems regarding long term 
problems and the environmental e ffec ts  o f the reactive spiral.
Without adequate information systems, effective resource planning 
becomes almost impossible, further reducing the effectiveness o f the 
existing police resources and enhancing the decay e ffec ts  o f the re­
active spiral.
Historically, and understandably in this situation, the operational 
urgency o f  dealing with immediate demands drastically reduces the 
resources and the perception o f  need for longer term preventive 
strategies. In addition, the reduction and ineffectiveness o f resource 
planning fails to influence this bias. As resource planning reduces 
so do preventive strategies.
On the streets, if the public have been effectively  excluded by 
police, or allowed to opt out, then there are virtually no public 
restraints against crime and conflict behaviour. Isolated, the police 
may be reduced to their own group seige mentality 'the thin blue 
line'. Individual police o fficers begin to adopt the defensive over 
control o f  their emotions to deal with high stress levels often called 
'John Wayne Syndrome', others may adopt the deviant ends over 
means mentality o f the 'Blue Knight Syndrome'.
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However, it should be noted that in addition to the evaluation 
proposed by this study there were other evaluations o f this large 
policing research project. Two such evolutions will now be discussed 
in order to illustrate alternative views to the results o f  the Neigh­
bourhood Policing Project.
8. 2 POLICE FOUNDATION REPORT
The first evaluation was restricted to Nottlng Hill Division (POLICE 
FOUNDATION 1987). This report admitted that evaluation was 
difficult as the required 3rd LEVEL Policing System was not 
implemented successfully. Other than a small number o f isolated 
organisational changes, Notting Hill remained at best a 2nd LEVEL 
SQUAD Policing System.
However, the Police Foundation Report did make a number o f 
important proposals and conclusions. A major recommendation was 
that 'All notions o f  pro-social education o f the public by role 
modelling and social engineering should be abandoned.' The report 
suggested that the underlying theories o f pro-social modelling 
(Chapter 3) are largely impracticable and attempts at increasing 
public self help are based on dubious Interpretation o f the relevant 
research literature.
With regard to the police acting as role models, the Brixton 
experiment produced no evidence to counter the Police Foundation's 
opinion. But there were some qualitative data to suggest that if 
police did not behave as though they were role models fo r  pro-social 
behaviour or behaved inappropriately, this could be taken as 
justification for antisocial behaviour by significant sections o f  the 
public, particularly juveniles.
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Concerning 'social engineering', the Police Foundation's distaste for 
such objectives seems a little emotional and illogical. Almost every 
known definition o f  policing in the research literature describes 
policing as some sort o f  influence or shaping o f  public behaviour. In 
short, changing or maintaining public behaviour in certain ways, 
which can only be considered 'social engineering'.
It is also important to remember that in the described 3rd LEVEL 
Policing System, the police have to be totally open and honest about 
their motives. The formation o f a police/public contract will accept 
nothing less as a basis for the contract. In addition, the desired or 
'shaped' behaviour from the public is pro-social, to help each other 
when they are in difficulties. With these intentions and in the type 
o f open environment described, the public can make their own 
decisions to become involved, or to opt out.
The Police Foundation Report continues to suggest that 'Even if 
greatly increased resources were available the strategies - would be 
very unlikely to produce the e ffec ts  claimed for them.'
Evidence from the Brixton Project however begins to dispute this 
claim. There was evidence o f  significant changes in public 
attitudes and behaviour which correlated with changes in policing, as 
predicted by the theories under examination. A major example o f 
these changes were the increases in public VICTIM HELPING 
behaviour and willingness to be involved in COMMUNITY HELPING. 
All o f  these changes were happening at the same time that police 
were making strenuous efforts to persuade the public to increase 
these behaviours.
Another 'social engineering' concern o f  the Foundation Report was 
the control o f  minority groups by police. This did not appear to be 
a problem in the Brixton experiment. The majority o f  minority 
groups had very similar views to police and the public majority, as
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to what was acceptable or permissible and what was not. It was 
the methods used by police to enforce this consensus which caused 
the major differences. However, because the police had been forced  
to operate an open system, negotiation, discussion and contracting 
between police and public began to overcome these differences.
The remaining deviant minority, as was described in the Environment 
Profile in Chapter 4, were criminals, obtaining their living by crime. 
These values were not imposed by police but by the laws and 
statutes o f  this country. Great care has to be taken in identifying 
unscrupulous and clever individuals who manipulate popular ideologies 
for criminal gains. Virtually, every symbolic location in London has 
by now had alleged 'community leaders' accused and charged with 
such criminal behaviour.
Despite these differences, both the Foundation and this project are 
in agreement regarding the need for an open, responsive policing 
system. Many o f  the organisational proposals made in their report, 
were in fact able to be implemented at Brixton.
Additionally, both reports have recognised the urgent requirement for 
consultation and contracting skills in every-day operational policing. 
Conflict Management is jointly recognised as an important new area 
for police research and development.
Overall the Police Foundation Report was optimisttc on the future 
o f more advanced policing systems such as Neighbourhood Policing 
and concludes:
"The Neighbourhood Policing project, without reaching a 
single one o f  its main objectives may still prove to have 
altered significantly the agenda for urban policing, both in 
London and beyond."
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8. 3. TURNER REPORT
In contrast to this eventual optimism, the TURNER Report (1987) 
was almost totally negative and pessimistic. This report covered all 
o f the project sites and concluded that Neighbourhood Policing was a 
total failure:
"The evidence from the trial shows no clear advantages 
from Neighbourhood Policing and overall it cannot be said 
to be a success. Placed against estimated development and 
implementation costs for the experiment o f  over £5.5m, 
annual running costs at the sites o f £1.8m and the 
disruption caused by the process o f change, this must count 
as a failure."
This rather narrow and simplistic view has in fact omitted a number 
o f facts. Leaving aside for one moment the question o f  success, 
the element o f  expenditure has suddenly been introduced as a major 
part o f  the evaluation. What is not stated is that, over 90% o f  
changes and innovations at all Metropolitan Police Stations between 
1982 and 1986 emanated from the Neighbourhood Policing Project.
For an organistion with a yearly expenditure o f over 1 billion pounds 
to have this type o f  major research, development and
implementation system as an internal change agent for such a small 
proportion o f  the total expenditure (less than .005%), must be 
considered a major organisational success. Many organisations o f  a 
compatible size, outside the police, would be very pleased with such 
value for money.
With regard to the 'disruption caused by the process o f  change', the 
project pioneered the understanding inside the Metropolitan Police 
that change was normal and constant. It also played a major part
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in creating systems and concepts for the Management o f Change 
(TOFFLER 1970). There would also oppear to be an unfortunate 
linking by TURNER between no-change as being positive and change 
negative.
The next point made by TURNER is:-
"The evidence available gives no grounds for believing that 
this poor result is due to lack o f  time, site selection or 
incomplete implementation."
There is in fact ample evidence in TURNER'S own reports and data, 
that almost all o f  the failures at sites other than Brixton are 
directly due to failed or incomplete implementation. This o f course 
is an important finding when compared with these sites 
demonstrating successful implementation which did produce results.
This type o f  evidence creates the opportunity for a multiple level 
evaluation, starting with implementation, through to system design, 
ending with strategy and tactics evaluation. Unfortunately, these 
types o f assessments had not been attempted.
On the positive side it was considered:-
"Neighbourhood Policing has worked moderately well at 
Brixton" and "Of the Metropolitan sites, only Brixton 
offered  any signs o f  external e ffec ts  from Neighbourhood 
Policing but even they are questionable."
The report then begins to cite a number o f  other casual instances 
and events, which apparently are not considered part o f the 3rd 
LEVEL policing system l.e. The 1985 Anti-crime Operation, Crime 
Management strategies, level and effectiveness o f street manpower
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deployment and growing community involvement! It would appear
that TURNER is unaware that these 'external effects' are in fact 
planned aspects o f  a 3rd LEVEL system.
In addition, the significant reduction in street crime in 1985 is 
minutely analysed and then dismissed casually, arguing that none o f  
these factors can be conclusively proved as responsible, and 
therefore, the reduction did not really happen!
At this stage it is becoming clear that the type o f  conflict 
described in Chapter 2, regarding differing methods, concepts, views 
o f validity and reliability, is emerging.
TURNER was appointed as an independent evaluator o f the project 
in February 1985 and by June 1986 had replaced the original systems 
based approach to evaluation (ACKOFF 1974) based on psychology 
and management with one based on Econometric Modelling and 
individual element evaluation. Essentially this was a reductionist 
approach based on economic theories.
Unfortunately, this was exactly the type o f  evaluation which had 
been rejected as unsuitable prior to the beginning o f  the project. 
Therefore, the pre-test data did not include evidence for this type 
o f evaluation, particularly the financial evidence.
DAVIES (1987) had commented on this type o f  reductionist 
evaluation and its validity to complex open systems. He notes how 
traditionally scientists have tended to treat complex open systems as 
annoying aberrations, perhaps because non-linear systems are harder 
to study than linear ones. By focusing attention on simple linear 
systems science developed a strongly reductionist flavour. Scientists 
argued that they could always explain complex systems in terms o f
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their components, even though they are often interactable in 
practice. DAVIES then argues that this purely methodological 
restriction has become so ingrained that many scientists believe that 
the primary phenomena o f  nature are those relating to individual 
irreducible objects or elements alone.
It is clear that TURNER is this type o f  evaluator as demonstrated 
by his recommendations for future work:
"Descriptive packages should be assembled on methods o f  
community contact, geographical responsibility and directed 
patrol. These should be limited to a description and 
criteria for assessing their suitability for a given situation."
"Station Commanders should be encouraged to apply such 
packages only one at a time and for limited areas."
"Experiments should be limited to changing only one aspect 
at any one place and at one time."
DAVIES would argue, as was the original intention o f  the evaluation 
(HART 1984), that the network o f  the 3rd LEVEL system is holistic. 
It is the pattern o f  the system with its ability to 'self-organise' that 
is important, not the state o f  any specific node. Therefore, it is 
not possible to reduce the net-work, or a pattern o f  activity therein, 
to the activity o f  individual nodes. It is the collective behaviour o f  
the whole system that defines the end state o f  the phenomena under 
investigation.
Perhaps an example o f  this type o f  invalid reductionism is 
TURNER'S dismissal o f  the significant reduction in street crime for 
a fifteen  month period. Because it cannot be reduced to an 
individual causal element, it does not really exist! However, the
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inappropriate ness o f the evaluation still does not explain the 
apparent negative bias throughout the whole evaluation. Positive 
results at the highest levels o f significance are either ignored or 
devalued wherever possible.
Elements which are considered to have some type o f  positive e ffec t  
in TURNER'S evaluation were:
Participative Management 
Community Contact (qualified success)
Geographical Responsibility (qualified success)
Directed Patrolling (qualified success).
8. 4 EVALUATION SUMMARY
Unfortunately both o f  the evaluations described seemed to 
have failed to understand that there are at least two 
separate clusters within the police system which require 
different types o f evaluation. Essentially, a 3rd LEVEL 
Geographical System is a physical structure or system, 
supported by technology which uses strategies and tactics, 
in order to achieve objectives.
HOPE (1986) has noted that some confusion surrounds police 
orientated research and what is really needed is a system 
'for getting things done', where a framework is provided for 
police and public to work efficiently together in whatever is 
effective. Even i f  some o f  the strategies and tactics do 
not work they can then be changed within the system 
provided.
It is suggested that this type o f  evaluation is required for  
Geographical Policing, which asks the question, did the 
system improve the ability to achieve desired results? 
Therefore, initially, the total system is under evaluation, 
not various strategies and tactics such as Neighbourhood 
Watch, Environmental Crime Prevention etc. In addition, 
individual element 'failures' in the total system cannot 
cause the whole system to be rejected. Within these 
concepts a number o f  conclusions will now be made.
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8. 5. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Perhaps the major achievement o f the project at Brixton Police 
Station was to demonstrate that major changes to the police 
organisation could be successfully implemented. In addition these 
particular changes, introduced by the 3rd LEVEL Geographical 
Policing System, began to influence significant police behavioural and 
attitudional changes. These changes then began to influence the 
problem situation described in this project and summarised above.
The evidence that preventive policing systems can be implemented 
allows some proposals to be made for future police planning. The 
diagram 8. 1. illustrates a simple overview o f the major elements 
involved in this process.
Fig. 8. 1.
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Retaining the concept that the police station is the most important 
organisational structure, it is developed as two separate yet inter­
active systems. The first is the LEVEL o f  policing which has to be 
decided in conjunction with the other elements in the planning 
system. If for example a 3rd LEVEL system were decided, then the 
interacting strategy and tactics would have to be planned in accord­
ance with the ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL and the e ffec ts  o f the 
REACTIVE SPIRAL calculated.
In the project, descriptions o f the three LEVELS o f policing, 
together with their performance measures have been provided. The 
most effective o f  these LEVELS is considered to be the preventive 
and geographical 3rd LEVEL. This system has indicated some 
potential for achieving objectives in an effective manner.
A number o f  strategies and tactics for use with this system have 
been described together with some evidence o f success. However, 
many other research projects provide additional and improved 
preventive strategies (HOME OFFICE 1988).
The ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL has been described in some 
detail in this project and research into improvements continue. It 
would appear that with the advances in social survey techniques this 
concept could soon achieve a high degree o f  validity and reliability.
At the heart o f the whole system sits the relentless REACTIVE 
SPIRAL which Impartially decides on the effectiveness o f  any police 
system. This project has provided significant evidence for the 
existence o f  this spiral and perhaps some insight into its associated 
processes.
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Recently a number o f  public services particularly the Health Service 
have suffered from similar problems and processes. They have found 
their greatest difficulty to be changing and implementing new 
organisational systems and procedures. This project has shown that 
police can successfully implement more complex systems which opens 
the door for major improvements and innovations in policing the 
future.
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CHAPTER NINE
9. CONCLUSIONS
9. 1. THE OBJECTIVES
This Chapter reviews the original objectives laid down in Chapter 
One and summarises the positive e ffec ts  and changes achieved by 
the project in each objective. As previously stated it was envisaged 
that each proceeding objective would include and build on the 
evidence and knowledge provided by the previous findings, and this 
will also be considered. Conclusions are also made regarding 
possible contributions to British Policing in general, which are 
producing significant changes resulting from this thesis.
9. 1.1. THE REACTIVE SPIRAL
The existence and e ffec t  o f  the core Reactive Spiral (HART 
1981), where increasing public demands will always outpace 
police reactive resources, was clearly validated in the 
Brixton Case Study. In the Pre-Test analysis it was shown 
that even effective 1ST and 2ND LEVEL police response 
systems will not influence the decay e ffec ts  o f  the Spiral.
However, the Post-Test analysis also indicated that a 
simplistic increase in police resources dealing with pro­
active or preventive strategies will not by itself influence 
the decay effects. It was clear that demand prevention 
must include a significant proportion o f voluntary public 
resources. There are two reasons for this requirement; 
first it provides an opportunity for a real and significant 
increase in available resources and second, it has a 
regulatory e ffe c t  on excessive public expectations o f  police 
reactive and pro-active services.
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Therefore, except in areas where demands on police are 
increasing very slowly, an efficient and effective police 
service which stabilises public demand, can only be provided 
by a 3RD LEVEL, Geographical Police System.
In addition, it would appear that the greatest proportion o f 
resources invested in demand prevention and stabilisation 
will have to be voluntary public assistance. It is also 
suggested that this, public assistance should be some form 
o f 'self-policing'.
These findings are suggested to be o f  major importance to 
the planning, implementation and maintenance o f any 
policing system and its attempts to utilise a Joint police 
and public preventive strategy.
9. 1.2. THE EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL
Outside the core Spiral, two other important and linked 
spirals are suggested to have been validated in this Case 
Study. The Police Spiral and the Environmental Spiral are 
considered to increase the understanding o f links and 
interactions between major elements, or perhaps more 
accurately compounds, in each area.
Once police resources are understood to be very limited in 
their quality and their ability to directly a ffec t  change, 
then the concept o f  Police Systems or LEVELS, becomes 
important. The description o f  three LEVELS developed by 
this thesis become an important practical instrument in 
defining what actually existed in any police station requiring 
analysis. Once this had been completed, using the same 
concept, decisions and planning could then take place 
regarding prefered changes.
-  402 -
The vital importance o f  police investment in Information 
Systems was also highlighted by this Spiral, as were the 
serious police deficiencies in this area. Without doubt the 
project identified and clarified the need for total,
integrated information systems as a priority for any police 
system.
The Police Spiral also introduced the unfamiliar concept o f 
Resource Management to police stations. This particular 
area was most important in any successful attempt to 
develop the efficiency and effectiveness o f any police 
service. In addition, developments within the project which 
consolidated Crime Management and introduced Conflict 
Management were considered major advances in police 
Resource Management theories and practice. This thesis 
has continued this development into the creation and 
validation o f  performance measures, which is still continuing 
as an Important area o f research.
Police Resource Management also Included the utilisation o f  
voluntary public resources which prior to the concepts 
developed in this thesis was an extremely difficult and 
controversial proposal. However, with the paradigm change 
o f Police Behaviour being described as Pro-social or Helping 
Behaviour, the compounds o f the Environmental Spiral now 
became strongly linked into the Extended Spiral.
Pro-social Behaviour as a concept, allowed the practical and 
realistic development o f  a public input into policing. 
Victim Helping and Prevention, together with Community 
Helping became quantifiable outputs from the public's 
voluntary resources which could be channelled into demand 
prevention and stabilisation.
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Public Satisfaction has always been recognised as an 
important aspect and performance measure o f  any public 
service, particularly the police. I f police are to achieve 
the required levels o f voluntary public behaviour, their 
satisfaction is a major part o f  the Environmental Spiral. 
This project indicated some success in this area, but 
perhaps more importantly identified areas for development, 
particularly, the areas o f public involvement and information 
in everyday policing matters. These types o f links would 
appear to have the important e ffec t  o f limiting public 
expectations, hence satisfaction, to realistic levels o f 
satisfaction with police and their own achievements.
Existing police performance measures were recognised by 
this thesis as being counter productive to police 
performance. By encouraging undue emphasis on crime 
measures, it could be seen that police were forced to 
concentrate on a reactive, crime dominated police service. 
Unfortunately, as the thesis has explained, reactive police 
service and obsession with crime, where police alone can 
never be effective, are detrimental to a police service.
By developing police performance measures around the 
concept o f  a defined Quality o f  Life, significant advances in 
police performance are now possible. It was clear in this 
thesis, that even in the relatively short period o f  the Case 
Study, significant trends improving the public's Quality o f  
Life were already apparent. By adopting a more realistic 
and holistic network for the development o f  police 
performance measure, genuine and realist improvements in 
the service provided by police can now be achieved.
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Previous attempts at encouraging public involvement in 
solving their own problems are numerous. Very few, if  any, 
have been consistently successful in poorer, deprived areas 
o f the urban environment. Perhaps one o f  the reasons is 
the almost total neglect o f important psychological 
concepts, such as 'Locus o f  Control,' which would predict 
such failure if  certain conditions were not achieved by 
those desiring change.
This thesis considers that 'Locus o f Control' is possibly only 
one important example o f  the type o f problems and require­
ments which must be accounted for by any process o f 
change in difficult urban environments. Only by attempting 
to understand individual and group needs in a particular 
environment can a particular beneficial behaviour by the 
public be supported and reinforced. There was some 
evidence in this thesis that by careful planning and support, 
increases in behaviour such as Pro-social can be achieved.
The Extended Reactive Spiral has to some extent provided 
solutions, or directions for change regarding the findings o f 
the core Reactive SpiraL However, what is still required is 
the specific development o f  a police system designed to 
achieve an effective and efficient police service by utilising 
the evidence from both objectives.
9. 1.3. POLICE SYSTEM AND STRATEGY
A m apr objective o f  the thesis was to provide a design for  
a superior policing system, able to provide an effective and 
efficient police service in the most difficult urban areas. 
Chapter Five provides such a description with a detailed list 
o f elements functions and processes. This description is 
unique in that it introduces for the first time in police
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administration the concept o f  a TOTAL System based on a 
systems design. Also, the essential systemic nature o f such 
an approach, involving the public and public agencies is an 
integral part o f  the overall design.
Chapter Six recognises the difference between a system 'for 
getting things done' as provided by Chapter Five and the 
requirement for 'how things are achieved'. In Chapter Six 
strategies and tactics are described down to the level o f  
proposed behaviour sequences for optimum effectiveness. It 
is important to remember that both chapters reflect the 
action nature o f the research and were developed and 
refined by actual experiences at the test site.
At the very least a basic framework for a 3RD LEVEL 
Geographical System and its strategies has been provided. 
Every aspect o f this system has also survived a very 
practical test in a hostile urban environment.
9. 2. OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
It is suggested that a major expansion in public knowledge is now 
possible utilising the findings o f  the Brixton test site. Using a 
defined theory, system and police strategy, significant new findings 
and evidence have been obtained by this project.
One o f  the most important conclusions is: Using this system in a 
hostile environment, with high demands for police service, a 
calculated number of police officers, mainly uniformed Constables, 
can significantly effect rising public demands for reactive police 
services.
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From this finding it is now possible to develop an accurate police 
manpower formula for a specific geographical area. When this type 
o f calculation is linked to the newly developed performance 
measures, as at Brixton, policing is beginning to develop into 
quantifiable, planned service.
In the wider police environment, outside the test site in this thesis, 
changes are taking place. Due to the Systems nature o f  this project 
few if any new ideas or concepts currently under development or 
research in policing, are not included in the Geographical model o f 
policing.
Of course, the majority o f these ideas and concepts were not 
conceived or invented by this thesis. It merely recognised their 
potential and included them in a logical, and systemic method to 
exploit their maximum potential. But this co-ordination and 
maximisation is argued to be one o f  the major achievements o f  this 
thesis. Existing and future developments in policing theory and 
practice should be absorbed into improved versions o f  its System and 
Strategy. As has already been indicated, a number o f Police Forces 
have already adopted the approach resulting from this thesis.
Within the thesis itself, a number o f  new concepts and theories have 
been created and developed. It is argued that this combination o f  
theory and practical achievement has provided the opportunity for an 
important paradigm change in British Policing.
Perhaps most importantly for the central concern of this thesis, is 
evidence that the actual Police System or organisational design can 
be a major influence on police and public behaviour.
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